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PREFACE 
The arrival of the 1820 Settlers in South Africa and their 
impact on the political and social life of the Cape Colony has 
been well covered by historical research. This work is 3n attempt 
to illuminate yet another area in which their impact was felt. 
The failure of the settlement scheme under which these people were 
introduced into the colony has tended to detract from the importance 
which agriculture played in the early years of their residence in 
South Africa. The failure of the first crops may well have ended 
the attempts by many to establish themselves on the land but for 
others it was the beginning of a process of adaptation to the 
agricultural conditions of a new country. In this they were 
remarkably successful and within a decade the English farming 
community of the eastern frontier was prospering. 
The theme of this work traces the progress of these farmers 
through the initial period of crop failures, which condemned the 
settlement in the eyes of many, and through the ensuing years and 
later misfortune, the Sixth Frontier war of 1834-35. Both these 
setbacks were very significant in moulding the development of 
agriculture as practi~ed by these farmers. In the past, historians 
have tended to over-estimate the reverse suffered by these farmers 
during this frontier war. The seemingly paradoxical questions 
raised by the rapid recovery of this community after the war have 
been left largely unanswered. Some attempt is made i n the pages 
which follow to shed new light on this issue. 
In the first three chapters of this work the letters written 
by Thomas Philipps to his family in Britain form the chief source 
ii 
of information. Much of this correspondence has already found 
1 
wider publication in a 'volume edited by Arthur Keppel-Jones, 
but there are significant omissions, particularly with regard to 
Philipps' commentary on agricultural matters. Unfortunately, 
this series of letters ends in 1830, and the chief sources for 
the latter period of this work are the various entries made) on 
agricultural matters, in the Graham's Town Journal,2 together with 
3 the farm diary of James Collett, another frontier farmer. From 
these, and various other works, it has been possible to trace the 
major developments of this farming community. 
1 Keppel-Jones, A. (ed.), Philipps. 1820 Settler (Pieter-
maritzburg, Shuter & Shooter, 1960). 
2First published in December, 1832. 
3unpublished Document No. SM593 in 1820 Settlers' Museum, 
Grahamstown. 
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CHAPTER I 
The history of White South Africa down to 1870 developed around 
the interaction of various groups in what was largely an agricultural 
economy. Farming and the land are the underlying themes of ~ost of 
this history. ' It was only with the discovery of diamonds in 1867 , 
that the first step was taken towards broadening the economy of the 
various states away from their agricultural base. 
This study is an attempt to consider this agricultural develop-
ment on the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony during the period 1820 
to 1845. The reason for the choice of this area and time period lies 
in the fact that by the early decades of the nineteenth century the 
agriculture of this colony had largely established itself in a set 
form. This form was to be altered after the arrival of the British 
Settlers in 1820, who were placed upon this frontier as an ag'ricultural 
community. Amongst this group were farmers who had experienced the 
innovations of the British Agricultural Revolution, and who were now 
in a position to impart this knowledge in the country of their 
adoption. The outcome of this infusion of new ideas which now acted 
upon the time-tried traditional methods of the older Dutch speaking 
sector of the community, was the rapid advancement of South African 
agriculture. 
The eighteenth century had seen the diversification of agri-
culture at the cape into two distinct channels. In the older, more 
establis hed , part of the colony, which was also in closer proximity 
to the only major market at Cape Town, cultivation of various crops, 
of which wheat and wi.ne were the chief ones, could be successfully 
carried on . Beyond a radius of approximately 70 miles from this 
market in Cape Town, it was no longer a profitable propoSition to 
\ 
2 
pursue cultivation. The reasons for this lay in a combination of two 
factors ; the limited nature of the cape Town marke t, and the poor 
communication links withi n the colony.l I n the interior farmi ng 
orientated towards pastoralism. There was a ready market for meat 
in Cape Town and the animals could carry themselves to markat over 
country where no roads existed. 2 Pastoralism also catered for a 
certai n mobility which was essential in the interior where drought 
could require the movement of herds and flocks to fresh pasture s. 
Under the administration of the Dutch East India Company (1652-
1795) two main forms of land tenure had developed. Initially most of 
the land had been granted to farmers on a freehold basis, or for t he 
payment of a quitrent. The Company no longer granted freehold farms 
beyond the districts in the immediate vicinity of Cape Town, which 
was the area into which the colony was expanding early in t he eight -
eenth century. Instead farmers could take out a loan tenure , where 
farms could be held on loan from the government, ini tially for s i x 
months, but later for a year at a time. Once granted, the Company 
administration seldom revoked such a grant although it was legally 
entitled to do so. A uniform rent, irrespective of the ground's 
fertility, was fixed at 12 Rixdollars in 1714, but raised to 24 Rix~f19 
dollars in 1832 . 3 This loan farm (leenings plaatsen) system was a 
compromise by the local Company administration to keep t he farmer s , 
who now moved freely about the interior , under the jurisdi ction of 
that administration. It could now gain revenue from them without 
INeumark, S.D., The South African Frontier 1652- 1836 , Ch . 4 . 
2Ibid . 
3DUlY, L.C., British Land Policy at the cape 1795-1844, p .15 . 
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imposing any form of direct control. 
Throughout the eighteenth century, there was a steady progression 
eastwards of these white pastoral farmers. In part, this was simply 
a movement of restless spirits who had no desire to settle permanently 
in anyone spot, but for the greater part it was engendered by an 
expanding population, in which those who now formed the younger genera-
tions sought farm land of their own. Their progress was largely un-
impeded by the various placaats issued by Cape Governors in order to 
determine frontiers and restrict their movement. l Neither had it been 
seriously restricted by the Khoisan tribes with which they had made 
contact. In the north the San had provided a greater obstacle to this 
expansion than had the Khoi or San in the east, but even these northern 
San had been eliminated as an obstacle by 1810. 2 The relative ease 
with which a loan farm could be obtained also facilitated this move-
ment, as it was a comparatively simple task to claim a farm, and even 
easier to abandon it when conditions proved unfavourable. While this 
progress eastwards was steady, it was not concerted, so that choice 
locations were taken up first, resulting in a wide and thinly 
distributed settlement. 
The first major impediment to the progress of this movement lay 
in the east. Beyond the Gamtoos River this progression of white 
farmers represented an inroad on territory already occupied by small 
bands of the Xhosa tribes. These represented the spearhead of a 
migration moving in the opposite direction to the white farmers. 
In time conflict between these two groups was to become inevitable. 
lNeumark, S.D., op.cit., p. 16. 
2Marais, J.S . , Maynier and the First Boer Republic, p. 3. 
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Both were pastoralists who measured their wealth by the size of their 
herds. Increased herds would mean the requirement of more land, 
and now that they had met, more land represented that of the other 
group. Both groups were also loathe to kill their cattle for their 
own use while game abounded. The Xhosa, in common with ot her Bantu 
tribes, regarded their cattle first as a source of wealth1 and 
secondly as a source of food. It followed that while the animal 
lived it was more valuable to its owner, and was only called upon to 
render its milk as a source of food. It was only when the animal 
1 died that it was eaten. It was rather to the herds of game which 
were hunted, that the Xhosa looked for a source of protein. The 
frontier farmers could find a ready market for their cattle in Cape 
Town, or from the butchers 'knects' who travelled around the country-
side,2 so that they too looked to the natural game for their supply 
of fresh meat. Conflict was also to arise from the theft of cattle 
by both sides. As the Xhosa were more firmly attached to their land 
than either the Khoi or San, it was inevitable that this conflict 
between black and white pastoralists was to be a protracted one. 
Another source of conflict between these two groups arose 
from trading contact between them. Trading connections between the 
;. .. I~ .' .•• ,: ,' •• :.) ... ~ 
two groups were established early in the nineteenth century,3 prior ~ 
to the meeting of the pastoralists and continuous contact between 
the two groups in the l770's .4 While not all of this interaction 
lLichtenstein, H., Travels in Southern Africa, Vol. I, p.330 . 
2Ibid ., p. 285. 
3Wilson, M., Co-operation and Conflict: The Eastern cape 
Frontier, O.H.S.A ., Vol. I, pp.234-5. 
4Marais, J S °t 1 L • 0, op.c~ ., p. • 
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would seem to have been hostile, trading and hunting parties having 
been allowed to move freely into the Xhosa country at regular 
intervals, with the passage of time trading malpractice and theft 
seem to have given rise to a certain amount of resentment. The 
chief items of trade which the white traders sought were ivory and 
/' 
cattle, which they exchanged for metal goods, trinkets, beads, and 
tobacco. As Lichtenstein has indicated, the Xhosa were very 
reluctant to part I with their cattle, so that with the passage of 
time and an increasing awareness of their value to their trading 
partners, they would come to ask more for them. The white farmers 
who followed in the wake of the traders and hunters also complained 
that while the Xhosa entered the areas occupied by them ostensibly 
to trade their cattle, which these farmers welcomed, many of these 
2 Xhosa now simply settled down amongst the farmers. Nor were the 
farmers blameless. There is evidence of malpractice on the part of 
the whites as well. Marais quotes the case of a certain de Buys, 
who farmed and traded on the frontier. 3 
" ••. Two 'Kafir Captains' had told him [Maynier] how de 
Buys 'withheld' the Kafirs' wives and catt1e •••• 
He [de BUYS] used sometimes to shoot elephants in Kafir-
land, and to obtain cattle from the Kafirs in exchange 
for the best tusks. From the other tusks he made 'the 
rings worn by the Kafirs for ornament for which also 
they pay in cattle.' When he was in Kafirland de Buys 
took such cattle as he fancied out of the Xhosa kraals, 
had them driven to his farm, and when the Kafirs com-
plained, he made them lie on the ground and beat them 
almost to death." 
Men such as de Buys were bound to jeopardize relations between the 
two groups. 
ILichtenstein, H., op.cit . , Vol. I, p.330. 
2Marais, J.S., op.cit., p.14. 
3Ibid ., p.3!. 
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Another cause of dissent between the two groups lay in their 
fundamentally different concepts of the ownership of land. The Xhosa 
could not understand the principle of individual ownership of large 
tracts of land, and the exclusion of others from it. In turn the 
white farmers could not understand that while a chief could allocate 
grazing land to them, or the right to graze their cattle in cer~ain 
areas, the land remained the possession of the tribe, and that no 
chief had the right to alienate it or dLspose of it to anyone. 
This co-operation and conflict was an ever present factor in the 
development of the region for the eighteenth century and well in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Within this period nine wars 
were fought between these two groups before the whites had imposed 
1 their concepts of property and ownership on the blacks. A more 
positive feature of this interaction was that this same period had also 
seen the creation of a permanent interdependence between the two races 
in all aspects of economic life. 
Throughout the eighteenth century government officials were 
conspicuous by their absence from the eastern frontier. In 1786 the 
landdrostdy of Graaff Reinet had been established to control the 
activities of the frontier farmers and to collect the fee of twenty- f~ 
four Rixdollars payable annually for their loan farms. This officia l 
had to control the activities of the farmers in an area of approxi-
mately 50000 square miles, 2 and a frontier of over 700 miles. 
lsome of these wars, particularly the earlier ones, were no 
more than armed clashes between the two groups . The dates for these 
outbursts are: 1779, 1789, 1799-1802, 1812, 1818-19, 1834-5, 1846-7, 
1850-2, 1877. 
2 Duly, L.C ., op.cit., p.8. 
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Contact with the Xhosa in the east would seem to have initially 
hastened the eastward progression of the frontier. In 1743 the 
Great Brak River had been declared the eastern frontier of the colony. 
In 1770 it was shifted to the Gamtoos River. In 1774 the Bruyntjes 
Hoogte were declared the eastern perimeter, but as in previous 
declarations, the government moved at a slower rate than the colonists, 
with the result that in 1775 the frontier was once again shifted in 
the north-east to the Fish River, and to the Bushman's River in the 
1 
south-east. In 1780 the full extent of the Fish River was declared 
as the frontier. In many respects the government, lacking the 
administrative machinery and personnel, could not effectuate its 
claims to these territorial frontiers. It could neither keep the 
Xhosa out of its territory nor its colonists within it. In 1778 
governor Van Plettenberg attempted to legislate against further inter-
action between the two groups,2 but the co-operation and conflict of 
trade and pasture, together with the lack of administrative pressure, 
ensured the failure of the measure. 
This was the position when a military force established the 
'Star Fort' at Algoa Bay in 1799 when on an excursion into the 
interior to quell the rebellious farmers of Graaff Reinet during the 
first British occupation of the Cape (1795-1802).3 In the same year 
a more sturdy structure was constructed, which was called Fort 
Frederick, in honour of H.R.H. the Duke of York. 4 This fort 
lMarais, J . S., op .cit., pp. 2-3. 
2Ibid ., p.4. 
3Ibid ., pp.94ff. 
4Redgrave, J.J., Port Elizabeth in Bygone Days, p.ll. 
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represented the first military building established in the eastern 
Cape. Its garrison came to represent the first local outlet for 
the agricultural produce of these outlying farmers, short of cape 
Town. Here they found a ready market for their fruit, butter, and 
cattle, although the bulk of their cattle still gravitated t owards 
the Cape Town market . The brief period of Batavian Republic rule 
(1802-1806), saw the division of the district of Graaff Reinet, and 
the creation of the new drostdy of Uitenhage in the south-east, 
stretching from west of the Gamtoos River to the Fish River in the 
east, and extending inland to the Bruyntjes Hoogte. Within this 
newly created division fell both Algoa Bay and the Zuurveld, the site 
of the future settlement. 
The establishment of the fort in Algoa Bay was economically 
significant, not only in that it created a market for the produce of 
surrounding farmers, but also in that it was not to be too long before 
merchants and traders were to settle in the shelter of its presence. 
A hamlet soon sprang up in the opening decade of the nineteenth 
century. Amongst the earliest of these traders, and certainly the 
most significant of them, was Frederick Karsten, who arrived at 
Algoa Bay in 1811 as an established merchant from Cape Town. The lure 
of Algoa Bay to a wealthy merchant lay in the lucrative nature of the 
provisions contracts to supply the British troops garrisioned on the 
islands of Mauritius and St. Helena, and the passing naval convoys 
carrying troops and provisions to the east. l The closer proximity 
of Algoa Bay to the chief sources of the Colony's supply of beef 
meant that this commodity could be procured more cheaply here, than 
lChase, J.C., Old Times and Odd Corners (1), p.3. 
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in Cape Town. Besides this there was the relatively untapped 
interior trade of the frontier farmers. A base at Algoa Bay would 
also be in a position to corner most of the ivory and other raw 
produce, such as gum, from the f.r interior, which had previously 
passed on to Cape Town. Distance and difficulty of transportation 
to the Cape Town market had now become a limiting factor on production 
for this market. This was particularly true with regard to commodities 
such as soap and butter which were mainly supplied by farmers in the 
interior.1 
Algoa Bay was ideally suited to the preparation of salt beef 
for the military contracts. The only article which the area could 
not initially supply, was the kegs necessary for packaging. Cattle 
could be bought from the surrounding farmers, or bred on the large 
loan farm 'Papenkuil's Fontein' which had been granted to Korsten. 2 
Salt was available from four salt pans in the immediate vicinity; 
two on the site of the future town of Port Elizabeth, one at the 
mission station at Bethelsdorp, .nd one on the eastern heights of 
the Zwartkops River. 3 Labour could be obtained from the surrounding 
Khoi tribesmen, or from the slaves which Korsten brought with him 
4 from the Cape. 
Korsten did not limit his interests to the salt beef trade. 
He soon started a tannery as a subsidiary to this trade, a cooperage 
to overcome the high costs of importing barrels from the Cape, and a 
p.64. 
lNeumark, S.D., op.cit., pp.135ff. 
2Chase, J.C., op.cit. (1), p.3. 
3 Chase, J.C., The Cape of Good Hope and E.P. of Algoa Bay (2), 
4Chase, J.C., op.cit. (1), p.4. 
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mill which was to encourage the growing of wheat by farmers in the 
immediate vicinity. He also established seal fisheries on St. Croix 
and Bird Islands , which he leased f rom the government, and a whale 
f · h h ' t f Al lIa' 1 1S ery 'at t e p01n 0 goa y. In addition to these enter-
prises, he operated a big trading store at which farmers c ould pur-
chase most of their requirements. Branches were later opened in 
Algoa Bay, Uitenhage and Grahamstown. By the action of opening t hese 
branches, he became the first merchant to move into the interior to 
meet the needs of the farmers of the eastern frontier. 
The external trade of Algoa Bay was still largely confined to 
the visits of small coasting vessels, and the appearance of the odd 
whaler or Indiaman. Items which were to make up the more regular 
part of the exports, were butter, supplied by the surrounding farmers, 
hides and skins, the barrels of train oil and salt beef, dried fish , 
salt from the surrounding salt pans, and on a more limited scale, 
ivory and curiosities from the interior. To facilitate the transport 
of this produce by sea from Algoa Bay to Cape Town, Korsten operated 
hi . 1 2 s own coast~ng vesse s . This ensured the regularity of this trade 
and did much to encourage farmers to avail themselves and their 
produce of this quicker means of communication with the mother city. 
By 1819 the civilian population of Algoa Bay was still only 
3 
some 35 souls. There were now three other merchants operating from 
the Bay, Nicholls and Chabaud, in partnership, and Wi lliam Brooksby 
Frames , who had landed in Algoa lIay in 1815 . 4 The settlement could 
lIbid o 
2Ibid • 
3 Redgrave , J.J., op.cit . , p. 55,15. 
4Ibi d . 
11 
only boast four houses of permanent construction, besides the fort 
1 
and the 'large pile of buildings~ which made up Cradock Place . 
This then was the extent of the settlement of the future Port 
Elizabeth, which was to expand so rapidly as a pert of access to the 
Zuurveld following the establishment of the settlement there in 1820. 
By 1830 it could boast of the export of colonial goods representing 
2 £24,318 and of imports valued at £18,454. 
The establishment of the British settlement in the Zuurveld in 
1820 was politically and strategically motivated . While the Fish 
River had been declared as the frontier of the colony in 1780, no 
serious attempt was made before 1812 to clear the area west of the 
Fish, known as the Zuurveld, of the Xhosa and Khoi who occupied this 
3 
area alongside the few white farmers. The outbreak of the Fourth 
Frontier War in that year decided the governor, Sir John Cradock, that 
such a step should be undertaken. In the course of that year some 
20 000 blacks were driven across the Fish River. The necessary forti-
fications and administrative structure was established which WOUld, 
hopefully, keep the area clear of blacks, and thus accessible for peace-
ful white occupation. 4 Farms were offered on a quitrent tenure in the 
immediate locality of the military settlements of Cradock and Grahams-
town. This measure was not successful. The terms of settlement did not 
encourage the white farmers to occupy the area, while the Xhosa drifted back 
1 Chase, J.C., op.cit. (1), p.4. Korsten altered the name of 
his loan farm from Papenkuil's Fontein to 'Cradock Place' in honour 
of the governor, Sir John Cradock (1811-1814). 
2C.O.S971 (Cape Archives, Govt. Blue Books) . 
3 . Mara~s, J . S . , op.cit., p.lO. 
4 Walker, E.A . , A Histgry of Southern Africa, p.lS3 . 
, 
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to their old habitats. 
Cradock was succeeded as governor by Lord Charles Somerset 
(1814-1826). The failure of his predecessor's measures induced him 
to adopt a policy of negotiation with the Xhosa chiefs . Treating 
the chief Ngqika as the paramount of the western Xhosa, Somerset 
arranged a reprisal system on the principle that stolen cattle would 
be traced into Xhosa territory and cattle to an equivalent value, 
or those stolen, retaken from the kraal nearest to which the spoor 
1 
ended . Lacking the necessary troops to effectively operate this 
system, followi ng a reduction of troop numbers in the colony in 1817 , 
the new system could not succeed. In addition to this , Somerset 
allowed himself to become involved in a political struggle amongst 
the Xhosa, in which colonial forces were used to support Ngqika 
against Ndhlambi, who was seeking to unite the western Xhosa, after 
the defeat of the former in November 1818. Ndhlambi retaliated against 
the colony in the opening months of 1819. During the course of this, 
the Fifth Frontier War, Ndhlambi was duly defeated. The Xhosa were 
cleared from the area between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers which, 
with the exception of the Tyumie Valley which was retained by Ngqika, 
2 
was declared to be a neutral 'no man's land' . 
This frontier unrest was causing increasing embarrassment, both 
to the authorities in Cape Town and London. While the Batavian rule 
of the cape (1802-1806) had been marked by distinct attempts to 
establish the colony as a viable economy,3 the second British 
1 
walker, E.A. , op.cit., p.154. 
2Ibid ., p.155 . 
3Freund, W.M., 'The Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony during 
the Batavian Period', Journal of African History, XIII, 4, 1972, 
pp.631-645 . Two examples of this are the immigration schemes of 
13 
occupation (from 1806) had been undertaken largely for strategic 
reasons. This was to colour both the attitude of the colonial 
authorities towards economic policy, particularly investment expendi-
ture, and the internal politics of the colony, particularly racial 
contacts. While the Cape was valued only in strategic terms, it 
followed that the British government should be interested in reducing 
expenditure for the maintenance of the colony to a minimum. 
Particularly at a time when the British treasury was finding it 
difficult to meet its commitments in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, 
which had seen an increase in the national debt from £426 . 6 million 
in 1790-9 to £844.3 million in 1810-19.1 This had been followed by 
a post-war depression which, brought on by the necessity for British 
industry to make re-adjustments away from the war-orientated economy, 
had resulted in an abnormally high level of unemployment. The 
returning troops were an additional idle force which sought accommo-
dation in the peace-time economy. Once this initial depression had 
passed, there remained the dislocation, as certain industries pro-
gressed at a faster rate than others. 
The arrival of the British 1820 Settlers in South Africa can 
be seen as a reconciliation between the problems facing the Cape and 
Great Britain. Any attempt to keep the Xhosa out of the Zuurveld 
required the presence of a large military force. This had proved 
particularly true while the white population of the area remained 
small. Of the approximately 145 families which had settled in the 
G.K. Van Hogendorp and the "Eene Commissie ter verbetering van 
Veeteelt en Landbouw, hoofdzaklijk ter conversie van der Schapen 
deezer Colonie in zogenaamde Spaansche of Wolgevende Schapen". 
lMathias, P., The First Industrial Nation, p.463. 
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Zuurveld after the war of 1612, when the Xhosa were first supposedl y 
'cleared out' of it, some 90 families had again abandoned the area 
by 1617 due to the insecurity following the withdrawal of the troops. 
By 1620 only 36 farms were occupied. l Lord Charles Somerset saw a 
possible reduction in the level of the military expenditure of the 
colony, which was paid directly by the British Treasury rather than 
• 
the local administration, in the introduction of a closely knit set t l e-
ment of whites on the frontier. 2 Such a settlement would then form a 
human barrier to deter further incursions by the Xhosa. This would 
enable a troop reduction to be effected permanently. The necessary 
people for such a scheme could then be found amongst the unemployed 
members of the working classes of Britain. To a British government 
being confronted at home with increasing social unrest, an emigration 
scheme to settle the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony seemed a 
perfect short-term solution to both the question of unemployment at 
home and military expenditure within the colony. Agreement to this.' 
scheme was reached in 1616 while in the following year the necessary 
3 
advertising and preparations were carried into effect -- the scheme 
being made all the more urgent by the outbreak of yet another frontier 
war in 1819. 4 Eventually, in the closing weeks of 1619 the transport 
vessels carrying the Settlers left their various ports of embarkation 
on the long voyage to South Africa. 
The first of the transports began arriving in Algoa Bay during 
1 Theal, G.M., History of South Africa Since 1795, Vol. I, 
p.296. 
2 Edwards, I.E., The 1620 Settlers in South Africa, pp.31-3. 
3Ibid ., p.42ff. 
4Fifth Frontier War. 
15 
April, 1820. Here the Cape government had been busy making the 
necessary preparations for their arrival. The exact number of 
Settlers to be catered for was not known, but the camp established 
at Algoa Bay was planned to accommodate 1 500 people , while pro-
visions for 2 000 people for one month were laid on . l In addition 
to these preparations, transport in the form of over 200 ox wa gons, 
together with their teams of oxen, drivers, and 'voorlopers', hac 
been requisitioned amongst the local Dutch farmers by the government 
to carry the newly arrived Settlers to their eventual destinations 
in the Zuurveld. Cat~le and sheep were also bought up by the military 
commissariat to meet the needs of the tent town which had sprung up 
on the shores of Algoa Bay. The British governmen~ had undertaken to 
supply the necessary seed, ploughs, and other agricultural equipment, 
which would be needed by the Settlers in their new venture. These 
2 items were sold to the Settlers at cost. 
The financial arrangements for the establishment of the settle-
ment and the passage money out to the colony had been approved on 
12 July, 1819, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Vansittart , 
introduced a mo~ion into the House of Commons asking for £50 000 to 
assist "unemployed workmen to remove to one of His Majesty's 
colonies" . 3 The sum was used to defray the costs of the project. 
The British government required that a deposit be paid by all 
potential settlers, on the basis of £10 for every family taken out; 
a family being defined as a man, his wife, and two children under 
1 Hockly, H.E., The Story of the British Settlers of 1820 in 
South Africa, p.47 . 
2 . f See 1n ra, pp.2l-2. 
3 Hockly, H.E. , op. cit., p.52. 
16 
the age of fourteen years, and £5 for every two additional children 
under the age of fourteen, or £5 for every one additional child 
between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. This sum was to be repaid 
to the settlers in instalments. One-third of the sum was to be 
repaid on landing in Algoa Bay, when victualling at the expense of 
the British government ceased. Another third was to be made available 
to the settlers once they had been located on their land allotments 
in the Zuurveld, while the remaining amount was to be paid out three 
months after the second payment. 
This arrangement was not carried into effect. l The initial 
payment was duly made, but the remaining two-thirds of the deposit 
money was withheld as security for the supply of rations by the Cape 
government. This move was essential for the maintenance of the 
Settlers until such time as they had reaped their first crops. From 
the time of their arrival to 30 September, 1821, the Settlers received 
full rations, while from 30 September to 31 December, 1821, they 
received half rations. 2 The Settlers were the ultimate benefactors 
from this arrangement in that while they were indebted for their 
rations to the extent of 210 470 Rixdollars or £18,416 2s.6d., more 
than the value of their unpaid two-thirds of the deposit money by 
the end of 1821, this sum was written off by the authorities on 
instructions from Lord Bathurst, the Colonial Secretary, in 1825. 3 
These rations were supplied in bulk to the various locations of 
Settlers. They were collected by the Settlers at the new centre of 
1 Ibid" p,48 .• 
2Theal, G.M., op.cit.., Vol. I, p.313. 
3Ibid • 
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Bathurst, which, chosen for its central locality i n r elation to the 
locations , was to become the new seat of the ma gistracy. 1 Meat , in 
the form of live sheep, flour, sugar, tea, candles and soap were 
supplied . 2 The basic rations were supplied on the calculation of 
~lb. meal and 21b. meat daily for the men, ha l f this amount for the 
women, and a third of it for children . 3 
The original number of Settlers to arrive in the winter months 
of 1820 was 3 736. 4 By the end of 1821, close to 5 000 Settlers had 
arrived at Algoa Bay, at a cost to the British government of 
5 £86,760 5s. 4d. The arrival of the Settlers also created difficulties 
for the Cape administration as the colony ' s expenditure was to rise 
without a proportional increase in revenue . The Settlers were exempt 
from the payment of taxes for the first ten years of their sojourn in 
South Africa. 6 This made it more difficult for the Cape government 
to raise the finance necessary for providing the Settlers with food . 
Down to 30 June, 1825, the Settlers had cost the colony £34,461 for 
their maintenance, besides the additional sum of £3,375 annually for 
7 the salaries of officials for the drostdy of Albany. During this 
IThis decision taken in 1821 by the Acting- Governor, Sir 
Rufane Donkin, was rescinded on the arrival back in the colony of 
the Governor, Lord Charles Somerset, in 1823. 
2 Hockly, H.E . , op.cit., p . 59. 
3 . C h . h Rlvett- arnac, D.E . , T us Came the Englls , p . 43 . 
4 Chase, J .C., op . cit . (2), p.87. 
5 Theal, G.M., op.cit., Vol. I, p.352. 
6An attempt was made in 1821 to gather taxes f r om t hem but 
this move was resisted most strenuously by Philipps and others. 
See Philipps 1820 Settler (ed.) Keppel-Jones, A. , p.lOO . 
7 Theal, G.M., op.cit., Vol. I, p.352. The Drostdy of Albany 
had been created in 1814. 
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period the only contribution which the Settlers made towards t he 
revenues of the colony was in the form of the increased customs dues 
and other fees payable on the increase in the importation of goods 
through the newly named village of Port Elizabeth. l 
The object of the settlement was to form a closely knit agri-
cultural community on the frontier, which would act as a buffer 
against the inroads of the Xhosa . To achieve this each family, or 
head of party on behalf of each family introduced into the colony by 
them, was to receive an allocation of 100 acres of land. This was 
very small in comparison with the farms of between 3 000 and 6 000 
acres occupied by the Dutch farmers in the colony. It was intended 
that these allotments would be used mainly for cultivation, with the 
numbers of livestock kept to a minimum . The success of this scheme 
was at best partial . 2 The reasons for thi~ being threefold. 
Firstly, less than half of the Settlers had any agricultural experi-
ence, or even experience of a rural situation . 3 This is revea l ed 
time and again in the writings of the Settlers in reference to the 
difficulties experienced in the erection of their first homes, the 
problems of driving their rations home to their locations , and the 
difficulties encountered in the planting of their first crops. 
Secondly, and certainly an over-riding factor, was the unsuitability 
of the Zuurveld , with the exception of localised patches , for inten-
sive cultivation. Even where the land was suitable for cultivation, 
success was still subject to the uncertain rainfall of the region. 
1 So named by the Acting Governor , Sir Rufane Donkin, on 13 
February, 1821. 
2 Hockly, H.E . , op.cit., passim. 
3Rivett-carnac, op.cit., p.55. 
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This factor condemned the settlement in terms of the limited size 
of the land allocations. Finally, the Settlers initially lacked a 
market, so that even if all had been agriculturalists and the land 
had been conducive to a close settlement, the scheme could not have 
succeeded in its original form. As it was, it was most fortuitous 
~-..../'--
that many of the Settlers were in a position to answer the call of 
the colony for skilled artisans, for in being drawn away from the 
land they assisted in the creation of a market for the very agri-
cultural produce which would otherwise have caused their downfall. 
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CHAPTER II 
The arrival of the Settlers in April and May of 1820 
coincided with the beginning of the planting time for winter cereal 
crops in the Southern Hemisphere. After the months of inactivity 
on board the transport ships, many of the new Settlers now looked 
forward to the opportunity of establishing themselves and their 
1 families on their allocations of land. These allocations of land 
had been limited to 100 acres for each adult male, in order to 
restrict their activities on this ground to arable, rather than 
pastoral, farming. Lord Charles Somerset, as Cape governor, had 
sought the creation of a closely knit settlement as part of his 
schemes for the defence of the frontier. It was also realised that 
the presence of large numbers of livestock in the settlement would 
tend to encourage discontent and trouble on the frontier between the 
1 In order to gain a better understanding of the progress of 
the settlement as an agricultural proposition in its early years, 
a closer inspection of the records must be made to isolate informa-
tion relating specifically to farming. There is no continuous record 
of an agricultural nature relating to this early period , before 1830, 
which has survived, so that information has been gleaned from 
several sources in order to construct a picture of the settlement in 
these formative years, which are so important in the history of South 
African agriculture. The chief source of information for this period 
is the collection of letters of the Settler, Thomas Philipps, who 
had come to the Cape with the intention of establishing himself as 
a gentleman farmer . (Philipps, T., Letters to his Kinsfolk in 5 vols. 
covering the period 1820-9. This is the source for A. Keppel-Jones' 
Philipps, 1820 Settler, in which much of the information relating to 
agriculture has been omitted or reduced,) 
Information has also been drawn from the diaries of various 
Settlers and from the pioneering work of Thom on sheep-farming in 
South Africa . (Thom, H.B., Die Geskiedenis van die Skaapboerdery 
in Suid Afrika,) From this information it is possible to gauge the 
progress of the settlement . 
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Xhosa tribes and the whites. Cattle had in the past been a cause 
of friction. The Xhosa had shown themselves adept as cattle thieves 
in the past, and there seemed no reason why they should have changed 
their ways, particularly in consideration of the fact that they had 
only recently been driven from the area now to be occupied by the 
settlement, and in which stock thefts could fulfil a wider political 
function in relation to the loss of this territory. 
The parties which the Settlers formed in Britain prior to 
setting sail for the Cape can be classified into several different 
types relating to the social status of those involved. With regard 
to the land and land-ownership, there were broadly two types of 
settler who were to gain a right to the land. There were some 
parties, such as the Sephton party and most others, which were made 
up of independent family units, and in which each unit was to receive 
its own allotment of land. Others, such as the Philipps and Pigot 
parties, were made up of party heads who had every intention of 
farming the land for their own account and who had brought out their 
labourers to carryon their farming practices as they had in England. 
In such cases these parties were allocated land according to the 
number of labourers they had brought with them. Many of the indep-
endent members of the parties had no previous farming experience, 
which was to result in additional hardships for them during the 
initial stages of the settlement. This, and the lack of capital 
amongst many of the poorer type of Settlers, resulted in them 
banding together and pooling their resources and knowledge in order 
to try to establish themselves. 
To assist the Settlers in their new agricultural pursuits, the 
British government made available to them, at cost, the necessary 
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equipment for their farming operations. Ploughs and other agri-
cultural equipment was shipped out to Algoa Bay in readiness for 
the arrival of the Settlers . There would seem to have been delays 
in the execution of this plan and all was not ready for the issue 
of this equipment to the Settlers when they began to move away from 
Algoa Bay in the wagons of the Dutch farmers. These had been 
requisitioned to carry them to their locations in Albany. Writing 
in November, 1820, Philipps indicates that the delivery of the 
ploughs was delayed to such an extent as to delay the planting of 
1 the first wheat crop until July, which was very late in the season. 
It would seem that many of the articles were also allowed to deteri-
orate in the sea air of Algoa Bay, prior to their delivery to the 
2 Settlers. To overcome the difficulty of a lack of ploughs, 
3 Philipps had a plough made for his own use, but for the majority of 
Settlers, seven-tenths of whom had little or no means on their 
arriva1,4 this was impossible. When the implements were finally 
5 delivered, Philipps commented as follows, 
"The implements which were sent out by the Government 
and disposed of at prime cost, proved to be of the most 
wretched quality, and became in the end extremely ex-
pensive, in the purchase of many of them Government was 
most shamefully imposed upon." 
The English ploughs which were sent out were found, by some, to be 
unsuitable for the firm, rocky ground of some of the locations, 
1philipps 1820 Settler, ed. A. Keppel-Jones, pp.74-5. 
2Rivett-Carnac, op.cit., p.39. 
3 Philipps , op.cit., p.75. 
4 Chase, J.C., op.cit. (2), p.87. 
5 hOl o 0 4 P ~ ~pps, op.c~t . , p.12 • 
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causing many of the Settlers to combine their resources to buy t he 
1 heavier local ploughs and the necessary spans of oxen to pull them. 
The late arrival of this agricultural equipment, together with 
the fact that it was also essential for them to consider the con-
struction of their first rude dwellings, restricted cultivation to 
that of vegetable gardens and small plots of wheat. These they hoped 
to reap before the end of 1820. A lack of cattle also hampered this 
cultivation, as oxen were required for draught purposes. 
Arriving after the March and April rains in the Zuurveld, the 
Settlers found the grass growing tall and the streams flowing. To 
many the prospect seemed good. 2 Thomas Stubbs recalled, 
"There must have been very heavy rains before we arrived, 
for the whole country was running with water and the grass 
was knee high .•• many a Settler began a garden where he saw 
the water running out an Ant Bear hole on the side of a 
hill, but which dried up before a Month. They then began 
as close to the rivers as possible, built houses, made 
Gardens, and had every prospect of doing well until the 
Floods came in 1823 and cleared everything away ..• " 
Philipps cast a more critical eye over his allocation,3 
"After a walk of 3 miles, we arrived at my location, where 
we were left, and we immediately pitched our Tents near 
the ruins of the old House, hardly venturing to ask each 
other how we liked it, in fact none were in reality 
pleased, there was scarcely a vestige of wood, and it 
being an extensive plain. we considered we had a full 
view of all that was to be seen, and we had left the day 
before such charming places." 
Attitudes towards their settlement were bound to differ amongst 
the indivi duals who made up the various parties. All tastes could 
not be catered for, and for the majority. who had no direct experience 
lRi'vett-carnac, 't 58 op.c~ •• p. • 
2 Stubbs, T . • Reminiscences of ...• pp.7-8. 
3philiPps. op.cit .• p.53 . 
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of an agricultural environment, there was not much to distinguish 
one piece of land from another. The choice of a location for the 
settlement on the eastern frontier was surely not only motivated by 
a desire for defence on the part of Lord Charles Somerset. The 
Zuurveld had a favourable reputation as a farming area in the annals 
of the Gape, and for a governor who had not personally made a detailed 
investigation of the area, it was inevitable that the records of early 
travellers and current opinion would do much to influence his decision. 
H. Lichtenstein had written in 1803-04,1 
"The country about Algoa Bay is by nature so fertile, that 
even if uninhabited it would produce wood, game, salt, and 
grass for feeding cattle in abundance. Now since it has 
been cultivated by Europeans in quiet times, it produces 
corn and fruit of all kinds, and even wine. The breeding 
of cattle prospers so much, that meat, milk, butter, soap, 
and other articles dependent on this part of husbandry, 
are to be had at very low prices." 
Thomas Philipps gives an indication of the attitudes of the Dutch 
2 farmers to the area. 
"The Dutch always looked to this quarter as a desirable 
residence, but were deterred by the incursions of the 
Caffres. Anxious to have every information we could 
collect in coming up, we gleaned all we could from our 
Drivers, the result was 'one country is good for the 
Corn, another for the Sheep, and another for the Cow, 
but your country is good for all, oh the Zuurveldt is 
good' and thoroughly convinced am I that we shall find 
it so, but perhaps not altogether for sheep. This will 
be a disappointment to me ..• " 
W.M. Macmillan has suggested that the Dutch farmers pitied the fate 
of the newcomers if they were to be settled in the 'drought-stricken' 
areas of the Zuurveldt, but bases this statement on unsubstantiated 
evidence. 3 It is quite possible that the Dutch farmers realised that 
lLichtenstein, H., Travels in Southern Africa, Vol. I, p.288. 
2 Philipps , T., Letters to his KinsfOlk, Vol. I, pp.223-4. 
3 . 1 0 Macm~l an, W.M., The Cape Colouruestion, p.l09. 
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the size of the proposed allocations were insufficient, but this 
would not detract from the overall desirability of the area. To deny 
this is to negate a good deal of the theory of land as a causative 
factor in the frontier conflict between black and white . 
In his search for information regarding the suitability of the 
Zuurveld for the location of the settlement, the governor also called 
for the opinions of the recently appointed head of the London Mission-
ary Society in Southern Africa, Dr John Philip. Raving recently 
returned from a journey through the eastern districts of the colony, 
Dr Philip was in a position to supply information regarding the area. 
Philip saw that the area was suitable for a settlement, but stipulated 
1 that, 
..... For several years they will have to rely on herds and 
flocks rather than on agriculture." 
He also stressed the necessity for making a preliminary survey of the 
area to ensure an adequate water supply for each location. While 
nothing else is stated by Macmillan, this assertion for an initial 
reliance on pastoral rather than arable farming by Philip, would 
suggest that he had realised the limitations of the area, particularly 
with regard to climatic conditions and the all essential saleability 
of agricultural produce. 
That the advice of Philip and any others who sounded a note 
of caution with regard to the establishment of the settlement, was 
not heeded, is borne out by the eventual pattern which the settlement 
took. Here the strategic value of a closely knit settlement placed 
in close proximity to the frontier, outweighed any arguments for a 
more economically viable settlement. 
lMacmillan, W.M., op.cit. (1), p.llO. 
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Another of the faults of the early settlement, was the failure 
of the Cape government to appoint an officer to assist the Settlers 
in adapting to South African farming conditions. The appointment of 
such an officer would have possibly helped to overcome many of the 
early problems faced by the Settlers, and prevented the mistakes of 
experienced and 'Cockney' farmers alike. To what extent the ta l es of 
the exploits of 'Cockney' are justified, is difficult to determine. 
Their prevalence would suggest some foundation for a distinct lack 
of knowledge of basic farming principles, such as, sowing, ploughing, 
and the training of animals, on the part of a large number of the 
Settlers. This factor in itself, without the aggravating circum-
stances of the failure of the wheat crop owing to its infestation 
with rust, would have resulted in smaller than required crops during 
the first year. As it was, both the experienced and 'Cockney' 
farmers were to make mistakes during the first season in the new 
environment. While 'Cockney' farmers were attempting to plant wheat 
by the spade full,burying carrot seed, or hiding potatoes under tufts 
of 1 grass, the more experienced farmers and men who had brought 
agricultural labourers out with them, were also recording mistakes 
and failures. Philipps recorded two such mistakes, and indicated 
the cause of his errors,2 
\ 
"Government were remiss in not selecting proper people to 
attend us and point out what we were to do - The Officers 
were our only guides, their advice was - sow and you will 
reap - don't put manure, the ground is too rich - the fact 
is the reverse, the ground is poor and requires more 
manure than at home •.• " 
Philipps paid dearly for this advice, and as many of the 'Cockneys' 
1 Butler, G" The 1820 Settlers, p.136. 
2philipps, T., Letters, Vol. I, pp. 309-10. 
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looked to the supposedly experienced for guidance, the cumulative 
effect of such advice can only be imagined. Commenting in November, 
1 1820, Philipps stated, 
It! am sorry to say our crops are looking very bad, owing 
to the ground not having been sufficiently worked before 
the seed was sown - had we followed our own course we 
should all have done better but we were told we had only 
to sow and reap - disappointed as we shall be this year , 
yet the cause is so manifest that we are reconciled to it, 
my loss is the greatest as I have the most seed in the 
ground ... II 
Another sphere where the mistakes made by the Settlers was to cause 
problems was in the planting out of their gardens. Philipps pOints 
2 
out, 
"We ignorantly put many of our garden seeds into the 
ground in the month of May and most of them perished -
Potatoes which were then put in, I have seen in August 
cut off by the Frost, but they recovered again ... n 
The first visit of an official related to agricultural matters 
to the settlement was only made late in 1820, when Robert Hart, the 
superintendent of the government 'Somerset Farm', was sent to check 
on the progress of the Settlers during October. He offered sound 
advice but it is interesting to note that the commentary made on 
this officer's advice by Ayliff's 'Harry Hastings' extended only 
to the novel sight of the hobbling of the horses of Hart's party 
when they were put out to graze, and his criticism and warning 
against the construction of homes too near to the banks of streams. 
As the construction of these dwellings was already a fait accompli, 
little notice was taken of this sound advice. 3 This had disastrous 
lIbid., Vol. I, pp. 278-9. 
2Ibid ., Vol. I, p.23l. 
3Ayliff, J., The Journal of Harry Hastings. Albany Settler, p.79. 
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consequences in 1823. 
If certain of the garden seeds planted by the Settlers had 
failed to germinate, others had, and in June, 1820 Philipps could 
claim to have 'Peas, Beans, Onions, Cabbages, etc. ,I sprouting. 
Dugmore recalled in 1870 that the Settlers were earnest and energetic 
in their first attempts to make a success of their farming ventures, 
and soon garden plots had sprung up throughout the settlement. If a 
lack of agricultural equipment and draught animals had initially 
hindered the cultivation of larger areas, this situation was eventually 
remedied, so that after the initial failure of the first crop, summer 
planting could be undertaken on a wider scale. 
While some of the wealthier Settlers had brought out livestock, 
the numbers involved were small, and were only to form a nucleus for 
the improvement of local stock. Livestock for general utility would 
have to be purchased locally. This was found to be a relatively 
inexpensive business. Philipps had obviously had prior warning of 
the low cost of acquiring cattle. Realising the urgent necessity 
for acquiring a span of oxen for the pursuit of his farming operations, 
he bargained with the Dutch farmer who carried his family to their 
1 . 2 ocat~on, 
"I was anxious to purchase a black span of 12 [oxen] which 
drew Potgiter's waggon, as well as for their colour 3 as 
their beauty and altho' I offered the large wm of £40 for 
12 I could not pursuade him. In Britain the 12 would have 
produced at one time £300." 
Philipps was overjoyed, when on reaching his location, he found that 
IphiliPPS, T., Settler, op.cit., p.71. 
2Ibid ., p.65. 
3philipps came from Pembroke shire , which had by the eighteenth 
century its own characteristic breed of middle-horned black cattle. 
See ErnIe, Lord, English Farming: Past and Present, p.179 . 
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1 his son had met with greater success, 
" .•. he asked me if I had passed 12 black oxen, he had pur-
chased them the day before for 390 Rixdollars, or £39 
[English] and hoped he had done right. ~ wa s anything 
so apropos. II 
Philipps was able to purchase his livestock at the following prices . 
Sheep at between 5s. and 6s. each, cows for 24s. each, oxen for 60s . 
each, and calves for 4s. each. He noted that the equivalent of the 
2 Cape ox would sell in Smithfield market for between £25 and £30. 
At these prices the stocking of their farms presented no problems 
to the wealthier Settlers, but for those who h.d little money at all, 
it still required that they group together for the purchasing of 
their draught animals. Hastings recalled the group purchase of four 
oxen from Piet Retief in Grahamstown for the sum of 120 Rixdollars,3 
while Stubbs noted that their first draught oxen were taken from those 
provided for slaughtering as a part of their rations. 4 For those who 
had enterprise and little else, a new avenue opened itself for the 
acquisition of livestock. The Settlers had soon come to realise that 
many of the common features of everyday life in the rapidly indust-
rializing culture which had spawned them, represented rarities in 
the lives of the Dutch frontier farmers. Watches, the new Sheffield 
knives, and the very fabrics which were the hall mark of the new era, 
were eagerly sought after by the Dutch farmers, and as early as 
October 1820 there is evidence of Settlers undertaking trading 
excursions into the interior amongst these farmers. Most of this 
IphiliPPS, T., Settler, op.cit., p.67. 
2Ibid ., p . 7l. 
3Ayliff, J. , op.cit . , pp.65-6. 
4 Stubbs, T., op.cit., p.19. 
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trade was now undertaken by barter, and in this way Settlers were 
1 
able to accumulate herds and flocks of Dutch cattle and sheep. 
The demand for livestock was bound to have its influence on 
prices. 2 Writing in June, 1820, Philipps noted, 
"Cattle and sheep are increasing in price rapidly, and 
must if more Settlers come out. Horses have become 
extravagantly dear. I gave. £10 for mine which before I 
arrived could be bought for £S." 
The influence of rising prices and the distances involved in journeying 
into the interior to undertake trade with the Dutch farmers, turned 
Settler eyes to a potential market for cattle which was nearer home. 
Across the Fish River lay the Xhosa tribes, cattle farmers in their 
own rights. 
Bartering for cattle was not a new aspect of frontier life. 
Trade was eagerly sought after by individuals on both sides of the 
Fish River long before the arrival of the Settlers, but the colonial 
officials had seen that while this interchange brought prosperity, 
it also brought emnity, thefts, and the intermingling of the two 
races, which was strategically undesirable. 3 When outright prohibition 
4 had failed to stop this contact, an attempt was made in 1817 to 
organise a regular fair at Grahamstown at six month intervals. S This 
was inconvenient for most Settlers who needed a more regular trade 
to meet their cattle requirements. There was also the additional 
1 Butler, G., op.cit., pp. 193-4. 
2 h Ol o 1 P ~ ~pps, T., Letters, op.cit., Vo • I, p.201. 
3 See supra, Ch. I, pp.4-S. 
4All contact between the two racial groups had been pro-
hibited by a placaat of the DoE.I.C. administration in 1778. This 
was followed by similar legislation from the British. 
S Walker, E.A., op.cit., p.lS4. 
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inducement that besides cattle the Xhosa had ivory to barter. Thus 
while cattle prices rose within the colony, there was no immediate 
reason to increase the value paid for these cattle to the Xhosa, and 
the profitability of such ventures increased. Passes were also 
granted to Xhosa to enter the colony to procure the red clay they 
used for cosmetic purposes from the pits which were in close proximity 
to several of the locations. Stubbs has pointed out that these people 
brought cattle and ivory with them to barter, not for the clay, but 
1 for trinkets, beads, and buttons. It was inevitable that the Settlers 
living in close proximity should be tempted to indulge in such trade. 
Once this initial step had been taken, the next, of trading 
expeditions into Xhosa territory, followed naturally. The growth of 
this trade was inevitable following the failure of the first attempts 
at cultivation and the increasing reliance on livestock. It was not 
without its hazards, as the frontier was patrolled to prevent such 
trade and the incursion of Xhosa into the colony. The death of 
Stubbs' father when returning from one of these expeditions in June, 
2 1823, bears testimony to this. It may nevertheless be safely 
assumed that a fair proportion of the cattle finding their way onto 
the settlements to meet the requirements of the Settlers, were of 
Xhosa origin. 
For the party of Scots who had been settled away from the 
other locations, in the Baviaan's Kloof, the procurement of livestock 
was an easier matter owing to their closer proximity to the Dutch 
farming communities of Cradock, Tarka, and Graaff Reinet. Their 
1 Stubbs, T., op.cit., p.26. 
2 McGeoch, R.T., The Reminiscences of Thomas Stubbs 1820-
1677, pp.3-4. 
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leader, Thomas Pringle, noted that having fulfilled their first 
necessity of erecting crude dwellings to shelter themselves from the 
1 
elements in this mountainous region, 
"The object next in urgency was to provide ourselves with 
a sufficient number of horses and draught-cattle for our 
immediate wants, and with breeding cattle and sheep to 
commence farm-stock. For this purpose each family sent one 
of their number over to the Tarka, a district rich in flocks 
and herds, to make purchases; and with the assistance of one 
or two of our Hottentots for interpreters, this necessary 
business was satisfactorily transacted. Good draught oxen 
cost us on an average about £2 each; cows £1; sheep (broad 
tailed) about 3s.; and ordinary country horses from £3 to 
£7. Ten or a dozen stout watch dogs were also obtained." 
As has been mentioned above,2 several of the Settlers brought 
livestock with them from Britain for breeding purposes within the 
colony. The most important of these animals were the woolled sheep, 
but cattle, pigs, and poultry, were also brought with them. Major 
Pigot had brought with him two bulls, one of the Devon breed and the 
other a Fatherland or Friesian, together with a small flock of merino 
3 
sheep. There is also evidence of him owning at least one Alderney 
4 
cow, which died on 9 October, 1820. The death of this animal 
within the first year, and the mention of it in his daughter's diary, 
suggests that it was an animal brought with the family from Britain. 
It has been claimed that these merinos of Major Pigot's were the 
first of that breed introduced into the eastern districts of the 
5 
colony. The diary of Sophia Pigot mentions the arrival from Algoa 
1 . 1 A . f R . d 45 6 Pr1ng e, T . , Narrat1ve 0 a eS1 ence, pp_ -. 
2 See supra, p. 28 . 
3Ra · . h J 1 f Ship· 73 1n1er J M. I T e ourna S 0 00 a l.got t p. . 
4Ibid ., p.72. 
5 Thom, H.B., op.cit., p.305 suggests that Pigot bought his 
merinos from the Somerset Farm. This is refuted by Rainier . 
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Bay of 'the English sheep and bulls' on 29 October, 1820. If the 
claims of the Pigot flock master, Charles Webb, are correct, and 
that these were merinos,l then these sheep had certainly arrived 
earlier than those brought into the colony by the returning governor 
Somerset, in December, 1821. 
There is also a strong possibility that the merinos of Pigot 
were not the only ones introduced during 1820. Miles Bowker had 
commenced sheep farming with merinos at Cherborough Park in Devon, 
2 
after his marriage in 1800. There is therefore a strong possibility 
that a few of these sheep were taken with him when he set sail for 
South Africa. His purchase of two merino rams from those introduced 
into the colony by Lord Charles somerset3 might well only have been 
an augmentation to those already in his possession. 
The rams and bulls imported by Pigot were driven slowly to the 
settlement and only reached there on 29 October, 1820, after having 
4 been rested at Algoa Bay. Thomas Philipps chose to transport his 
small stock in one of the wagons carrying his possessions. 5 Great 
care was taken for the welfare of these precious beasts, both on 
board the ships and after their arrival in Algoa Bay. Philipps 
recalls some of the problems besetting the livestock on board the 
lRal."nl."er, M "t 125 6 ., op.Cl. ., pp. . - • 
2Mitford-Barberton, I., Commandant Holden Bowker, p.ll. 
3 Thom, H.B., op.cit., p.30S. 
4Ral." nl." er, M " t 73 ., op. Cl. ., p. . 
Sphilipps, T. , Letters, op.cit., pp . 125-6. 
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h ' ' h" 1 1 transport s ~ps ~n ~s )ourna , 
"Friday 17th March . One of my sheep had received a hurt 
long since, which gradually got worse, and living so l ong 
on hay, he did not improve. In order to save hi s life 
[sic] I cut his throat •.• 
Saturday 18th March. The ship has rolled so much that one 
of my Ewes received a blow, but I hope she will recover, 
altho' with the loss of her lamb • •• 
Thursday 23rd March. My last bag of hay is up today, a nd 
cannot last more than four days, however there are plenty 
of peas etc ..... " 
Fortunately for Philipps, land was sighted on Sunday 26 March . Once 
Algoa Bay had been reached, his animals were taken on shore,2 
"I took my five sheep on shore and my greyhound, and we 
were highly amused with the surprise of the animals when 
they again came on grass." 
One of his rams went wild and fled the camp, and was only recaptured 
with great difficulty. Algoa Bay was only a respite. Soon prepara-
tions were made for the trek overland to the locations. On May 4, 
1820, Philipps loaded his five sheep, one sow, cocks and hens, dogs 
and puppies, into one of the five wagons taking his possessions a nd 
3 farming equipment to the Zuurveld. It was soon proved that bumping 
wagons could inflict as much injury on the livestock as rolling s hips,4 
"On getting the Sheep out of the waggon to graze I found 
my favourite little Ewe with her leg broken and soon 
afterwards another Ewe died all by the violent jolting 
[of the wagon]." 
5 A year later Philipps lost his sow, 
" ••• 1 have lost a sow which I brought out by her swallowing 
a bone, she was a beautiful animal and I would have sold 
IphiliPPS, T., Settler, op.cit., pp. 35-6. 
2Ibid . , p.47. 
3Ibid ., p.49. 
4 h ' l ' Le 13 P ~ ~pps, T., tters, op.cit., p. 1. 
5Ibid ., Vol. II, pp.14-15. 
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her for £20. I have three of her breed luckily but not 
as perfect as she waS .• ," 
Pigs were very scarce on the eastern frontier prior to the arrival 
of the Settlers. Philipps commented on this and went on to suggest 
that he was determined to pay particular attention to pig breeding. 
as he saw the weather as being ideal for the salting and curing of 
ham and bacon for the greater part of the year. The necessary salt 
for this curing could be obtained cheaply at the salt pans outside 
Port Elizabeth. 1 A wagon load could be had for 4s. and the cured 
products could be sold in cape Town at between 2d . and 3d. per 
2 pound. 
Both the pigs and poultry were prolific. As with pigs. 
poultry was very scarce on the frontier prior to the arrival of the 
Settlers. Philipps was astounded at the price of poultry on his 
arrival,3 
..... they sold on our arrival Geese 24s. a couple. Turkies 
30s •• Ducks 7s .• Fowls 6s. I have one duck and cannot 
procure another without going 30 miles. Fowls from our 
sea stock and we now have 20 or 30 breeding hens [July 
1821J - they bring out every egg to the number of 25 so 
that you may suppose the increase ...... 
There is also reference to the breeding of poultry to be found in 
the diary of Sophia Pigot. 4 Here particular emphasis seems to have 
been laid on the breeding of ducks and turkeys. 
Those Settlers with a knowledge of farming as practic ed in , 
Britain found farming conditions on the eastern frontier. in what 
Iphilipps. T •• Settler. op.cit. , p.77. 
2 Philipps. T •• Letters. op.cit •• Vol. II. p.15. 
3Ibid •• Vol. II. p.15. 
4Rainier, M •• op.cit •• pp. 73-5. 
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they considered, a primitive state. Philipps singled out the a gri-
cultural equipment for criticism in a letter written in November, 
1820. 1 Commenting on the yoke , he wrote, 
"The yoke is a strait round pole which is laid on their 
[the oxen] neck , two strait sticks are put thro ' it on 
each side of the neck with notches on them, they are 
fastened by a thong made of Hide, thus the strait pole 
rests on the neck, and the animal has a high hump behind 
it on the top of the Shoulder against which it draws, 
but the thong on drawing hard presses the wind-pipe which 
prevents much exertion. Our own form is evidently 
superior, but without the necessity for that thickness 
which we give them. We found difficulty in getting wood 
that would easily bend, and we have universally adopted 
the Dutch mode for the present only." 
Commenting on the plough, Philipps wrote,2 
"The Plough has only one handle and is the rudest imple-
ment ever seen, they may very well put 14 oxen to draw 
it - they force it through with a vengeance. The Dutch 
allow that 6 or 8 oxen will do for our ploughs, but they 
allege they do twice the work with theirs and if tearing 
the soil to pieces may be called ploughing, they are 
right. I cannot however do them the justice to say that 
they listen with great attention to our suggestions .• • " 
Philipps also noted that the harrow in use was still equipped with 
wooden teeth and that there was a conspicuous lack of the use of 
rollers for evening the seed bed prior to planting. 3 He also noted 
that leather thongs had replaced cordage in general farm usage, and 
that rather than the flail, grain was threshed by being trampled out 
under the hooves of horses or cattle. Commenting on this, he wrote 
in 1822,4 
"We are in fact gone back to primitive times, the plough 
is rude like what we have seen in old prints, the threshing 
floor is enclosed with a mud wall only, in the field and 
1 Philipps , T. , Settler, op.cit. , p . 74 . 
2philipps, T. , Letters, op.cit. , Vol. I, pp.220-l. 
3 Philipps , T. , Settler, op.cit. I p.76 . 
4philiPps, T. , Letters, op.cit. , Vol. II, pp. 212-3 . 
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the grain trodden out by cattle as recorded in Scriptures 
- we have no coin, everything is done by barter - as Homer 
values Glaucus' shield at so many Oxen, so do we estimate 
everything, an Hottentot is hired by the year for so many 
Cows - I have at this moment two labourers working for 30 
many pigs or beeves." 
Surprise was also shown at the different composition of the 
countryside. Here, at the cape, there were no neat tidy patchworks 
of cultivated fields interspersed with pasture lands, and strictly 
defined by the stone walls and hedgerows . The Settlers had to con-
tend with a totally different climate to that to which they were used; 
one which dictated a very different pattern and style of farming. 
It was only with the coming of the barbed wire and netting fences, 
introduced later in the nineteenth century, that enclosures became 
possible and practicable in the South African context. Philipps 
wrote in 1820,1 
"As a Farmer here never dreams of enclosures, his cattle 
and Sheep are herded by day, and brought home to a kraal 
at nigh~ which is in general composed of dead hedges of 
the Thorny Mimosa. Here exposed to the wet they lie 
without fodder or bedding. I long for a good farm yard 
and sheds, without it we shall never have good farming •••. " 
Another significant difference lay in the field of animal husbandry. 
Here the Dutch farmers' reliance on his Hottentot and slave labourers 
in the herding, tending, and milking of cattle >las quickly noted by 
the Settlers. Ayliff recounts the amusing experiences which could 
occur at milking time,2 while Philipp, as the serious farmer took 
3 
a dimmer view of this aspect. 
" .•• owing to the Dutch practice with them I cannot succeed 
in mil~ng them, without letting the calf draw at one ... • 
Iphilipps, T., Settler, op.cit., pp. 76-7. 
2Ayliff, J., op.cit., pp.69-70. 
3 h Ol o 1 P 1 1PPS, T., Letters, op.cit., Vo • I, p.224. 
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whilst the girl milks · the other - another practice is to 
let the calves suck first and take the remainder 
they allege that the Cow will not give milk if you with-
draw the calf to rear it as we are accustomed, and if the 
calf dies, the Cow is turned dry immediately. Now all 
this is complete ignorance and when we have proper 
buildings and heifers to calve first with us, we shall 
convince them it is owing to mismanagement -
Philipps noted that by November, 1820 the price of cows had increased 
1 from 24s. to between £1 6s. and £2, and for cross-bred animals, 
w~h were now becoming popular, anything up to £3 and more. 2 Philipps 
was initially proud to be the owner of two 'handsome ones of a Devon 
Brown' which he had bought in calf for 26s. each, but these had yet 
3 to calve. 
"The Cows have sadly disappointed us, it would take 8 or 
10 female Europeans to milk 50 Cows and then we should 
not have as much as 20 European cows would give - they 
have a flush at first but the dryness of the grass makes 
it soon deminish - the two hind legs must be tied to 
prevent kicking - •.• - the Hottentot men only can manage 
them, this we cannot remedy and must be content until our 
own scorsing4 become Cows, or, until we can get European 
crosses which are increasing fast, but I have not had one 
of this kind that has calved yet, altho' I expect every 
day. II 
Despite the initial problems confronting the Settlers, the l ack 
of agricultural equipment, draught animals, and a guiding hand and 
advice in applying themselves to their new found tasks, there was a 
general air of confidence throughout the settlement during 1820. 
There had been regular rains and if there was disappointment in the 
1 p . 29. The increase being between 2 October and See supra, 
22 November, 1820. 
2philipps, T. , Settler, op.cit. J p.77. 
3 Philipps , T. , Letters, op.cit. , Vol. II, pp.26-7. 
4scossing or scorsing were the words from Old English still 
in use in the dialects of the south-west of England in the ni neteenth 
century, meaning barter or exchange. 
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relatively small acreage of land under wheat cultivation, there was 
general pride in the success of the small gardens which had sprung 
up in close proximity to every cottage. Vegetables flourished, and 
in the dry spells it was an easy matter to irrigate these gardens 
from the streams which flowed in close proximity to many of the 
Settler homes. Philipps wrote enthusiastically on the success of 
1 his gard en, despite the initial failure of many of the seeds. By 
November, 1820 he was already expressing an opinion on the most 
2 
suitable time for planting, and the most suitable crops, 
"August in my opinion is the best month for sowing in 
the garden - and wheat in the field and Barley in Sept-
ember and we shall reap to the latter end of January or 
begining of February - however there are different 
opinions on this head .•• Oats I am confident would answer 
well here - it is seldom grown for seed, but cut green and 
made hay of. We want an importation of real good Barley 
and some potatoes ... " 
Other settlers were also enthusiastic about their gardens. Sophia 
Pigot's diary has an entry during August , 1820, 'I digging my 
3 garden', while by September 10, 1820 the Rev. Boardman and his 
neighbour, Alexander Bisset R.N., had planted, in addition to two 
and a half acres of wheat, 100 vine stocks, potatoes, peas, beans, 
pumpkins, melons, turnips, cabbages, onions, beetroots , and cauli-
4 flowers. Philipps wrote in July, 1821,S 
"You would be delighted with the gardens ••• crops of 
vegetables succeed each other every month now. Potatoes 
1 See supra, p.27. 
2 h ' , P LILpps, T. , Letters, op.cit . , Vol. I , p . 231. 
3 Ra , , '68 ~n~er, M., Op.C1t . , p .. 
4 Lower Albany Chronicle, Part I, p.22. 
5 h'l ' P L LPPS, T., Letters , op.cit., Vol . II, pp.11-13 . 
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all the year round - the increase you will wonder at , 
when I tell you that Mr Ellis gave me a little bag not 
a 1/4 of a Winchester at the Bay, •.. Capt. Evatt gave me 
about the same quantity, I smiled when they pressed it 
on me, supposing I could get some here~ I found, how-
ever they were 10/- a winchester, but none could be 
procured at that price when I passed through - they were 
planted - We had resolution not to taste above a few 
dozen - they were again planted - I again proposed 
abstinence - they are again in the ground above a month 
and occupy 2 acres - all this within 12 months if they 
bear then [at the] present price I shall have enough to 
set, enough to cut, and sell £50 worth - they are a 
certain crop twice a year. 
A cabbage sold here when we came up for 2/- You 
would have smiled and pitied us to see us eat our mutton 
without potatoes or greens - the turnips were sown too 
thick, the thining of them procured us the first vegetable 
dish, next the bean tops, and then a plate of radishes 
was placed on the table .•. in less than six months we had 
everything ..• You can have no conception of the delicacy 
of every vegetable excepting the parsnip, which is rather 
starchy at times •.•• I can grow enough to feed 20 families, 
but am too far from this place [to Grahamstown] to send 
any for sale, but indeed everyone growing, a sale is 
difficult ... " 
Philipps summed up the general attitude of the settlement when 
1 he wrote, on November 25, 1820, that, 
" .•. We are going on prosperously altogether, altho' we 
suffer much from the high prices which we are paying for 
everything imported." 
Even as he wrote, a problem had presented itself to the Settlers, 
which was rapidly to turn into disaster. A fungus disease, more 
commonly known as 'rust', began attacking the wheat crops. Coming 
to the crops which were, at best, only a partial success, feelings 
were bound to run high. Having been told to only plough once and 
to sow the seed thinly,2 their wheat had failed to stool. 
Although it had grown following good rains in October, it remained 
stunted, and by November was coming into ear when only twelve 
1 hil' T 1 . 8 P ~pps, ., Sett er, Op.C1t., p.O. 
2 See supra, p. 27. 
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inches high. l 
It should be borne in mind that, situated on the small allo-
cations of land, the object of which being to encourage arable 
rather than pastoral farming, this crop of wheat represented the 
first opportunity for the Settler to gain a cash reward from his 
farming activity. Being reliant, as he was, on rations from the 
Cape government for the greater part of his subsistence , the failure 
of this wheat crop also determined the necessity for a longer and 
greater dependence on these rations. The shortage of wheaten flour 
in the colony, and the failure of its inclusion in their rations for 
nearly two months during September and October, 1820, was already 
leading to sickness and distress. 2 This had enhanced the hopes of 
the Settlers for the success of their own crops. By early December 
3 it was clear that the first 'cash crop' was lost. Philipps des-
cribed the ~ogress of the disease in a letter of April 25, 1821,4 
.. ... a blight, called here very appropriately the rust, 
attacked our corn. It is exactly like the rust of Iron 
and appears at the root, and soon covers the stalk, and 
the ear dries up. Some say it is owing to the sun's hot 
rays after a ... rain. However it is the most destructive 
of all visitations, for the whole of my crops which 
had wonderfully improved ••• and promised a fair return 
were totally spoiled, that they were not worth cutting 
for the straw and the Cattle would scarcely eat it, 
altho' part was green." 
For the poorer Settlers it was a great disappointment and a direct 
threat to their existence, many not having the necessary funds 
available for another serious attempt at cultivating considerable 
Iphilipps, T., Settler, op.cit . , p.75. 
2 Lower Albany Chronicle, Part I, p.24. 
3Ibid ., p.26. 
4philipps, T., Settler, op.cit., p.89. 
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acreages of land. They now had to rely increasingly on the s upply of 
rations and their gardens, while they chose to remain on their 
locations, or were compelled to in terms of the stringent regulations 
1 
made by the government to keep them there, in the case of the inden-
tured artisans . To add to their misfortune, the government announced 
on December 21, 1820, that it would close all accounts of deposits, 
with a view to discontinuing the issue of rations. 2 This was owing 
to the fact that most of the parties had overdrawn on the value of 
their deposit monies . By,December 31, 1820, the balance due by the 
Settlers for provisions issued up to that date amounted to over 
£24,000, and ranged from £1,279 owing for Willson's Party, to 30s. 
3 for General Campbell's Party. OWing to the failure of the crops, 
the government agreed to the continuation of the rations against pay-
ment, or undoubted security.4 
This new regulation provided a strong incentive for the poorer 
group of independent Settlers to vacate their locations, wherever 
there seemed a remote possibility of finding alternative employment . 
For the wealthier type of Settler, it offered an encouragement to 
reduce their labour forces to only those required for the continuation 
of their farming activities. Philipps wrote in April, 1821, 5 
lThe high salaries paid to artisans in the colony were a 
strong inducement to the labourers who had been indentured to 
the heads of parties, to break their engagements. The regulations 
stipulated that no one could leave his location without a pass 
from the head of his party, or the district without one from the 
landdrost. 
2 Theal, G.M. Records of the Cape Colony , Vol.XIII, pp.337-8. 
3 Lower Albany Chronicle, Part I, p.26. 
4 Records, Vol. XIII, p.338. 
5 h'l " 1 97 P ~ ~pps, T., Sett er, op.cit., p. • 
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"I have only 5 men at home, the rest I can have at any 
time I want them, I shall run no risk of losing my land. 
Every Head has been obliged to dismiss some of his men 
in consequence of the total failure of the first crops." 
For the wealthier group of Settlers there was an inducement 
to try again. To men like Philipps, the first crops were seen as a 
failure even before the rust attacked them. In consideration of 
their wider resolves to establish themselves as gentlemen farmers, 
along the lines of the English class system, there was no question 
1 but to start once more . As early as December 14, 1820, Pigot had 
again begun ploughing. 2 These men had the necessary capital to invest 
in another crop, and there was the inducement of an inevitable rise 
in the price of wheat in the eastern districts of the colony. In 
addition, men such as Pigot and Philipps had not relied entirely on 
their wheat crops. 3 Pigot was to reap good barley and oats crops, 
while Philipps would seem to have had some success with maize. 4 
5 Miss Philipps wrote in February, 1821, 
"The wheat alone has suffered, and we have Barley, Rice 
and Indian Corn to subsist on till America can supply us, 
and there is still some wheat to be procured. The Indian 
Corn makes very excellent bread mixed with a little Wheat, 
we have grown some in the Garden which has produced 
abundantly. " 
By April, 1821, Philipps had learnt the truth regarding the 
6 
rust in wheat crops in the colony, 
1 Hattersley, 
Africa, p. 85. 
2Ra° ° l.nl.er, M. r 
A.F., An Illustrated Social History of South 
op.cit., p.75. 
3 Lower Albany Chronicle, Part I, p.27. 
4philipps, T., Settler, op.cit., p.85. 
5Ibid . 
6philiPPS, T., Letters, Vol. II, pp.309-10. 
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IINow we have become acquainted with the practical farmers 
we find that it [rust] is partial every year, but few 
remember to such an extent as this year, for the whole 
colony suffered alike - the Dutch treat it with the utmost 
indifference, if it fails they are contented to eat fat 
mutton, without bread, they merely sow enough for their 
own use, never having till lately a Market ... 11 
Philipps sought an explanation to the rust in the prevailing weather 
d .. 1 con :1.t~ons, 
" ••. the weather as to hot and cold is most remarkably 
uncertain one day hot summer the very next sharp Autumn, 
this has no bad effect on the human constitution what-
ever, but I think it is a great measure the cause of the 
failure of the crops of Corn -" 
The close of the year 1820 brought no material relief to the 
Settlers. Commenting on their position to the colonial secretary, 
2 the Cape acting governor Sir Rufane Dankin, wrote, 
"The failure of the harvest will be most severely felt 
by the new Settlers, whose crops have been, I may say, 
wholly destroyed by the blight, so that scarcely any of 
them expect to reap even the quantity of seed put into 
the ground. 
The failure of their first effort is much to be 
lamented, and, in its consequences, must be attended with 
considerable expense and trouble to this Government. 
I beg leave to assure Your Lordship, that whatever of 
the former may be incurred, shall be watched by me with 
the utmost attention. II 
With no pecuniary income and debts mounting up as they continued 
to rely on government rations for their subsistence, the future for 
many Settlers certainly looked bleak. While the Cape government 
had agreed to the continuation of rations, and this had relieved 
all of the anxiety of wondering where their next meal was to come 
from, it must nevertheless have come to represent an increasing 
psychological burden for many. Particularly as most of these rations 
lphilipps, T., Letters, Vol. II, p.333. 
2 Records of the Cape Colony, Vol. XIII, p.346. 
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were only granted against the mortgage of their future crops and 
1 property. 
The new year, 1821, was heralded with mixed feelings by the 
Settlers. The majority of the Settlers, being townsfolk, who had no 
agricultural training or links with the land, were naturally des-
pondent. 2 Philipps wrote, 
"Out of 5000 people there must be a great many who 
entered into the scheme at the solicitation of others 
or without reading, or maturing their ideas. From 
such as these you will find complaints ..... 
But there were those who chose to remain on the land. For many of 
the Settlers, coming from their working class backgrounds in Britain, 
the lure of the ownership of land must have been irresistible. 
Especially so in the light of the development of class and political 
awareness which marked the early nineteenth century in Britain. 
Undoubtedly, the sight of land which was 'not another England ' , 
would have disheartened many from the outset. The high wages paid 
to skilled artisans in the colony also offered a strong incentive 
to many to abandon their original intentions of wresting a living 
from the land. 3 Philipps commented on this as follows, 
"A great many tradesmen came out who could find no 
employment on their land, and they are flocking to the 
Towns. It is from this discription of People that com-
plaints will go home to England, but I will venture to 
pronounce that Farmers, Carpenters, Masons, in short all 
the Country trades in the County of Pembroke will be 
most amply recompensed by emigrating to this Colony, and 
will always find employment. £6 a month is the common 
rate of pay for carpenters and Masons. Many of them 
earn enough for their families, and if saving, to buy a 
couple of Cows every month." 
I Hockly, H.E . , op.cit., p.67. 
2 h ' l ' I' 84 P ~ ~pps, T., Sett er, p.c~t., p. . 
3Ibid ., p.79. 
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Within a short while Settlers began requesting permission to abandon 
their locations in search of pursuing their old trades, or for 
gaining the necessary cattle and sheep, by barter, to carryon their 
f lba ·l arming operations on a pastora 515. Another attempt at growing 
wheat was only a privilege for those who had the necessary capital 
and equipment. An increasing tendency towards stock-farming became 
evident in the settlement during the course of 1821. 
Philipps wrote in April, that he was again preparing for the 
2 planting of a wheat crop, 
"I am determined to try Corn again, I shall begin to sow 
in May and keep on a little for June and July to try 
each month. I am now busy ploughing with two teams of 6 
oxen each, ... II 
Where he had failed in the preparation of his land the previous year, 
Philipps and others were determined that this should not be a factor 
in bringing on the failure of their second crop. The land was duly 
well prepared, by ploughing several times and the application of 
repeated harrowings, to provide a smooth planting surface. There 
was no scarcity of rain and the crops progressed favourably. 
3 Writing in July, 1821, Philipps commented, 
"We are jogging on very fairly considering we have a 
famine and such a one which I am happy to say, no one 
remembers, so of course it is not likely to happen again, 
at least so general ... l have sown as much corn as anyone 
- I will deserve success, if I can't obtain it - We shall 
not know if we can reap until the Reapers are in the 
field so sudden does the rust set on the ear - we only 
want some return for our labours, to enjoy ourselves 
extremely well in this ( ) and uncommon climate." 
By September reports were reaching Grahamstown of the outbreak of 
1 See Lower Albany Chronicle, Part I, Entries for 1821, 
pp.27ff. 
2 h'l' T S ttl . 97 p ~ 1PPS, ., e er, Op.C1t., p. . 
3 h'l ' T Lett . t V 1 I 4 P 1 1PPS, OJ ers, op.Cl. OJ o. I, p .. 
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another attack of rust on the wheat crops. On the 13th September 
1 in a letter to his sister, Philipps wrote, 
" ..• Sorry I am to say that I must again inform you of 
the probable failure of our crops of wheat, mine are 
looking luxuriant, healthy and everything that could be 
wished, but at the moment I am writing I dread the 
visitation of this scourge called the rust ... " 
The dread of another outbreak of rust was all too evident in a 
letter written on 18 September, although it is clear from it, tha t 
Philipps had no other complaints to make regarding his situation,2 
" ••. Altogether there does not exist on the face of God's 
earth such another fine climate as this •.• when we get 
our vineyards in bearing and our garden fruits and grow 
Indian corn and barley - we must forget wheaten bread and 
the annoying rust - unfortunately for us the two former 
grains are so scarce that we cannot procure them for seed. 
I have a little of both but not sufficient for our sub-
sistence - we are at a most awful period indeed and if 
the rust is general I know not what we are to go on." 
An entry in the letter of 19 September, contained the news of the 
3 
rust, 
"Grieved beyond measure I am to inform you that the rust 
is again making a regular progress, ... there is no doubt 
but it will be general again and gloom and despair appears 
in all ranks here, but chiefly with People like myself who 
derive income from our land, Mechanics are doing well and 
getting up in the world while we are sinking fast - this 
year I looked to deriving £300, but it will all be gone 
and subsistence is now precarious , this is a result that 
no human foresight could foretell, to what the necessaries 
of life when in possession of fruitful land and promising 
crops, appear so inexplicable ... A second time too - and 
in a successive year when such a general calamity was 
never known before ... II 
As if in a mocking gesture, the rust had appeared three months 
earlier, that was, early enough to tempt those on the land into the 
lh "l" "14 P ~ ~pps, T., Settler, op.c~t., p.O. 
2phi lipps, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. II, p.45. 
3Ibid ., pp.45-6. 
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planting of spring crops. To those who could get it. and afford the 
expenditure. it was generally believed that the rust was less des-
1 tructive to barley crops. There was now also the possibility of 
planting crops of maize . For many there was no possibility of a 
third crop. and aided by the reduction of rations by a half2 in 
October. 1821. more people were encouraged to leave the land. 
Philipps had lost between 70 and 80 acres of wheat. This. even to 
a wealthier Settler. such as Philipps. was a serious blow. Writing 
3 in October. 1821. he commented. 
" ... the loss of this such a golden crop would win even an 
English Farmer what must be the consequence with us who 
have been already 2 years without deriving any income from 
the Land certain of being a third and even a chance of 
another failure - in short wheat. by which grain we can 
alone hope to gain an income beyond mere subsistence 
presents so many obstacles from rust and drought occasionally 
that it is in vain to trust to it, ... " 
Pigot. too. had suffered severe losses. By May. 1821. he had 
4 ploughed and fenced one hundred acres. and it can be safely assumed 
that a large proportion of this land had been under wheat. Con sid-
erable efforts had also been made by Pigot for the improvement of 
this land. for during July. 1821. his daughter. Sophia. noted in 
her diary that their carts were involved in carrying lime from 
Bathurst to Pigot 5 Park. An entry for 2 October in her diary is 
somewhat confusing. stating • ••• in the ploughed field evening. 
6 
cutting green wheat.' This would suggest that either this was a 
lphiliPPS. T •• Letters, op.cit. , Vol. II. p.50. 
2 Philipps. T •• Settler. op.cit. J p.l07. 
3 Philipps. T .• Letters, op.cit .• Vol. II. p.5l. 
4 Lower Albany Chronicle. Part I. p.32. 
5Rainier, M., op.cit., p.BO. 
6Ibid .• p.90. 
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later planting, or that some of the wheat affected by rust had 
fallen and germinated in the ploughed field. This was presumably 
1 being cut to feed poultry. 
Had the rust not attacked the wheat of the Settlers in Sep-
tember, there would still only have been a poor crop. The greater 
part of the second half of the year passed in drought. Philipps 
wrote in December, 1821,2 
"I am sorry to say that our garden this year, like all 
others, produces nothing, we have had so little rain that 
vegetation is totally different from last year. Would you 
believe that we have had no rain to penetrate far into the 
ground since June, and one hundred miles from us animals 
have died for want of food •••• I sowed 6 Winchesters of 
Barley, my return from this will not be more than I sowed, 
it is so short I cannot reap it, my men are pulling it up 
by the roots. The peaches and figs in the old Gardens are 
dropping off for want of moisture. My potatoes failed in 
quantity, judging from last year and the quantity sown, 
I expected 240 measures, I gathered only 60. In short 
two such different seasons could not be supposed in the 
same country, ..• " 
Philipps had noted in November, 1820 that the weather was not to be 
relied upon. He mentioned that while the climate could be considered 
as a great ally of the farmer, a regular supply of water by irrigation 
3 
was essential to ensure a return. What he had not seemed to 
realise, was the temporary nature of Southern African streams as a 
source for irrigation. 4 By January, 1822, he reported that every 
garden had been scorched by the drought. The general lack of know-
ledge of South African farming conditions, coupled with a lack of 
captal and the necessary equipment, had acted against the building 
lIbid., p. 73ff. 
2 Philipps , T. , Settler, op.cit., p.109. 
3 Philipps , T. , Letters, op.cit. , Vol. I, p.31O. 
4philipps, T. , Settler, op.cit. , p.l09. 
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of dams by the Settlers. There was no assured irrigation to any part 
of the settlement in these formative years. 
In contrast to the previous Christmas, which had been marked 
by optimism by the wealthier type of Settler, like Philipps, the 
Christmas of 1821 was dismal. Plans were being made by cel:tain of 
the Settlers for another move to a more hospitable country. The two 
most favoured countries being Van Dieman's Land or South America. l 
Philipps wrote,2 
"Last Xmas we could joke on the loss of our Harvest - but 
it is very far from a joke this time, had it not been for 
the visitation of the Rust we had really almost overcome 
all our difficulties and in spite of drought etc. I could 
have said that I should have been independent, but it is 
in vain to regret what human power cannot remedy." 
The end of the year 1821 saw a fall in the price of cattle . 
Philipps attributed this to the Settlers having stocked their farms, 
3 
or being unable to purchase more. Other likely factors were the 
drought and the increase in depredations by Xhosa tribesmen from 
across the border. The earliest thefts of cattle to affect the 
Settlers took place in the vicinity of the clay pits. Xhosa were 
allowed into the colony twice a year to attend the Grahamstown fair. 
Special passes were also granted to them to enter the colony for the 
specific purpose of gathering the red clay from the pits in close 
proximity to several of the Settler locations. Mahoney's party was 
situated in close proximity to these pits, and it was from this 
party that the first cattle were stolen. There is every reason to 
believe that the theft of these cattle was connected to Xhosa 
IphilippS, T., Settler, op.cit., p.lll. 
2Ph "1" L 1 ~ ~pps, T. , etters, op.cit., VO . II, pp.77-8. 
3Ibid ., p.8l. 
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resentment to the presence of the Settlers, and the wider political 
motive of retaliation for the loss of the Ceded Territory following 
the war of 1819. There was also the factor that cattle belonging 
to another tribe or group were considered fair game. Neither, it 
should be remembered, were stock thefts something new. The initial 
presence of a large body of whites on the frontier during 1820 had 
probably served to discourage stock thefts, particularly as there -·'r e 
then very few animals on these locations. Thus in the very short 
term, Somerset's policy of a dense settlement of arable farmers on 
the frontier might be seen to have succeeded. The failure of the 
first crop had, however, stimulated the Settlers' quest for cattle 
and during 1821 increasing numbers of cattle were finding their way 
onto the locations. 
This factor, together with the increasing contact between 
Settlers and their Xhosa neighbours, particularly by those Settlers 
located closest to the frontier, such as the Mahoney party, had shown 
to the Xhosa the relative vulnerability of the whole settlement . 
Stubbs complained of the inadequacy and inefficiency of the military 
force sent to regulate the activities of the Xhosa at the clay pits,l 
while the Settlers were, generally, poorlyarmed. 2 The build up of 
herds of cattle in close proximity to the frontier was to do much 
to increase the frequency of cattle thefts. The Xhosa were to take 
advantage of this ideal situation over the next twenty years. The 
Settlers stood, initially, as pawns in the wider political conflict 
between black and white in Southern Africa. 
lStubbs, T., op.cit., pp.25-6. 
2Mitford-Barberton, I., Comdt. Holden Bowker, p.52 . 
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By 14 March, 1821, the Xhosa collecting clay from the clay pits 
1 had taken 14 of Thomas Mahoney's cattle. This is the first 
recorded loss from the Settlers. The Settlers, not being allowed · to 
employ black or slave labour, other than Khoi, who could be rec~uited 
from the nearby mission station at Theopolis, had increasingly 
resorted to the use of their own children to guard their herds and 
flocks. This was done as the Khoi were found to be unwilling workers 
where their services could be obtained. Young children were sent out 
with their lessons to tend the cattle, until the murder of one 
determined that it should be guns rather than books which were taken 
to the fields. 2 Thomas Stubbs recalled, 
"It was now arranged that I and my Brother, William were 
to herd the Cattle, we had to take all our books with us 
to learn lessons set by my Mother, and say them when we 
came home at night, this went on for some time untill a 
young Lad named Williams, while herding cattle at Stoney 
Vale, (he was reading a book), was murdered by the caffers 
and his body thrown into a Vley ..• Our books were now 
exchanged for Guns •.. " 
The employment of Khoi as labourers was further restricted in terms 
of pass laws which had been introduced in 1797 and 1809 with the 
intention of restricting the free movement of these people about the 
colony. This had tended to restrict Settler recruitment to the 
Theopolis mission station. The early murder of Settlers and their 
families was severely felt on the labour forces at their disposal. 
This was particularly true once more of the Settlers had started 
moving away from the locations. Those remaining were largely prevented 
from employing any but white labourers and these too were few and also 
expensive, as any additional labour not brought out under the original 
1 Lower Albany Chronicle, Part I, p.30. 
2 Stubbs, T., op.cit., p.24. 
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settlement scheme would have to have their passages out, and other 
i ncidentals paid for by the Settler sponsoring them. Most could not 
afford this . The original intention of the scheme of giving allocations 
of one hundred acres had implied that such an amount would suffice 
for the satisfactory employment of a family . The nature of the climate 
had increasingly called into question this assumption, and by 1825 
Lord Charles Somerset had agreed to the enlargement of the locations 
1 
of those remaining on the land. This extended the labour shortage 
to those who would otherwise have had too small an allocation to be 
severely effected by the shortage of labour. The early murder of 
these people was thus also felt as a loss of labour. Reporting the 
murder of two children from Willson's party while out herding in 
1823, Philipps continued,2 
"These poor people are now left without the means of t aking 
care of their cattle. It is utterly impossible to procure 
Men or Boys or even Hottentots to herd. Everyone retains 
their own little portion of land and finds employment for 
their Sons either herding their cattle or in cultivating 
the land and the Hottentots who have activity enough to 
leave the idle life they lead at the Mission Schools are 
immediately taken by the Dutch Boors or by the Government 
Farm. II 
This lack of labour was later seen by Philipps as responsible for 
the delay in the full exploitation of the land. 3 
J.C . Chase indicated that during the course of 1821 there were 
some 294 cattle and 4 horses stolen from the frontier farms, that 
4 
were officially recorded. Of these Hockly has suggested t hat 94(?) 
5 
were recovered. This was a remarkably low figure, if the annual 
1 Theal, G.M., op.cit., Vol. I, p.329. 
2 h "l " 182 P L LPPS, T., Settler, op.cit., p. . 
3Ibid ., p. 252. 
4 Chase, J.e., in Graham's Town Journal , August 30 , 1838. 
5 Hockly, H. E., op.cit . , p.89. 
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losses of the frontier farmers are considered over a longer period,l 
but it should be remembered that even the loss of small numbers to 
the Settlers suffering from the straits in which circumstances had 
placed them, was a severe blow. There was also the fact that cattle 
bartered illegally from the Xhosa, and lost to them again by theft, 
could hardly be reported to the authorities. Their losses could 
therefore have been far greater than actually claimed. Here it 
should be borne in mind that while the Xhosa can be held responsible 
for a large proportion of these losses, they cannot be held res-
ponsible for all of them. Considering that the majority of these 
Settler herders were inexperienced little children who had not grown 
up in this land still abounding with wild beasts, and who, unlike 
their Xhosa counterparts, were untutored in this task of herding 
cattle, losses were inevitable. It would be naive to suggest other 
than that a certain proportion of these animals were simply lost. 
The cattle numbers of the Settlers grew rapidly after 1820. 
2 Theal reports that, 
" ... many hundreds of oxen and cows were purchased and 
brought into the pastures of Albany." 
By mid 1823 the settlement could boast of 2,950 cows, 3,230 oxen, 
3 3,220 sheep, 650 goats, 500 pigs and 210 horses. Certainly the 
major reason for this rapid increase in the number of livestock, 
and particularly that of cattle, was, that in addition to their use 
for draught and milking purposes, there was the apparent higher 
profitability of stock-farming. This was true particularly following 
Isee Appendix I. 
2 Theal, G.M . , op.cit., Vol. I, p.325. 
3 Hockly, H.E., op.cit., pp.89-90. 
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the failures in arable farming, which turned many Settl ers a way 
from this form of farming. The presence of a meat processing plant 
at Cradock Place on Algoa Bay and t he avail ability of large quan-
tities of cheap salt, together with the periodic visits of Cape 
butchers , meant that there was always a fair probability of an 
internal market, or an external market in the form of salted beef. 
From the outset, the experienced farmers amongst the Settlers 
had asked where or what their market was to be . Philipps noted,l 
.... . this is the grand obstacle to our well being, the want 
of market, if navigation is not opened in some manner, • .. 11 
The only potential market within close proximity to the settlement 
was the military village of Grahamstown, where the garrison and a 
few merchants represented the only sector divorced from agricultural 
pursuits. 2 Here the Settlers had to face the monopoly enjoyed by the 
government 'Somerset Farm' which had been established in 1815 f or 
meeting the requirements of the troops serving on the frontier for 
farm produce, at a time when little surplus cultivation was being 
undertaken by the Dutch farmers along the frontier . Philipps des-
3 
cribed the government farm as a curse, 
.... . They monopolise the cattle contract as well as the 
corn, and we cannot sell our beeves to the Army which 
ought to be our market." 
This lack of a market severely hampered the progress of the settlement . 
The failure of the wheat crop in 1820 saw most of the Settlers stil l 
4 in possession of good, flourishing vegetable gardens, but since there 
1 h ' l' ' l 13 P ~ ~pps, T., Letters, Op.C1t. , Va . II J p. . 
2Goldswain, J., The Chronicle of • •• , Vol . I, p.55 . 
3 Philipps , T. , Settler, op.cit., p.139 . 
4 See supra, pp. 39-40. 
56 
was no market within the immediate vicinity, this potential st op-
gap to bolster t heir incomes had failed. The acting governor, Sir 
Rufane Donkin, had hoped to abolish Somerset Farm, but this step 
had been made impossible due to the failure of the Settlers to 
provide the necessary wheat required for the victualling of the 
frontier troops.l Another factor which operated in favour of the 
government farm, and against the Settlers, was the fact that the 
farm was operated mainly by military servants and Khoi labourers, 
who could be hired cheaply. This enabled the farm to undercut the 
Settlers in all sectors where competition was possible , as in the 
supply of vegetables . The Settlers were only allowed to employ white 
labour, which, particularly after 1822, when all restrictions on the 
abandonment of the settlement had been removed and potential workers 
could leave the locations in search of better wages, meant that the 
price of agricultural wages had risen accordingly. 
Somerset Farm was eventually closed down by the governor , 
Somerset, in February, 1825, in response to the petitions made to him 
on his visit to the settlements. By then the damage had been done 
and the majority of the Settlers had left the locations and were 
independent of any necessity for an agricultural market; other than 
that they now represented a demand for agricultural goods themselves . 
The removal of the larger portion of the economically active 
Settlers from the land by 1823, meant that within the district of 
Albany there was a proportionately large non-agricultural populat i on 
created, with the exception of those who moved further afield. They 
now came to represent a market for farmers' produce. Once the 
IHOckly , H.E., op.cit., p.74. 
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restrictions on the movement of the Settlers had been lifted in 18211 
and the market forces allowed to act freely on the supply and demand 
for labour, it was inevitable that the lack of a market for agri-
cultural produce, acting in conjunction with the high wages offered 
to skilled artisans and labourers, rapidly drew labour awa y from the 
stagnant settlements. Added to this was the collapse of the farming 
system, owing to the failure of the wheat crops, which served to 
precipitate this movement. The new system had stabilised within three 
years. Cory notes that by May, 1823, of the 1004 males who had 
arrived in 1820, only 438 remained on the locations. 2 The point to 
be made here is that even if the settlement had succeeded from an 
agricultural point of view, it is doubtful if the parties would have 
remained long in their original forms. The lack of a local market 
and the high wages offered in the colony to skilled artisans and 
labourers would, inevitably, have had the influence of reducing the 
number of Settlers left on the locations. The fact that the settle-
ment failed in its original form, meant that a large proportion of 
the Settlers were now released from the land to attempt other forms 
of occupation and to create a market for those who remained on the 
land. 
The year 1822 was marked by a distinct increase in the incidence 
of Xhosa stock-thefts. The theft of cattle belonging to the 
missionaries stationed at the kraal of Ngqika in February led to a 
retaliatory raid by a patrol from the colony. This had failed in 
its objective of capturing the chief and only succeeded in promoting 
1 Cory, G.E., The British Settlers of 1820, in C. H.B.E., 
Vol. XIII, p.240. 
2Ibid ., p.241. 
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a series of cattle raids. There were fears that this action might 
lead to war but this had not materialised. The removal of the troops 
stationed at the Clay Pits Post, the Coombs Post, and the Scott's 
1 2 Bottom Posts , in February, and their return only in August, 
probably was also a contributory factor. Chase calculated that some 
2,537 cattle and 54 horses were reported missing during the course 
of 1822 along the frontier,3 or an increase of 2,243 cattle and 50 
4 horses over the previous year. Of these a fair proportion dieappeared 
from the settlement. 
Agriculturally, the year did not hold out much promise. The 
drought which had affected summer crops during the second half of 
1821, continued. 5 Philipps noted, 
"The drought still continues, Indian corn, cabbages etc all 
burnt up, we can do nothing to employ ourselves - the 
ground is too hard to dig or plough." 
As a result of this drought, which continued into July, the best 
months for the sowing of winter cereals passed without an intensified 
effort being made at planting these crops. Philipps noted in August 
that the barley crop planted in April was only then coming up, while 
the planting of their wheat had been delayed to mid August, so that 
there was very little hope of a substantial return. He had ordered 
maize seed from Cape Town and was banking on this for his support 
6 in the coming year. Much of the wheat which was now being planted 
1 Lower Albany Chronicle, Part I, p.42 . 
2Ibid ., p . 47. 
3 Chase, J.C., in G.T.J., August 30, 1838. 
4 See supra, p.53. 
5 h"l" 11 P l lPPS, T., Settler, op.cit., p. 2. 
6Ibid ., p.129. 
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was of the Bengal variety. which was a much harder. if smaller grain. 
Philipps recounted the success which one farmer had had with this 
1 grain the previous year, 
"From 6 Winchesters of Bengal wheat which a Dutch farmer 
was luckily able to get from Cape Town last year. he 
reaped 240 which he sold at about one guinea per winchester • • • " 
Unfortunately, much of the Bengal seed supplied had been eaten by 
the weavils so that it too came up very thinly. The wisdom of planting 
a hardier type of wheat was not to go untested. for as early as 
September reports began filtering in of attacks of rust on the wheat 
crops of the eastern districts. Philipps wrote early in September 
2 that, 
"I am sorry to say that although the most confident hopes 
were entertai,ned by all the native farmers that the long 
protracted winter would eradicate the Rust, symptoms are 
appearing in all the native corn, the Bengal even partially 
but mine is too backward to judge at present. I have sown 
all Bengal. except a very little as an experiment. and 
that only by desire of the Landroost." 
By the end of September Philipps' wisdom in planting the majority 
3 
of his land to a hardier type of wheat was reaping its reward. 
" . • . the rust has appeared in my Bengal - but don' t be 
alarmed - it is so trifling that it has had no bad effect 
as yet. and we really have the liveliest hopes that we 
shall not perish altogether. It is impossible to see a 
finer ear although thin in the Ground. had we better grain 
sent us ••••• we might have reaped enough. 
The Cape wheat is again affected, some say not with 
that violence as before. but I have not had an opport-
unity of judging generally - in my neighbourhood it is 
all gone." 
One of the Settlers who now tired of the struggle to establish him-
self as a farmer, was Major Pigot. 4 Philipps noted his plight. 
lphiliPPS, T.. Letters. op.cit., Vol. II . p.237 . 
2Ibid • 
3Ibid .• p.262. 
4Ibid., pp.237-8. 
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"Major Pigot has given in at last, he is convinced that 
farming will not answer, and intends to raise only suffic-
ient for his own consumption. cattle he is afraid of 
venturing on, as his Place is the very den of the Caffres . 
Sheep he means to attend to, as the caffres do not take 
them, but t he heavy winter rains which sometimes fall make 
that branch very hazardous without sheds. Four years ago 
one man lost 7000 in one week, but he had the enormous 
stock of 15,000 -" 
This contrasted strongly with Philipps' own excitement at the prospect 
1 
of eventually being able to reap a crop. This excitement was not 
altogether justified, for in spite of the harder type of wheat planted, 
the rust was still damaging if at least not totally destructive. By 
October Philipps was reaping a good barley crop and the immediate fears 
of want in the coming year were allayed. Not all the Settlers were 
so fortunate, although 1822 would seem to have been a good year for 
potatoes and maize as well. The problem of the lack of a market was 
brought forcefully into focus again in the eyes of the settlement . 
Philipps commented on this surplus production of maize and potatoes 
2 
as follows, 
"The return , you may have read, is enormous, and it will 
be quite unsaleable in another year and so indeed [ •.• ] 
of every grain that will grow, for our markets are so 
limited and having no navigation we can never expect more 
than a bare maintenance in this country or rather it will 
never be worth our while to grow more than we can con-
sume - this country will do very well for those who have 
never been educated with a view to anything better than 
the little farmer of Europe, such a person may here enjoy 
himself beyond comparison much more than he can at home, 
his land will be his own, he has very few taxes, no tythes, 
no poor rates , he is harrassed by no Exciseman, in short 
he is really independent but even if he is industrious he 
can have no hope of improving his condition he can 
never be rewarded for his industry and if he has 20 child-
ren he has no hope for them - beyond his own condition -
his daughters will marry Boors, and his Sons will remain 
with him until they are of age to ask for a farm - which 
IphiliPPS, T., Settler, op.cit., p.139. 
2philipps, T., Letters, op.cit . , Vol. II, p.270ff. 
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is seldom less than 3 or 6000 acres that is given them, 
they occupy it with a few cows, set a few pumpkins, build 
a wood cabin and plaster it with mud • •• then they grow a 
few acres of corn - their cattle increase to 500 which is 
perhaps as much if not generally more than the farm will 
maintain and that is his utmost riches with 2 or 3000 
sheep, the value of all this is not more than what a 
farmer of 100 acres in England commands. II 
While Philipps derided the traditional way of life of the frontier 
farmer , he was also quick to note that the appearance of the Settlers 
had roused the older inhabitants to exertion. It was seen that this , 
combined with the instability of the frontier, made success impossible 
for a man with the designs of himself, for the establishment of a new 
, 1 
landed aristocracy at the Cape . 
"We were for a short time blaming these people for their 
inactivity and could they have foreseen our arrival they 
might have made a little money, this and the rust has roused 
them to exertion, more land has been cultivated by them and 
what will be the result - At a good harvest what with both 
our exertions corn will be unsaleable J for it is quite idle 
to imagine that it will pay for 100 miles of land carr iage 
to Algoa Bay, this has lately been brought to our con-
viction for at one time it was thought we should have a 
general harvest when contracts were talked of at a price 
that would not pay, with such losses as we have already had, 
with continual dread of losing our little property by the 
Caffres and with such prospects for our.Offspring - can you 
wonder at our wish of removing to same other country, in 
our own minds there remains no doubt ... " 
By December at least some of the Settlers were eating bread 
made from wheat grown by their own efforts. The Bengal strain of 
wheat had at least proved partially resistent to the rust , although 
Philipps noted that it destroyed large parts of the stem, making 
the reaping of the wheat all the more difficult. 2 
The partial failure of another crop and the increasing intensity 
of the Xhosa raids, were destroying what little faith remained amongst 
IPhiliPPS, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. II, p.270ff . 
2Ibid ., p.301. 
'. 
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the Settlers for the success of their labours at the Cape. Added 
to this was the advent of another drought in the closing months of 
1822. Philipps was anxious to leave the colony to try his luck in 
Van Dieman's Land as he saw no hope for his success at the cape. 
The only factors restraining him were the pleasant climate of Albany 
and a lack of ready money. This made him reliant on his family 
connections in England to press those in power to grant him a free 
passage. It was not forthcoming. The mildness of the climate at 
the Cape had captivated Philipps and he noted that, in spite of the 
many privations suffered by the Settlers, there was very little 
disease and illness; indeed several of the doctors who had come out 
with the Settlers had given up in disgust. l Philipps summed up 
clearly his sentiments at the end of 1822 in a letter to a ' Mr Harries 
dated December 9,2 
"I have taken a house at Bathurst, close to the Barracks 
in which there are only to be seen 15 men, but still we 
shall be perfectly safe there in case we learn of the 
advance of the caffres ... Our Cattle are quite safe and I 
have built a new house for the men close to the new Kraal, 
and I think we may now defend it from the Marauding Caffre, 
if we had a wish to move before, what must be our increase 
on that head, but how are we to go is still more out of 
the question, our land when we have a title will perhaps 
~ not sell for a farthing 
Yesterday I heard that Bailey had received a letter •. • 
to give him a free passage to England, if this is con-
sented to, surely we have a right to expect the same to 
Van Dieman's Land, to which place we must go there is 
no alternative and the more I think with others on the 
subject, the more convinced I am that Government will be 
obliged to support us there with free passages, rations 
and full grants of land, at this moment we are so dried 
up that our gardens are perishing, nay more, our little 
well only gives us enough to drink, our brook has long 
since been totally dry - there surely never was such a 
dry country known, it was scandalous to send such a body 
1 Hockly, H.E., op.cit., p.65. 
2philipps, T., Letters, op.Cit., Vol. II, pp.283-4. 
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of People to it - our wheat turns out so so, but how much 
better than our neighbours, I don't know one that has 
succeeded like me, but my Van Dieman's land wheat is gone, 
also my Cape - in short all the fine delicate wheats 
perish •.. it is a poor satisfaction at the end of the 3rd 
Season to say a farmer has barely enough to serve him for 
the year, how are wages and the etc etc to be paid for .•• " 
The increase in the incidence of Xhosa cattle thefts during 
1822 caused widespread concern amongst the Settlers. Philipps noted 
that the intensity of these raids increased during periods of politi cal 
disturbance between the frontier authorities and the Xhosa, such as 
the attack on the kraal of the chief Ngquika. Another action taken 
by the cape authorities, on directions from the returned governor, 
Lord Charles Somerset, was the conversion of the right of the Xhosa 
to enter the colony on passes to collect the red clay from the pits 
near the settlement, into a government fair at which the Xhosa were 
1 
now expected to barter ivory and other commodities for this clay. 
This decision on the part of the government, to capitalise on what 
the Xhosa had come to consider as a right, was bound to cause friction. 
That they were now called upon to pay for what they had previously 
been allowed to carry away freely, was seen by them as an injustice 
which was, no doubt, rectified by the lifting of as many cattle 
from the immediate proximity as possible. Another major spate of 
thefts was to follow the return of a patrol led by Ensign Lavoine 
in February, 1823, which as a punitive measure, had captured a 
2 large number of Xhosa cattle. 
3 Several Settlers lost their lives in encounters with the Xhosa. 
This was the cause of a great deal of alarm and petitions were made 
1 Hockly, H.E., op.cit., p.76. 
2philipps, T., Settler, op.cit., pp.155-6, 172. 
3Hockly, H.E., op.cit., p.79; Philipps, T., Settler, op.cit., 
p.47; Supra, pp. 52-3. 
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for the establishment of some form of defence system . In October, 
1822, the Albany Levy was created, consisting of two troops of 
1 yeomanry and five companies of infantry, a body of some 600 men . 
This force was unsuccessful in reducing the number of depredations, 
as it was impossible to carry out both military and farming operations. 
It is notable that it did not lack volunteers, which gives a clear 
indication of the fears felt by the settlement. This loss of cattle 
and lives by the Settlers, at a time when they were struggling for 
their existence, was bound to severely affect their attitude towards 
the Xhosa. 
The settlement entered the year 1823 while in the grip of a 
severe drought. Thus the prospects for agriculture were bleak from 
the very outset. The first good rain only fell in March. Philipps 
2 
wrote, 
"We have had some rain at last enough to soak the ground 
for planting & the grass at last grows which it has not 
done for 9 months so as to last, for what rain has hitherto 
done, the Sun has in a few days afterwards undone . . .. " 
No further good rains fell until October on Philipps' location and 
similar conditions prevailed over most of the settlement, although 
good rains had been experienced in the interior. The repeated failure 
of the crops, together with the drought and Xhosa depredations , were 
now taking a heavy toll of the Settlers who had managed to remain on 
the land. Less than half of the adult males who had emigrated in 
1820 were now left on their 10cations,3 while many more, like 
4 Philipps, were all too eager to be off. 
lIbid., p.80. 
2 h ' I ' L t 't V 1 I 47 p ~ 1PpS, T . , et ers, op.c~ .. , 0.. II, p. .. 
3 Cory, G. E. , 'Bri tish Settlers', op.cit., p.241 . 
4philipps, T . , Settler, op . cit., p.176. 
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"All are quitting one way or other, not one half the Men 
remain at their Locations. Mr Dalgairns and his three 
Daughters took leave of us yesterday. He has taken a farm 
100 miles off near Somerset Government farm in partnership 
with the proprietor Mr Hart, there he can irrigate without 
which there is no certainty whatever. Mr. Greathead, 
ruined completely, is travelling up the country buying and 
selling goods to the Boors. Mr. Southey and Mr. Holder 
have both taken farms up the Country, many days journey 
from Society, but they can irrigate and are free from the 
Caffres. Thus 3 out of the 5 Heads of Parties in the 
Kennersley Castle have quitted their acres as useless." 
Phili ppps was preparing to plant again, but rather with a view to 
enhancing the value of his property, than the hopes of reaping a 
1 good harvest. 
"As for ourselves we are ploughing and preparing for a 
fourth crop and perhaps a fourth disappointment . We mean to 
sow 6 acres of Rye and I hope and trust in God that before 
the next harvest ripens we shall be off ..... 
In April he related the fact that in the previous year he had been 
offered £600 for his farm, if he could assure the title. He now 
doubted that he would get even this amount, which he considered 
paltry, as the general determination to quit the colony was so 
2 
strong amongst the Settlers. 
At least one of the Settlers, Mr R. Dunn, together with 
H. Nourse, was turning the potential of the settlement to good 
3 
advantage. In August, 1822, he had salted beef at Bathurst which 
he had shipped in casks made of local timber to a merchant in Cape 
4 Town. A second shipment was made in June, 1823, when some sixty 
casks, each weighing 330 Ibs., were consigned from the Kowie. 5 
2philiPPS, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. III, pp.77-8 . 
3see infra, P.83. 
4 Lower Albany Chronicle, Part I, p.47. 
5Ibid ., p.56. 
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By 1823 Philipps complained of the great uncertainty of any 
form of crop that might be planted and of the great expense incurred 
in obtaining the necessities of life on the frontier. The existing 
drought had destroyed all hopes of harvesting anything worth con-
sidering as a substantial crop. 1 In January, Philipps wrote , 
"The greatest objection to this Country, is the want of 
certain return for labour, you can rely on no crop; for 
instance I have this season two acres of potatoes, the 
haulm is fine, but no return whatever. I have not a single 
potato for use, I must be content to let the haulm die off 
and wait another four or five months, when without touching 
the drills I may have a crop, this provided there is rain, 
if not the seed will remain perhaps 12 months." 
Robert Hart, the superintendent of Somerset Farm, also told Philipps 
that while wheat had been grown on his property in the past, there 
was a very small chance of this succeeding on a regular basis. 2 
Besides their failure to reap a cash crop in the 1822-23 season, 
there had also been a general failure of secondary crops, such as 
pumpkin and maize. 3 It was probably this factor, for these crops had 
become the staple diet of the poorer Settlers, which drove many of 
those who had remained behind on the locations following the previous 
failures, from the land. One of the outcomes of this was that labour 
on the 4 locations became scarcer and dearer. This resulted in 
appeals being made by those who remained on the land to the Board of 
Commissioners, who had recently been appointed to investigate the 
financial position of the colony and the conditions of the Settlers. 
It was even rumoured that the Commissioners, who by May 1823, had 
Iphilipps, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. II, pp.339-40. 
2Ibid ., Vol. III, p.74. 
3Ibid ., p.234. 
4Ibid., p. 234. 
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not yet reached the eastern frontier, were to recommend that 
labourers be sent out, on government expense, from Britain, but with-
out the promise of land. l Philipps suggested that this should have 
been the case in the first instance! 
In spite of difficulties and earlier doubts, Philipps wrote 
in May, 1823, that he was again involved in ploughing and planting,2 
" ... we are ploughing and sowing once more, not again, I 
hope, to be disappointed, but I am sure you will not wonder 
that after three successive blanks we should feel a great 
distrust for any return capable of repaying us, even the 
expenses independent of profit. We intend sowing very 
little wheat, and some few acres of Rye which we are in-
formed & indeed have tasted makes excellent bread, & it 
has succeeded more generally than other grain altho' 
liable to attacks from the caterpillar - the crop of barley 
produces very little, the husk is so thick that when sifted 
but very little flour remains, we have however been living 
on it since Xmas and now and then some Indian corn cakes of 
which also we had a very trifling return .•. " 
Philipps saw that he was comparatively well off in comparison to the 
poorer Settlers, who were now living almost entirely on maize and 
pumpkins, and of these there had been a very poor return. Without 
the prospect of rations this shortage of essential food stuffs 
meant that in the face of another disastrous crop, many of those 
Settlers remaining on the land would be confronted with famine 
conditions. 
The disaster followed in October, when, on October 1, the 
period of nearly two years of inadequate rainfall was broken by good 
rains. By October 10 there had been five days of continuous rain, 
3 
and already buildings were beginning to collapse. By October 13, 
lIbid. , p.234. 
2Ibid ., Vol. III, pp.81-2. 
3 Lower Albany Chronicle, Part I, pp.58-9. 
68 
the rain had become a heavy downpour, which falling on waterlogged 
ground gave rise to raging torrents in all the local streams. l It was 
only on October 27, that the rain finally stopped falling. By then 
large parts of the settlement had been destroyed by the flood-waters , 
particularly the dwelling and gardens of the poorer type of Settler 
who had specifically built on the banks of streams to be in c lose 
proximity to the water supply. Philipps noted,2 
liThe accounts all around us have been lamentable indeed, 
many poor people of the Labouring Class have lost their 
little all, houses, gardens and small pieces of Indian or 
other Corn entirely levelled with the ground, and the 
Soil swept away." 
Philipps, being located on a plain, had escaped very little damage 
beyond the destruction of parts of his garden, the collapse of a wall 
of his kraal, the death of one cow, and the loss of several sheep, 
which had been swept away in the swollen stream which ran near his 
3 kraal. 
Worse was to follow 
vived damage by this means. 
the floods for those whose crops had sur-
4 Philipps wrote, 
"The greatest misfortune is that since the storm the Corn 
everywhere has been dreadfully affected by blight, rust, 
and caterpillar, even the solid stem wheat that everyone 
depended upon, and has been grown for the last 3 years 
without being affected in the smallest degree, is in many 
places totally destroyed. Mr. Hart of the Government 
Farm at Somerset has actually lost 4000 Muids of it . 
Col. Cuyler of Uitenhage has also lost his, and many others . 
The Rye is also much injured by the Caterpillar and blight, 
OillE is attacked by the former and our Wheat by the Rust, 
but the ears continue untouched and at present look 
lIbid., p.59 . 
2 h · 1 . T S 1 . 185 p ~ ~PPSJ ~ J ett er, op!c~t., p. . 
3Ibid ., pp.184-5. 
4Ibid ., p.185. 
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remarkably fine, we hope we may have a part spared tho ' 
not a full crop. Some few have partly escaped and are 
now reaping small crops. God grant that this may be the 
case with ourselves . .. 11 
Thus, in general, 1823 was another failure for those Settlers 
who had remained on the land. They had sunken to their lowest ebb. 
The majority of those able to had left the land, while those t hat 
remained , either through choice, or not having an alternative f orm 
of employment to go to, were destitute. Even those who considered 
themselves superior to the majority in every respect, like Thomas 
Philipps, now lacked the means for removing themselves from the Cape . 
It was on this sombre note that the year 1823 ended. 
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CHAPTER III 
In consideration of the recurrent failures of their initial 
attempts to grow wheat, the question should be asked as to why the 
Settlers persisted in their attempts at its cultivation . To find 
an answer to this question it must first be borne in mind that t he 
size of their locations disqualified pastoral farming as a suitable 
alternative to cultivation in the formative years of the settlement . 
Set with no viable alternative to arable farming, they fixed on the 
only crop, which, dictated by their English background, was con-
side red as a 'cash crop'. Wheaten bread also formed the chief staple 
in the diets of most nineteenth century European countries, and as 
such had formed the chief source of income to British arable farmers 
and to those in the rest of Europe. While it might not have been 
common knowledge to the Settlers that Britain had become a wheat 
1 importing country during the early years of the nineteenth century, 
the record prices which wheat had realised during these years2 was a 
major contributory factor to their emigration. What little informa-
tion could be gained before their embarkation would have suggested 
1 Imports of wheat and oats into Britain, 1800-1859 : -
Year Wheat and flour oats and meal 
1800-9 1,989,000 cwt. 1,470,000 cwt. 
1810-19 2,617,000 1,188,000 
1820-9 1,631,000 2,206,000 
1830-9 3,743,000 1,494,000 
1840-9 10,676,000 1,834,000 
1850-9 19,326,000 3,523,000 
(Source : Mitchell and Deane, 1962, pp.97-9.) 
2 Chambers, J.D. & Mingay, G.E., The Agricultural Revolution 
1750-1880, pp.112-3. In 1812 wheat prices were at their highest 
for the nineteenth century at 126s.6d. per quarter . In the early 
1790's it had sold at between 48s. and 58s. per quarter. 
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that the Cape was a colony where wheat was known to succeed. A 
colony where land was to be had for next to nothing , where the burden 
of taxes was virtually unknown, and where wheat could be cultivated, 
was indeed a land of Goshen. It was probably hoped that their sur-
plus production could find a market within the colony, or that it 
might even be produced at a low enough cost to stand the high trans-
portation costs to Britain or her other dependencies and colonies . 
Added to this was the blunder of the Cape government which also 
believed that wheat could be successfully cultivated in the Zuurveld , 
and had thus planned the settlement to cater for this form of 
farming. This administration, too, rather than admitting its mis-
take and abandoning the settlement, chose to actively encourage it. 
Thus what might in retrospect seem absurd, was motivated at 
the time by some knowledge of the European conditions, ignorance of 
the local conditions, and tradition. To the Settlers the growing of 
wheat was essential to their existence. It was also more than a 
mere cash crop . The first essential of the new Settlers was to 
attempt to achieve self-sufficiency in the provision of foodstuffs . 
In this wheat was to play an essential role alongside their 
vegetable patches. The fact that considerable crops of maize could 
be successfully grown and succeeded in saving many from outright 
starvation in the early years of the settlement, did not detract 
in the eyes of these Englishmen from their traditional staple. 
Maize was considered a poor substitute for their wheaten bread, and 
thus they persisted in the cultivation of wheat in the hopes that 
either the rust would disappear or that a suitable strain would be 
found which would be resistant to this malady. In this way, it was 
hoped, sufficient wheat could be cultivated, to maintain their 
72 
traditional way of life in the land of their adopti on, and a lso pro-
v i de them wit h an income . 
The high freight charges payable on produce shi pped between 
Algoa Bay and Cape Town, and the high wagon transport rates between 
the settlements and Algoa Bay, meant that from the outset t he Sett lers 
were placed at a disadvantage for the production of a bulky c ommodity 
such as wheat, both in the Cape Town market and abroad in Europe .l 
This set the more influential Settlers to clamour for the opening of 
their immediate market in Grahamstown, for the military forces on 
the frontier, and to begin a search for other markets for t heir 
produce in Mauritius and the Australian colonies. 
At the same time a greater understanding of the local farming 
conditions was reached. While Philipps could boast in 1820 that he 
had been settled on what had been the best wheat lands on the eastern 
frontier,2 by 1824 he had come to realise that this was a qualified 
and somewhat dubious claim in relation to what the average Engli sh 
farmer would expect a good corn land to be. Rust, drought, plague s 
of caterpillars and locusts, revealed themselves in turn to cast 
doubt on the wisdom of such statements, and the concept of re -
e stablishing the traditional ' south of England' estate began to fade 
f r om the minds of the intended squirearchy of the Settlers . 
If cultivation could not answer as the chief source of income 
and farming activity in the settlement, it was nevertheless 
impossible to abandon it entirely. The costs of imported foodst uf f s , 
whether from the we st of the colony or from abroad were prohibi tively 
lphiliPPS, T., Settler, op.cit., P.69. 
2 See supra, pp.23- 4, also Philipps, T., Settler, op .cit . , p.53 . 
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high. The early incidence of stock thefts by their Xhosa ne i ghbours 
a l so clearly indicated the wisdom of not placing too great a r eli ance 
on stock farming. The period after 1823, down to the outbreak of 
the Sixth Frontier War in 1834 was a period of diversificati on and 
experimentation by the Settler farmers in their new environment. 
Diversification into cattle and sheep farming, alongside cult i vation, 
was fost er ed by the failure of the wheat crops, and the gener al 
unreliability of the area to agriculture. At the same time a t tempts 
were made to find by experimentation a more suitable and reliable crop 
which would answer to the needs for providing an income from the land. 
I t was natural that the Settlers who had chosen to remain on 
the land entered the year 1824 with a great deal of doubt and 
trepidation . If there were signs of an improvement in t heir political 
relations with the Cape government and with the appointment of the 
Commission of Enquiry to investigate their complai nts,l the course 
which t hi s political activity might take still remained va gue . Once 
more their ploughs were turned to in the hopes that they might f i nally 
provide a miracle , or at least a subsistence. In the cultivation of 
wheat, all attention was diverted to the growing of Bengal wheat 
where possible . The Rev. William Shaw had used some of the funds 
provided by the Society for the Relief of Distressed Settlers in 1823, 
t o acquire this strain of wheat from those who had succeeded in 
growing it the previous year, in order that the Settlers who would 
otherwise not have been able to afford this strain might now a lso 
begin to reap t he benefits. 2 In some instances 50 Rixdollars per mui d3 
IHOckly, H.E . , op. cit., p.9lff. 
2Theal , G.M . , Records, op.cit., Vol . XVI, pp.265-6. 
31 muid = 3.1 bushels. 
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had been asked for this type of wheat. By June, 1824 Philipps 
reported that his son Edward was again ploughing a nd that they were 
sowing only solid stem wheat and barley 'with a very faint hope of 
1 
any return' . Phili pps had grown despondent with his farm 'Lampeter ', 
and had during January applied for an additional farm for grazing 
2 purposes. In May he made a more specific request to the Commi ssioners 
of Enquiry at their sitting at Bathurst, for a grant of land at 
3 Rietfontein, on the coast. 
As the season progressed and it became evident that the crop was 
to be a vast improvement over their previous attempts, the question 
of an adequate market for their produce became a reality for the first 
time. By November, 1824, Miss Charlotte Philipps could write,4 
"We have had the most delightful weather this season, the 
gardens are very luxuriant as we have had so much rain and 
the corn looks very well at present and promises a plent i-
ful harvest particularly up the country." 
The Commissioners of Enquiry, in reporting to the governor, Lord Charles 
Somerset, in July 1824, stressed the need for a market for the produce 
5 
of the Settlers, 
"The Settlers admit that hitherto in consequence of the 
destruction of the greatest portion of their Crops by the 
rust, the loss of a Market for the remainder was of little 
consequence to them. 
During the last year however some inconsiderable quant-
ity of produce was at the disposal of a few of the Settlers 
near Graham'S Town, who no doubt, unless the ultimate views 
of Government respecting the Somerset Farm were explained, 
would not fail to perceive in the present mode of supplying 
both Grain and Meat, the exercise of a command over the 
lPhilipps, T. , Letters, op.cit., Vol. III, p.246. 
2 Lower Albany Chronicle, Part I, p.63. 
3Ibid ., p.67. 
4philipps, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. III, p . 263 . 
5 Theal, G.M., Records, op.cit., Vol. XVIII, pp . 156-7. 
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Market that might at any time be used to their prejudice , 
or unjustly relaxed in their favour ...• It further appea r s 
that as the failure of the Corn Crops at Somerset Farm 
have happened in the same years that those of the Sett l ers 
have suffered, that Establishment has not afforded a 
resource in times of scarcity, while its produce would came 
into competition with theirs in plentiful Seasons ." 
For the Settlers who had settled in the Baviaans Valley, the problem 
had come a season earlier. There had been good crops of whea t at the 
end of 1823, and in February, 1824, their leader, although now settled 
in Cape Town, had memorialised the governor. He stated that t his 
group were at a disadvantage as there was no market in the immediate 
vicinity, other than the Somerset Farm, which had refused to purchase 
their surplus from them. Pringle requested that they be allowed to 
deliver this surplus to Somerset Farm at a reasonable price, below 
that which it cost the government to supply wheat from the western 
districts. l On February 19, 1824, Pringle submitted a tender f or the 
supply of 100 muids of wheat to the Somerset Farm, or any post within 
that distance from the Baviaans River, at 14 Rixdollars per mui d . 2 
3 This tender was then accepted. 
On the strength of the recommendations of the Commissioners of 
Enquiry and the general political unrest which had become incr easingly 
evident amongst the Settlers following their fourth successive crop 
failure in 1823 , the governor undertook a journey to the eastern 
districts in 1825 to judge conditions for himself, and to attempt to 
appease the political faction which was now growing into a strong 
opposition in that quarter. This visit had certain far-reachi ng 
1 Theal, Records, op.cit., Vol. XVII, p.85. 
2Ibid ., p.87. 
3Ibid ., p . 90. 
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implications for those Settlers still on the land. Following up 
the recommendations of the Commissioners, t he Somerset Farm was 
disbanded, and on the site of the former fa rm a t ownshi p was la i d 
1 
out and building erven were offered for sale . This village became 
known as Somerset. By this move the market created by the military 
presence on the frontier was thrown open to the Settlers. Need l ess 
to say , this did not create a free market, as the bulk of purchases 
of agricultural produce on the frontier were made by the milit ary on 
a tender basis. These tenders soon passed into the hands of a few 
who were in a position to meet the military requirements regarding 
quant ity, delivery and price. This was bound to exclude the small 
producer but it appeased the political force amongst the Settlers. 
Goldswain pointed out the difficulties confronted by the small 
2 producer, 
II • • • at this time it went verey hard with meney of the 
Settlers [1823J . •. and having no Market for our produce fer 
our nerest Market was Grahams Town thirtey Miles and meney 
of the Settlers having no convaince so that if they had 
aney thing for sale it was forst to be cept untill it got 
of no youce, . .. . " 
Other steps taken to appease the Settlers, were the revi ew of 
the original land grants and the granting of loans to those in 
possession of land, or who could offer some other form of security . 3 
On May 21, 1824, Somerset reported to Earl Bathurst, the Colonial 
Secretary, the appointment of a commission headed by William Hayward, 
to investigate the claims of the Settlers and to readjust their land 
allocations. 4 This commission worked relatively quickly and by 
1 Hockly, H.E., op . cit . , p.104 . 
2Goldswain, J., op.cit . , Vol. I, pp.55-6. 
3 Ibid . , Vol . I, p . 56. 
4 
Theal, Records, op.cit., Vol. XVII, p.340. 
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November Philipps was able to comment on its proceedings . As a 
leader in the group of Settlers who were now opposed to the governor , 
and who were appealing to their connections in Britain to bring 
parliamentary pressure to bear on the cape administration, in order 
that it might pay greater attention to the needs of the Settlers, it 
1 
was inevitable that Philipps' wishes would be assiduously pursued, 
"I think you were informed of the arrival at Graham's 
Town of the Commissioner Hayward to settle and adjust the 
Claims for Land and new Grants etc. He is now nearly 
finished his arduous task of endeavouring to please and 
satisfy us all and has given general and universal satis-
faction. There may be some few discontented grumblers 
amongst us but the greater part of those even have no 
reason to complain of him, he has not been able to find 
Farms sufficient for many who have applied and are 
deserving of them but this is not his fault and must be 
left to Government who we hope will see the necessity of 
purchasing Farms of the Boers now for sale and giving them 
to the Settlers ..• 
Great care is taken not to grant Farms to any who can 
maintain themselves by any trade or Profession. Mechanics 
and Labourers are to be encouraged to follow their trades 
in the different Towns - this is the plan at present 
proposed and which we all ardently hope will be adopted as 
the surest means of general improvement." 
Philipps had made representations to both the Commissioners of Enquiry2 
and to the government commissioner to be granted an area of land at 
Rietfontein . This land had originally been granted to the Sephton 
party, but they had later been moved to make room for the proposed 
large party under General Campbell. General Campbell died of 
injuries sustained when falling from his horse in May, 1622,3 and 
the party never materialised. His widow could thus not claim the 
full amount of land which had previously been allocated to the General . 
lphiliPPS, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. III, pp.265-6 . 
2 See supra, p. 74. 
3 Lower Albany Chronicle , Part I, p.44. 
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The area of land in question was now claimed by the original occu-
piers and Philipps. The grant was made in 1825, in Philipps' favour, 
after both sides had made their representations to the governor 
during his visit to the frontier. Permission was granted to Philipps 
in mid 1824 to pasture his cattle on this land, with the provision 
that they should be removed in the event of the land being granted 
1 to the other party. So sure was Philipps of his claim, that by 
the time the land was granted to him on February 23, 1825, he was 
2 
already busy with the construction of a house. 
The Commission of Enquiry pointed out in July, 1824, that it 
3 
considered the land grants of the Settlers too small, and so the 
governor on his visit undertook to implement the findings of this 
commission in granting larger locations. The Settlers had been 
due to receive the titles to their land in mid 1823, on the com-
pletion of three years residence upon the land. The land was to be 
measured at the expense of the government and the holder was to 
receive his title to the land on payment of a perpetual quit rent. 
This quit rent was not to exceed the sum of two pounds per annum . 
These grants were only to be made to those Settlers who had fulfilled 
the conditions of permanent residence upon the land and its useful 
cultivation. 4 The landdrost, Rivers, failed to have these titles 
completed by the fulfilment of their three years residence in May 
1823. This led to the appointment of the commission under Hayward 
lphilipps, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. III, p.269. 
2philipps, T., Settler, op.cit., p.236. 
3 Theal, G.M., Records, op.cit., Vol. XVIII, p . lS6. 
4 Hockly, H.E., op.cit., p.27. 
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to complete this task as quickly as possible. l 
While the Settlers had agreed to what seemed a nominal sum to 
pay by way of quit rent for their land prior to their embarkation 
for the Cape, on landing they discovered that this sum would be 
proportionately far in excess of what the Dutch colonists were 
expected to pay. Writing to the colonial under-secretary in June 
1823, George Pigot pointed out that for between four and six 
thousand acres of land the Dutch colonist paid between twenty and 
one hundred Rixdollars, while the Settlers were now to pay not more 
than twenty five Rixdollars for every 100 acres. It therefore 
followed that on the largest holding of any Settler, roughly two 
thousand acres, the quit rent could amount to a sum of five hundred 
Rixdollars . 2 The uncertainty and resentment which this discrepancy 
caused was finally settled in October, 1823, when the landdrost of 
Albany was issued with instructions to fix the quit rent at a rate 
of 4 skillings for each hundred acres, or at a similar rate to that 
paid by the older colonists, namely, 36 Rixdollars per 3,000 morgen 
3 
of land. By December 31, 1824, some 90,400 morgen 313 roods and 
122 feet of land had been granted in quit rent for a sum of 1,289 
Rixdollars, a sum well below the maximum of two pounds per hundred 
4 
acres ~ 
I. II< 
The prospect of an individual title to the land had drawn a 
considerable number of the Settlers back to the land who had pre-
viously left it. The Commissioners of Enquiry noted that the number 
lIbid., p.88. 
2Theal, G.M. Records, op.cit., Vol. XVI, pp.74-5. 
3Ibid ., Vol . XVI, pp.408-9. 
4 
Ibid., Vol. XIX, p.369. 
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of Settlers residing on the locations increased from 438 in May, 1823, 
to 596 in February, 1824.1 The reasons stated for this were, t hat 
they had returned to await the granting of titles, hoping that the 
government would take a lenient stance considering that they had 
broken their original agreements of permanent residence upon t he 
locations for three years. The partial crops of 1823 were seen to 
have revived the hopes of many for succeeding on the land. There 
were also those who had now made good as mechanics or labourers and 
were returning from the interior with small funds of capital. 2 
In turn, many of those who had remained on the land and had not 
moved away in search of other employment, were destitute. In 
November, 1824, a sub-committee of the Society for the Relief of 
Distressed Settlers was formed, to investigate the living conditions 
3 
of these Settlers. They found that there were many people without 
even a subsistence, very often in a degraded state and a~ost with-
out clothing. While temporary relief had to be afforded to these 
people, more permanent relief came in the form of a substantial 
harvest . 
The acreage under cultivation in 1824 had fallen drastically 
in comparison with two years previously, but returns were substantially 
more. There was certainly not sufficient sown to yield a surplus 
which would provide an income for the Settlers, but there was suffic-
ient to stave off immediate want until the following season . 
lIbid ., Vol. XXI, p.30l. 
2Ibid . 
3Lower Albany Chronicle, Part I, p.71. 
Crop 
Wheat 
Barley 
oats 
Rye 
Maize 
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TABLE I 
Crop Yields on the Settlements in 1822 
and 1824 respectivelyl 
Year Acreage Planted Total Reaped 
1822 679,5 117,5 muids 
1824 68,75 482 
1822 191 753,5 
1824 41,75 398,25 
1822 62,5 270 
1824 6 29 
1822 10 50 
1824 0,5 9 
1822 320,75 389 
Average Yield 
per acre 
0,173 muids 
7,011 
3,945 
9,539 
4,320 
4,833 
5,0 
18,0 
1,213 
This good agricultural season, being followed by the visit to 
the frontier of the governor in January and February of 1825, and 
the resultant increase in the size of many of the locations, meant 
that for most of the serious practicing farmers, the future now seemed 
considerably brighter. The crop of 1824 for the first time removed 
serious doubts that the land on which they were situated was capable 
of producing any form of crop. It had become evident that the returns 
to be expected per acre would be considerably below those achieved 
by their British counterparts. This was due to the nature of the soil, 
climate, and the fact that these factors could not be overcome to any 
considerable degree by the employment of irrigation. Lacking the 
offal and sewage wastes of a more densely populated country to 
assist in the fertilisation of the soil, greater reliance had to be 
1 Theal, G.M., Records, op.cit., Vol. XVI, pp . 40-1; Vol . XIX, 
pp.386-7 . 
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placed on the use of animal manures and rock minerals, such as lime 
for the improvement of the soil. It says much for the desire of 
these early Settlers to improve their land that men such as Goldswain 
and others could earn a livelihood by transporting lime to the 
locations. I 
The development of arable and pastoral farming in Albany were 
thus to reinforce each other. Any expansion in arable farming would 
require a considerable increase in the number of cattle or sheep to 
provide the necessary manure, while a certain amount of this culti-
vation would be devoted to the growth of fodder crops. This l atter 
factor would not playas great a role as in the European countries 
due to the relative mildness of the winters in the Albany district. 
Any increase in cultivation would thus also require a disproportionate 
increase in the size of a farming unit. In evidence before the 
Commissioners of Enquiry, the government commissioner, William 
Hayward, pointed out that at least ten loads of manure were considered 
necessary for the cultivation of one acre of land, and as there was 
no litter used in the cattle kraals in the colony, this necessitated 
twenty head of oxen or cows to provide this quantity of manure. 
More animals were thus required for the cultivation of land than were 
necessary for the working of it. It was seen that a team of ten oxen 
2 
could provide the labour necessary in the cultivation of thirty acres . 
In addition to this, Hayward pointed out that roughly ten acres 
3 
of grazing was required to keep an animal in Albany. The size of a 
lGoldswain, J . , op .cit . , Vol. I, p.69. Part of this lime was 
used for whitewashing buildings etc. 
2 Theal, G.M., Records, op.cit., Vol. XXI, p . 383 . 
3Ibid ., p.382. 
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farming unit would thus have to be disproportionately large in 
relation to the amount of cultivation which could be undertaken on it. 
This increased size had been granted and it remained for the Settlers 
to increase their cattle numbers to cater both for their agricultural 
needs, as well as to meet the demands of the frontier market. The 
contracts for the supply of meat for the European troops at 
Grahamstown had already been placed in the hands of the Settler 
farmers in 1824. 1 
A demand for cattle was also created at the Kowie, where Henry 
Nourse had established a plant for the processing of salt beef under 
the management of R. Dunn in 1822. 2 Regular cattle fairs were held 
there to meet the requirement of this plant and for the dispersal of 
sheep and cattle amongst the Settlers by agents and traders who 
brought them from the interior. Goldswain recounts the purchase of 
cattle at such a sale held during October, 1824. 3 Miles Bowker also 
noted the potential of this Kowie outlet for their produce, in 1824,4 
"Our prospects of improvement will be also much in feeding, 
in cattle, sheep and pork. We have an excellent market 
for it salted, at the Kowie, where our cheese which we make 
very good, as well as fat and hides, find a good market." 
Lord Charles Somerset found it sufficiently significant to report to 
Earl Bathurst the sailing of the 'Good Intent' from the Kowie on 
December 4, 1823, for cape Town with the first full cargo of hides, 
5 fat, butter, and other goods, purchased principally from the Settlers . 
lIbid., p. 325. 
2 See supra, P.65., 
3Goldswain, J., op.cit., Vol. I, p.56. 
4Mitford-Barberton, I., Comdt. Holden Bowker, p.24. 
5 Theal, G.M., Records, op.cit., Vol. XVI, p.464. 
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The development of the Mauritius, and indirectly, the St .Helena 
trade , for salt beef became a very important matter t o the Settler 
farmers. Men like Nourse and William Cock were largely respons ible 
for pioneering this trade, while many of the farmers attempted the 
processing of their own beef for this market. Here too mistakes were 
made and the cape product fell into disrepute, particularly in 
. .12 · Maur~t~us . Philipps wrote in June, 1827, 
"We are begining to salt Beef - Mr Nourse has just arrived 
to live upon his farm, he has brought up English salt -
he .expects to get a contract for the Isle of France but we 
all hope it will be a public tender - the garrison is kept 
9 months in the year in Salt Beef from Ireland - our good 
Friends the Commissioners of Inquiry mean to recommend a 
Contract here ... II 
but later noted that others had undertaken the salting of beef in 
the hot summer months, which caused the product to deteriorate 
rapidly and had given the Settlers' product a bad name. 3 Cock 
suggests that this was largely a situation contrived by the Mauritian 
traders . 4 He visited the island in 1827 and commented, 
"On the evening of my arrival at Mauritius I learnt that 
Cape beef was not in very good repute, but that the 
Provision Merchant that bought the 300 casks condemned 
would like to obtain another lot of the same quality • . • . 
The next business was to obtain a cask of the condemned 
beef. I eventually succeeded when I requested the agent 
to have it opened and to expose the beef for several days , 
and when cooked to allow me to taste it. This was done 
with the exception of my tasting it. The Commission of 
Enquiry were then at Mauritius and took great interest in 
lCOCk's Diary (Cory Library MS 14262), pp.3-4. 
2philipps, T. , Letters, Vol. IV, pp.231-2. The date on thi s 
letter is given in the letter-book as 24 June 1827. Nourse approached 
the government requesting a trade monopoly for salt beef on 30 
January 1824 (Records, Vol. XVII, pp.33-4). 
3 Philipps , T., Letters, op.cit., Vol . IV, p . 338. 
4Cock 's Diary, op.cit., p . 4. 
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the matter. Beef was delivered at Mauritius at 
2 1/4d. per lb. Irish beef costing about 6d. in England. 
Mr Pennell, the Officer of the Commission, a big gentle-
manly man, admitted that it was probable that they were 
wrong, that he would advertise for the entire supply of 
the Island, which he did and we took the contract for 
three years." 
The improved stability of the settlement following the good 
season in 1824, gave rise to an increasing demand for livestock, 
beyond the immediate initial requirement for draught animals and 
milch-cows. 1 An increased awareness of the need for large quantities 
of manure for cultivation and the opening of lucrative markets for 
animal products, enhanced the desire of the Settlers to enlarge the 
size of their herds and flocks. A market for salt beef was pioneered. 
This was shortly followed by exploratory moves for a market for hides 
and skins in Britain. The successful breeding of woolled sheep had 
already been undertaken in the western districts and was pioneered 
on the frontier by Settlers like Pigot and White. There was thus a 
keen demand for livestock in the settlement. Men like John 
MontgOmery,2 James Howse,3 and William cock,4 were to pioneer the 
trade with the interior farmers and that which became known as the 
'kaffir trade' with the Xhosa across the Keiskamma River. From 
these sources came the cattle and sheep to meet the demands of the 
Settlers for more livestock. In 1823 the governor had put an end 
to all legal interaction between black and white on the frontier 
in an endeavour to end the theft of colonial cattle by the Xhosa. 
1 See supra, Pp.30-1. 
2 Montgomery, J., The Reminiscences of .•. , passim. 
3Ayliff, J . , The Memorials of James Howse, passim . 
4 Cock, W., Diary , pp.2-3. 
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This merely resulted in an illicit traffic being carried on . In 
July, 1824, a system of fairs was introduced at Fort Willshire on 
the Keiskamma River, in which the two races could participate in 
trade under the watchful eye of the military authorities. l Licenced 
dealers were allowed to barter with the Xhosa under the t emporary 
restriction upon the purchase of cattle, and the sale of spirits, 
2 
arms and gunpowder. This restriction upcn the purchase of cattle 
was imposed with the object of 'checking the improvidence of the 
Caffres in dispcsing of their means of subsistence. ,3 The trade in 
gum, ivory, and hides, was encouraged as it was seen that these items 
in no way interfered with the social compcsition of Xhosa life. 
Cattle it was realised, stood as a measure of social status and 
wealth in Xhosa society, and while the exchange of them for novelties, 
such as buttons and beads and other trinkets, might be considered as 
acceptable to the Xhosa, the time would nevertheless come when the 
value of these items became known, and resentment and enmity would 
follow. This move was thus an attempt to check such trade until the 
Xhosa had come to realise the full value of their cattle. That the 
first seven months of this trade were to result in the Xhosa parting 
with some 50,441 Ibs. of ivory, and in the first five months of 
16,800 lbs. of gum and 15,000 hides, would suggest the wisdom of this 
move in the interests of preserving peaceful relations between these 
4 two groups. A propcrtionate drain in cattle would have been 
disastrous. 
ITheal, G.M . Records , op.cit., Vol. XXI, p.320. 
2Ibid ., p.320. 
3Ibid . , p.320. 
4Ibid • 
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A proclamation by the governor of November 17, 1825, removed 
this restriction on the trade in cattle . It pointed out that the 
proclamation of July 1 23, 1824, 
".~.has occasioned constant Smuggling in that Article 
[cattle], and has been attended with the most pernicious 
consequences to the Peace and Tranquility of the 
Frontier: .. It 
This measure had not stayed the Settlers' desire for cattle, or the 
Xhosas' desire for ornamentation. 2 Writing to Earl Bathurst on 
November 19, 1825, the governor complained,3 
" ••. your Lordship will perceive that the Kaffers have been 
very troublesome of late •.• the constant illicit Traffick 
which takes place between the Kaffers and some of the 
worst description of the Settlers located near the Frontier, 
and the frequent Incursions which the Kaffers make to 
plunder Cattle, in order to enable them to carryon such 
illicit Traffick have long since given me such uneasiness 
as the recovery of such Cattle by the Military must lead 
at times of bloodshed, by which the Spirit of revenge is 
always kept up." 
It was inevitable on the poorly guarded frontier that such 
illicit trade would result, particularly as there was such an urgent 
motive behind this trade. It was also inevitable that the Xhosa, 
having little harassment from the troops stationed on the frontier, 
would steal other colonial cattle on the way out of the colony, to 
recoup themselves for those traded to such 'unscrupulous Settlers'. 
Some of these animals would then be kept, but others were slaughtered 
for their hides. 4 As the landdrost of Albany pointed out, 
1 Theal, G.M. Records, op.cit., Vol. XXIII, pp.443-4. 
2 Lower Albany Chronicle, Part I, p.73. On January 14, 1825, 
John Johnson and John Brown were intercepted by a patrol, while 
trading with the Xhosa for cattle. On January 19, 1825, a patrol 
prevented Thomas and Daniel Mahoney trading for cattle at 
Trompetters Drift. 
3 Theal, G.M., Records, op.cit., Vol. XXIII, p.447. 
4Ibid ., pp.450-1. 
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" ... hundreds [of hides] are now brought to Grahamstown, 
which show plainly to whom they had belonged •.• a Caffre 
now gets as much for the skin of an Ox as he considers 
the whole beast to be worth." 
It was no longer a question of attempting to protect the position of 
the Xhosa in his supposed ignorance as to the value of cattle, but 
rather an attempt to protect the colonial farmer from increa sed 
harassment. The wisdom in this shift in emphasis, or lack of it , was 
to be revealed later . In a report to Earl Bathurst, the Commissioners 
of Enquiry noted,l 
"The caffres have long been desirous of opening a commer-
cial intercourse, and have entered keenly into the spirit 
of it, and whenever they have learnt the habit of res-
pecting the right of property when it is transferred from 
their own hands to others, the traffic in cattle cannot 
fail to become a source of much advantage to the British 
Inhabitants, altho' we still think that the Caffre tribes 
will find a difficulty in dispensing with a species of 
property that at once influences their civil condition in 
their own country, while it ministers essentially to their 
daily wants; such a barter might also stimulate them 
violently to dispossess other tribes of their cattle ••• " 
While there was a strong possibility that they would now be willing 
to dispossess other tribes of their cattle to meet the requirements 
of the colony for cattle, there was also the possibility that the day 
might dawn when they chose to dispossess the colonists across the 
frontier of their cattle as well. This would be particularly true 
once they came to realise the forfeiture they had made in supplying 
a great many of these animals to the settlement . It was inevitable 
that the day would dawn when the Xhosa came to realise that their 
cattle were worth a great deal more than the buttons and beads they 
had received for them. 
Cattle thefts were a continuing feature of the whole period 
I Theal, G. M., Records, op.cit., Vol. XXIII, pp.208-9. 
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between 1824 and 1834. In an age before the appearance of a cheap 
form of effective fencing and enclosure, it was inevitabl e that the 
incidence of both losses and thefts would be far higher. This is 
particularly true i f the nature of the terrain and of the immediate 
neighbours, the Xhosa tribes, are taken into account . The hilly 
terrain of Albany, together with the dense bush which is to be found 
in most of the valleys, meant that animals could be lost to the s ight 
of anyone herding them within a relatively short space of time . 
cattle grazing on the crest of a hill could have disappeared on the 
far side and have moved down into the valley and bush before the 
herder could come up to them. This also made it difficult to notice 
the activity of thieves, and the Xhosa, being familiar with the type 
of terrain, knew how to put it to best advantage for secreting and 
driving off cattle. There was also, undoubtedly, a certain amount 
of negligence on the part of the Settlers and also a lack of servants 
1 for the herding of these cattle. 
In the period 1824 to 1833 two of the Settlers were to estimate 
the annual average loss of livestock through Xhosa depredations as 
2 74 horses and 1,461 cattle. It is difficult to gauge the accuracy 
of these figures, but if they are correct, then they are a good 
indication of the seriousness of this problem which faced the Settlers. 
It was inevitable that the Xhosa should be blamed for the odd case 
of negligence where animals were simply lost, and also for thefts 
by residents of the colony. It is also probable that these figures 
reflect the total loss of. livestock from the colony, so that a monthly 
1 Theal, G. M. Records, op.cit., Vol. XXI, p . 321 . 
See supra, pp.52-3 . 
2Wilmot, A. & Chase, J.C., Annals of the Cape Colony, p.303 . 
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loss of 6 horses and 120 head of cattle over the whole length of the 
frontier would not seem quite so severe. It is, nevertheless, true 
that such depredations were a continual source of worry and annoyance 
with which frontier farmers had to contend. The loss of one or two 
animals to whatever cause represented a serious blow to t he poorer 
Settler, while the loss of twenty or thirty head of cattle was a 
disaster to any man . 
The 1825-6 agricultural season was not, generally, a favourable 
one. In the western districts of the colony, the wheat crop was 
once more attacked by rust, causing prices to rise on the cape Town 
market from III Rixdollars per load of 10 muids, to 224 Rixdollars 
1 per load. Drought played a role, and on April 3, 1826, a proclama-
tion of the new acting-governor, Major-General Richard Bourke, who 
served while governor Lord Charles Somerset proceeded to Britain to 
defend his actions as governor, stated that due to the general failure 
of the crops all pulse, grain, and flour, was to be admitted into 
the colony's ports at a reduced ad valorem rate of 3 per cent until 
2 December 31, 1826. On a journey undertaken by Philipps into the 
interior in 1825 to pay the Pringle location a visit, he noted that 
this was reported to be the driest season yet experienced by the 
Pringles in the interior. As a result of this drought, the Baviaans 
River, which supplied this settlement with water for irrigati on of 
their wheat lands, had dried up.3 
This situation contrasted strongly with the position in l ower 
INeumark, S.D., op . cit., p.32. 
2 . Theal, G.M. Records, op.c~t., Vol. XXVI, pp.235-6. 
3philiPPS, T., Letters, op.cit . , Vol. IV, p.58. 
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Albany. Philipps had moved his family permanently to his new farm 
at Rietfontein, which he finally chose to call 'Glendour'. Here his 
sons had planted grain and laid out a garden, on which Mrs Philipps 
commented in July, 1825, as 1 follows, 
"We are all quite well ·and enjoying ourselves very much 
improving this sweet place - our Corn coming finely on 
with a fair promise at oresent of a good harvest 
plenty of Milk and Butter and Vegetables in our present 
small garden ... " 
While Philipps' cattle were improving in condition on the 
richer grazing of his new farm, they were not without disease. It 
would seem strange that a man as well educated and well read as 
Philipps should have attributed the cause of the complaint affecting 
his cattle to the nature of their grazing. The only reason for this 
can be attributed to the novelty of this disease and the fact that 
it had not been encountered before. Many of the diseases with which 
the Settler farmers now had to contend had not been encountered in 
Britain, particularly the tick-borne diseases which plagued the 
Albany district • 2 Mrs Philipps commented on this disease as follows, 
..... we occasionally send our cattle there [Lampeter, the 
original farm] when they want a change of grass, for it 
is literally sometimes too rich for them and there is at 
present a most extraordinary complaint amongst the Calves 
they say occasioned by it, when once attacked by it they 
never recover and removing them into a different and 
poorer grass to prevent their taking it is the only means 
to be adopted, it commences by a small lump formed under 
the skin which on the shoulder or leg occasions the Calf 
to walk lame if immediately perceived and killed the 
rest of the meat is extremely good and the Hottentots eat 
it - the part affected has exactly the appearance of 
Sponge or a violent bruise and it is called the Sponge 
sickness if left alone this spreads allover the body 
and it dies in two'days or less - no cure has yet been 
found for it - it is very common in this part of the 
lphiliPPS, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. III, p.37l. 
2Ibid., Vol. III, 'pp.36l-2. 
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country and our Calves have been attacked by it, on this 
account we have sent them to Lampeter for a change 
the grass there is poor enough -" 
The disease from which these animals would seem to have been suffer-
1 ing was Blackquarter. During 1826, Philipps was also to complain 
of a fatal distemper which affected the horses, and which seemed to 
2 be particularly virulent along the coast. In the same letter, 
written in April or May of that year, Philipps noted that there had 
been considerable falls of rain. These are the ideal conditions for 
the spread of Horsesickness. 3 
IHandbook for Farmers in South Africa, Vol. III, pp.362-3. 
The germs causing this disease are of a highly resistant 
nature and can affect pasture lands for a number of years. The 
period of susceptibility in cattle ranges from six months to three 
years and usually affects young cattle in good condition, with 
those between nine months and two years being most susceptible. 
The exact mode of infection is still largely unknown but it is 
generally believed to be ingested in the case of cattle or to result 
from wounds caused during shearing in the case of sheep. The Hand-
book quotes the following: "When a bovine is affected, it develops 
a temperature, stops eating and very soon shows a widespread swell-
ing in a part of the body covered with thick muscles, for example 
the buttocks, shoulder or neck. The swelling spreads rapidly .•• 
The animal weakens quickly, goes down and shows accelerated 
breathing. Death saari follows. 
When the carcase of a bovine is skinned over the affected portion, 
the subcutaneous tissues appear red, jelly like and moist. The 
affected muscles on cross-section, resemble a sponge and the cut 
surface gives the impression of marble, due to darker and lighter 
areas. The gas escaping from the muscles smells like rancid butter." 
2philipps, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. IV, p.l64. 
3Handbook for Farmers in South Africa, Vol. III, p . 427. 
Horsesickness is a virus disease, which while not being 
contagious, is transmitted by night-flying gnats. It is a disease 
which is unique to the African continent and which is most preva-
lent, amongst other areas, in the eastern Cape. The disease occurs 
most frequently during the summer and particularly in the autumn. 
The most dangerous years are those in which there has been a heavy 
precipitation of rain. Infection usually occurs in animals which 
are exposed on the open veld during the night. 
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Philipps attempted, once more, to grow wheat on his new farm, 
in the hopes that this area might be more suited to its cultivation 
than his property at Lampeter. This was not to be the case, and in 
January, 1826, he reported the failure of this experiment,l although 
he could boast of fine crops of potatoes, maize, and pumpkins. 2 
The latter crop was now grown largely for the feeding of his servants. 3 
Besides the cultivation of what had now become their standard 
crops, Philipps was also keen to undertake experiments in the culti-
vation of other crops in the hopes of finding one which would serve 
as a replacement for the loss of wheat as a cash crop. In February, 
1826, he reported having half a dozen cotton plants which were already 
in blossom. 4 In May, 1826, Edward, Philipps' eldest son, was to 
write,S 
..... we are continually making experiments of one thing and 
another there are several very find Cotton Trees growing 
and seem to thrive remarkable well all covered with pod -
Our Orange Trees are also in a progressive state - ••• The 
Cotton Trees ••• we had growing here my Father raised from 
Seed procured from Ceylon but as the latitudes of Malta and 
the Colony are nearly the same I think Seed would thrive 
still better ..... 
The Philipps' had relatives in Malta and this broad hint to the 
relatives in Britain was to result in various seeds being sent out 
to the cape from Malta. In August, 1827, Philipps wrote to his 
relatives in Britain,6 
IphiliPPS, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. IV, p.8. 
2Ibid ., p.32. 
3 . f 1 8 See ~n ra, p. 0; supra, p. 37. 
4 h'l' L . V 1 32 P ~ ~pps, T., etters, op.c~t., o. IV, p. • 
5Ibid ., pp.155ff. 
6Ibid ., pp.253-4. 
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" ••• I am now putting in 500 Cotton seeds and am anxiously 
waiting for what Mr Hunter [of Malta] has promised me 
will you remember to ask him for full directions as to 
sowing, culture and cropping and if he could send me a 
discription of the machine for getting the seeds free, 
without which latter I cannot get on - what I have grown 
is fine ••• " 
The arrival of the anticipated seeds was recorded in a letter from 
1 Mrs Philipps in February, 1828. Due to prevailing drought these 
seeds were not planted until September, 1828,2 and by January, 1829, 
the plants were destroyed, along with the other crops at Glendour, 
3 by swarms of locusts. This effectively put an end to these early 
attempts to grow cotton in the Albany district. Others were to follow 
later. Experiments were also being made in the cultivation of tobacco, 
cinnamon, and various strains of wheat. Cinnamon did not succeed, 
but Philipps was able to successfully cultivate some tobacco. Again 
his relative, Mr Hunter of Malta, was looked to to provide information 
regarding the curing of this crop,4 
"Can he give me or procure 
method of curing Tobacco 
cannot manufacture it well 
me any hints as to the Brazil 
we grow very fine plants but 
enough. II 
5 It was also hoped that woad could be successfully cultivated by those 
who had sufficient manure to provide the high level of soil fertility 
required by this plant. Nothing came of this either. 
For the Albany farmers the 1826-7 season saw a good return for 
their efforts. In a letter to Earl Bathurst, the acting-governor 
Bourke pointed this out in February, 1827, when he transmitted a 
IphiliPPS, T., Lett,ers. op.cit., Vol. IV, pp. 302-3. 
2Ibid ., Vol. V, p.8. 
3Ibid ., pp.71-2. 
4Ibid ., Vol. IV, pp.253-S. 
5 A plant grown for the production of a blue dye. 
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memorial from the inhabitants of Albany requesting the repeal of the 
prohibition on the distillation of liquor from grain in the colony. 
This request was made due to the abundant harvest of barley and oats 
which had been reaped and for which no other way of disposal was 
1 
seen. 
"It is truly gratifying to be enabled to state to your 
Lordship that the affairs of the Settlers in Albany appear 
to · be improving. By far the greater part of these people 
are now finally placed on their lands, which have this year 
yielded considerable returns of barley and oats, and in 
some places, tho' not generally, the wheat is reported to 
be an average crop . The power of producing the former of 
these grains in the Albany District is I believe very ex-
tended, and if an easy vent for the surplus produced were 
procurable might be made a source of great profit to the 
growers. The difficulty consists in the expense of land 
carriage from the district to the shipping port in Algoa 
Bay. Return carriage is seldom .to be had, and, the whole 
cost of transport must be laid on the grain, which would 
in most years enhance its price beyond what the exporter 
could afford to pay. If the prices were moderate the 
barley would be taken off to St.Helena and the oats to 
Mauritius ••• The difficulty attending the entrance to the 
River Kowie is such as to have deterred almost all the 
Traders from frequenting Port Frances, ••• 
The expense in land carriage • • • is to be hoped may in 
great measure be overcome by the increased demand in that 
district for wine, brandy and British goods brought coast-
wise from Table Bay and for ~lauritius sugar •.• which would 
thus furnish a return load for the waggons ••• Barley may 
also be used for brewing beer ••• which is not prohibited by 
the Colonial Laws for domestic use, and Beer may be brewed 
for sale on an annual licence of forty-five pounds." 
The permission to distil was not granted as it was felt that such a 
move would jeopardise the position of the wine farmers of the western 
districts . It was inevitable that the production of a surplus of 
grain would immediately give rise to questions being asked regarding 
its disposal. The only shortage which remained was that of suffici ent 
wheat to meet the bread requirement s of the Settlers. The wheat price 
was now 2s.6d. and that which was available was considered to be 
I Theal, G.M ., Records, op.cit., Vol. XXX, pp.330-1 . 
1 
virtually useless. 
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Not all the grain crops planted by the Settlers were allowed 
to grow to maturity. Those farmers who lived within closer proximity 
to Grahamstown had the advantage of contracting for the military re-
quirements for green forage for its horses. There was a distinct 
advantage to be gained from this as it meant that the farmer could 
be assured of a profit within a shorter period of time and usually 
before the appearance of rust on these cereal crops. In evidence 
before the Commissioners of Inquiry, Lieut. T.C. White pointed out 
that when wheat sold for less than 100 Rixdollars per load of 10 muids 
in the Cape Town market, bearing in mind that the transportation cost 
between Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth was 4 Rixdollars per muid, it 
meant that with the high costs of white labour in the settlement and 
other sea freight costs, production of wheat in particular, and the 
other cereals, was unprofitable. 2 This was the reason for Albany's 
undisposable surplus of grain. Such problems did not exist for those 
who could cut the bulk of their crop while it was still in a green 
state. Describing the farming activity of his son-in-law, .Tohn 
Carlisle, who farmed in the Belmont Valley . in close proximity to 
3 Grahamstown, Philipps wrote, 
" .•• his farming is entirely different from us at a distance, 
he grows Barley which is cut green and contracted for by 
the Commissariat for forage for the Cavalry in Barracks and 
also Oats which is suffered to grow till nearly ripe and 
then cut and made into Hay for the same purpose -" 
lphiliPPS, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. IV, pp.188-9. 
2 Theal, G.M. , Records, op.cit., Vol. XVI, p.431. 
3philipps, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. IV, pp.190-1. 
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The profitable nature of this exercisel was to encourage Philipps to 
undertake it as well in 1829. In August of that year he wrote of an 
experiment which he and his sons had undertaken of planting their 
oats particularly early in the season following good rains in April , 
in the hopes that this crop could be sold, either as dry forage for 
the Cavalry, or for the grain, noting that,2 
..... both will do in part and what we cannot do in the 
former will do at a minor profit in the latter." 
For the Settler farmers, rust was to remain a major obstacle to 
their cultivation of wheat throughout the period down to 1834. The 
Bengal wheat which had come to their rescue in the initial years of 
the settlement was not considered a very satisfactory substitute for 
the European varieties of this grain. It had a coarse husk and yielded 
a relatively small quantity of flour. Experiments were thus under-
taken with a great variety of wheat strains in the hopes of finding 
one which would answer to local conditions. Unfortunately not all 
these farmers were in a position to undertake such experiments, and 
a general failure of the wheat crops continued to feature in the 
reports from this district. These farmers had become accustomed to 
such regular failures of this crop, and all of them had diversified 
their activities into other crops and livestock farming. Writing 
home in November, 1826, David Cawood summed up the position of the 
3 
average Settler farmer, 
"The crops of wheat are failing in general with the rust 
which has been the cause of it since we came into this 
country. Barley, oats, Indian corn we have in general very 
lMitford-Barberton, I., Comdt. Holden Bowker, p. 24. 
2 Philipps , T., Letters, Vol. 5, p.109. 
3 Theal, G.M., Records, op.cit., Vol. XXX , p.398. 
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good crops, and all kinds of vegetables grow very well. 
We have plenty of all sorts of fruit. I have heard that 
the worsted trade is very bad, and I think I am much 
better here out of it." 
For those who were in a position to do ·so, various strains of wheat 
were gathered for experimentation. Philipps was a keen participant 
in such activity, as was Lieutenant T.e. White, who was to bring 
48 different strains of Italian and European wheat back to the colony 
from the Paris Botanical Gardens on his return in 1828.1 Philipps 
drew his samples of wheat from his relative, Mr Hunter of Malta, and 
from Lieutenant White. In October, 1826, he commented in his letters 
on the success of a strain which had become known as 'Russian wheat' 
amongst the Settlers, although the exact origin of this wheat was 
not known. John carlisle, his son-in-law, had also successfully 
reaped three acres of this variety.2 By December, 1826, the other 
3 
varieties, planted later than the Russian wheat, had been harvested. 
"We have excellent little crops of wheat ••• our Wheat is what 
is called in England creeping wheat ..• We have enough for 
use and perhaps a little for disposal - our Barley Wheat, 
or as some call it Tartarisa Wheat is really an excellent 
grain - no rust comes near it and we shall have a second 
crop - we reaped this in the first week October and sowed 
it again 27th October and now it is in ear and next month 
will be cut - As Agriculturalists we are in high spirits 
with this and the creeping wheat ..... 
During 1827-8 Philipps was to receive samples of wheat from both 
Lieutenant White and Mr Hunter and these were duly planted in 1828. 
Writing in August, 1828, he commented on the progress of these 
. . 4 
varl.etl.es, 
1 G.T.J., March 16, 1832. 
2 Philipps , T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. IV, pp.l97-8. 
3Ibid ., pp.2l2-3. 
4Ibid., Vol. V, p.7. 
I 
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"Please do inform Hunter that his wheat is luxuriant -
I have sown many sorts given to me by Mr . White on his 
return - The Tuscany and another Italian wheat looks well. 
I had rather than 50 Crowns that the 'Hunter' wheat 
succeeds and it shall be so named if it does ••• " 
Success with this wheat did not mean that it was general ly available 
to the rest of the Settlers , although similar experiments were being 
undertaken by the government at the Groote Post farms. There is no 
evidence to suggest that information from these experiments was being 
distributed in Albany. Thus it remained for farmers like White and 
Philipps to grow sufficient to initially meet the demands of the 
district for seed wheat. 
The year 1827 was marked by a general deficiency of rainfall 
in the frontier districts. This shortage of rain, together with the 
general depression which had set in in the colony following the slump 
in the British market following the post Napoleonic War boom, the 
depreciation and fixing of the Sterling-Rixdollar exchange rate at 
Is.6d. to the Rixdollar in 1825,1 and the first slump in the 'Kaffir 
trade' in 1826,2 resulted in a general depression and fall in prices 
on the frontier. The price of cattle, the chief source of wealth 
amongst the frontier farmers, was to fall drastically. These prices 
were also to remain low for a number of years. In the interior a 
major cross road in the saga of the cattle farmers had been reached. 
It was becoming increasingly difficult to find a market for their 
cattle in the traditional outlet of the Cape Town market. In evidence 
before the Council of Advice in Cape Town, a Graaff Reinet farmer , 
Henry Olivier, stated that there were more cattle available than there 
lArndt, E.H.D., Banking and Currency Development in South 
Africa (1652-1927), pp.49ff. 
2 Neumark, S . D., op.cit., p.154. 
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was a demand for them. This was partly because farmers in closer 
proximity to this market were succeeding in fulfilling all its 
requirements. 1 This was bound to have repercussions on the market 
for cattle in Albany, as these farmers sought to divert their 
animals towards this market. Here the farmers were already beginning 
to reach a stage where they sought markets for the increase of their 
own stock. Philipps wrote in August, 1826, the same year in which 
Olivier filed his complaint, that he anticipated the first killing 
of cattle they had bred themselves in the following winter for salting. 2 
Up to now Albany had been a good market for the interior farmers and 
'Kaffir traders', for the disposal of their cattle. Albany farmers 
had been buyers of livestock for increasing their herds and had not, 
as yet, become a major source of supply to the organisations which 
were processing salt beef, or to the military. Their purchases had 
exceeded their sales. This situation was now changing and this was 
bound to have an additional depressing effect on the market. 
In August, 1826, Philipps noted that the price of well fed oxen 
for slaughtering stood at £2 5s. This price was considerably lower 
than the price he had paid for his original oxen in 1820. He had 
then 
had 
and 
paid £3 each. 3 In contrast to this, the price of breeding cows 
remained largely constant at 24s. 4 Prices were to decline steadily, 
Philipps noted in June, 1827,S 
1 Theal, G.M., Records, op.cit., Vol. XXIX, pp.477-8. 
2philipps, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. IV, p.189. 
3 See supra, p. 29. 
4philipps, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. IV, pp.188-9. 
5Ibid ., pp.231-2. 
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"Affairs are harried in this Country, in Graham t s Town 
several are calling meetings of their Creditors for time 
principally. Cattle and Sheep have fallen 40 per cent 
and more if a sale is forced. Sheep have been sold at 
ls.6d . and Cows at ISs." 
In March. 1828. Philipps noted that the price of cattle had fall en 
1 to lOs . a head. while by June of that year he wrote. 
"Cattle are no longer saleable .•• Cows are selling at 
3 shillings and sixpence. the Purchaser returning the 
Hides and Horns to the Seller." 
To add to this crisis there was the prolonged drought. No 
substantial falls of rain were to be recorded between October. 1826. 
2 
and March. 1828. Swarms of locusts now also made their appearance 
in the Albany district. The Settler farmers had undoubtedly heard 
of this plague before but had not. as yet. experienced it on any 
large scale. Philipps gives a vivid description of his first en-
3 
counter with this plague • 
.. . • . I was suddenly about 25 miles from hence [home] in 
the midst of what I thought young Grasshoppers •..• finding 
them numerous I got off my Horse and to my astonishment 
and dismay I discovered that they were the migrating 
Locusts. 0 what a chill: I immediately thought of my 
corn and the advanced state of it which from that circum-
stance would if eaten never grow again, .. • on I went and 
for two miles Myriads crawled about and my Horse crush-
ing them under his feet - ••• 1 learnt I had only seen a 
small detachment." 
Goldswain recalled the descent of a swarm of locusts onto crops of 
maize in 1827 and indicated that attempts to disturb them were 
4 
useless and the crop soon devoured. 
" ••. the three acers was eaten quit up in less then two 
houers. We had two acers of Inden Corn that most of it 
was quit ripe but as soon as they had eaten the young they 
Iphilipps. T .• Letters. op.cit •• Vol. IV. p.338. 
2Ibid .• p.320. 
3Ibid •• pp.240-1. 
4Goldswain. J •• Chronicles of •• • • Part I. p.61. 
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fell to work on the old and you mite see a hundred Lakes 
on one stalk and they eat untill they and the stalk fell 
to the ground and out of the two acers of Inden Corn we 
only gartherd one bucket of Corn." 
The presence of the locusts continued into the year 1828, and in 
1 February of that year Philipps reported a closer brush with them, 
"The Locusts have disappeared for the present; one 
morning Fredk came in to say they were appearing, we 
instantly saw them over our heads flying towards Port 
Frances, we set off our Batteries, as the Boys called 
them, namely heaps of straw, weeds etc., which we set on 
fire, but owing to the wind they had not much effect . 
They continued flying for near an hour in a long line, 
but few alighting, and then disappeared." 
The drought had more serious consequences for Philipps, but 
here too he was to be far more fortunate than most of the inhabitants 
2 
of Albany, 
"Then came on a continued drought, and just at the nick 
of time seized our wheat when filling, and the result 
was we have just had our seed back. Our Barley was much 
better, but from the same cause deficient; we have only 
realised from our grand expectations three measures where 
we ought to have had ten. But then we are better off 
than anyone Albanian besides, altho' bad is the best, 
and what vexes us most this year is that our Dutch Neigh-
bours, from being able to irrigate, have had great 
returns, and near Cape Town immense. What are we to look 
forward to? II 
In a letter to the acting-Governor, the landdrost of Albany wrote 
in November, 1827 , 3 
"The summer rains have at length, I am happy to say, 
commenced, which will enable us to get our Maize into 
the ground, and if that be not eaten up by the young 
locusts we may perchance keep famine from our doors 
during the following year. 
The graziers are in a sad state of distress from the 
drought; they have literally been forced with their 
lphiliPPS, T., Settler, op.cit., p.328. 
2Ibid . 
3 Theal, G.M., Records, op.cit., Vol. XXXIV, p . l34. 
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cattle into the neutral ground for pasturage, which in 
many parts of this district is not to be found; the 
springs and rivers are dry or so brack as to be totally 
injurious to the cattle; .•• The failure of milk among 
the Caffres has reduced those poor creatures in the drier 
parts of their country to a situation even worse than I 
have represented our people to be in." 
These rains could not have been very substantial for by June, 1828, 
Philipps again wrote commenting on the dry conditions,l 
"Our drought has continued almost without intermission, 
and next October I say let those look out who are in 
danger, we shall have a flood no doubt - we have ploughed 
and sowed all early but in the Graham's Town neighbour-
hood, the soil refuses to admit the Plough ••• carlisle 
has not yet sowed his forage and he ought to be cutting 
his first crop ... " 
John Carlisle had in fact taken the post of Deputy Sheriff of Albany 
as a result of the uncertainty of his farming operations. 2 Rain 
followed in July and late crops of Barley were planted. The locust 
threat was also to reappear. The good rains had caused the eggs 
laid in the previous season to hatch and the farmers were once again 
troubled by this scourge. 3 These rains resulted in a more abundant 
harvest being reaped where crops had escaped the ravages of the 
locusts, and where continued rains had fallen. These intermittent 
falls of rain were to do more harm than good. They provided 
sufficient moisture for the hatching of the locusts and for the 
germination of crops, but did not provide sufficient moisture for 
the continued growth of such crops. 'Glendour', being situated on 
4 
the coast, was again to escape the worst of this drought, 
Iphilipps, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. IV, p.339. 
2Ibid ., p.336. 
3Ibid ., pp.344-5. 
4Ibid ., Vol. V, pp.63-4. 
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" .•. Edward and Frederick reposing after getting in for 
the first time a really tolerable harvest of both Wheat 
and Barley and at a time when all the Neighbours have 
suffered and the prices of grain high. the latter even 
Cent per Cent higher than last year •. . it has i nfused 
fresh spiri ts into the whole household and an i ncrease 
of our Agriculture is determined on - pray tell Mr. 
Hunter that his little present of Wheat has produced 
70 fold and finer than the seed sown. I left placid 
happy Glendour • •• . two days ago. grass in abundance and 
water. whilst here [Grahamstown] they cannot dig their 
Gardens nor plough. nor a single vestige of green. fruit 
gone dropped off the trees - higher up Sheep and Cattle 
dying in thousands - ••. 22.500 Sheep had died in one 
field Country [a sub-division of Somerset district] -
light rain is now falling but it will do no good I fear 
the heat of the sun is too powerful - the caffres are 
as badly off their Cattle dying and their last years 
corn deficient or consumed already, now remember all 
this does not extend to within about 8 or 10 miles of 
the Sea all along the Coast. there we are even flourish-
ing not by comparison but our Cattle are absolutely fat. 
no one can secure credit the wretchedness that prevails 
elsewhere increasing as the distance from the Sea -
Families hitherto independent have lost their whole stock 
of every kind and obliged to remove for want of water 
even for drinking for themselves, the very Locusts are 
dying of famine. ~ vegetables are so plentiful that we 
are sending presents to Belmont [carlisle] " 
The year 1829 saw a general improvement in the agricultural 
conditions in Albany. Good rains were recordedl and the harvest was 
generally adequate. As early as August. Philipps was reaping a good 
2 harvest of oats and in November he could comment. 
"We are in the midst of a plentiful Barley Harvest and 
have saved a little Wheat from the Rust of a different kind. 
but our stock one is yet to ripen and looks favourably. 
we have had a rainy season and the Country is in Splendour . " 
Philipps hoped that this barley crop would bring in an income of over 
£250. 3 This was certainly a fair income and from 1830 to 1834 there 
were no major setbacks to the progress of the Albany farmers . 
1 Philipps. T .• Letters. op.cit .• Vol. V. p.lOO . 
2Ibid • • p.140. 
3Ibid .• p . 146 . 
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Prices for agricultural produce were gradually to recover thei r 
pre-depression levels. Drought had a serious effect on the crops 
in October, 1833, and forced many to discontinue tillage , but 
cattle remained in good condition following good rains in the 
1 previous season; The Graham's Town Journal commented in an 
editorial in 1834 that,2 
" • • • the pursuit of farming is begining to acquire that 
stable character which always indicates that the ,community 
itself is in a sound and healthy state." 
It will be seen that two of the major innovations of the ' new 
farming', as practiced in Britain in the early years of the nine-
teenth century, are conspicuously absent from what has been written 
so far . There is little mention made in the contemporary literature 
of the Settlers of evidence of the rotation of crops, or of t he 
introduction of labour saving devices and machinery. Here it is 
necessary to point out that the famous 'Norfolk system' of 
alternating the crops grown in any particular soil on an annual 
basis, usually in the rotation of wheat, followed by turnips, t hen 
barley, and finally clover, before repeating the cycle again, and 
the system of 'ley-farming', which differed in the exclusion of 
the root crop from this rotation, while the clover was left down 
for a number of years , were not in general practice, nor applicabl e 
to all of Britain prior to the emigration of the Settlers. The 
Norfolk system was one devised and implemented chiefly in the light 
sandy soils of the eastern coastal areas of England, while the l ey 
1 Graham's Town Journal, October 17, 1833 . 
2Ibid ., January 2, 1834 . 
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farming was devised for the heavier types of soil. The application 
of these types of rotation was not general and should not be looked 
upon as the sole criterion for judging the advancement of agri-
1 
culture in the nineteenth century context. They applied more to 
areas of intensive grain cultivation and were not necessari ly 
practicable to all areas, so that many of the Settlers might not have 
been familiar with their practice. 
In Albany, the Settler farmers were to find a very different 
set of circumstances. Initially, land was to be scarce on the 
locations, so that if they had been forced to continue on these small 
areas of land an inducement to the implementation of strict crop 
rotation would have existed. As it was, the size of land holdings 
were to be increased and a style of agriculture was now adopted which 
borrowed from the experience of the Dutch colonists. The Dutch 
' trekboer ' had proved the value of cattle to the frontier districts 
during the eighteenth century, and the wisdom and profitability of 
this form of farming2 was soon revealed to the Settlers. There were, 
nevertheless, still amongst the Settlers men, like Philipps, who 
were loath to part entirely with the experience of their British 
background and who were prepared to persist in the development of 
arable farming under the new conditions of the Cape. There was now 
also greater incentive.to participate in agriculture on the frontier 
concomitant to the increase in the population of the area, and the 
increased demand for agricultural produce. The nature of the terrain, 
the large size of farms after 1825, relative to the amount of 
1 Jones, E.L., Agriculture and the Industrial Revolution, pp.40ff. 
2 . 
Neumark, S.D., op.cit., passim. 
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cultivation practiced, and the fact that pastoral farming under 
South African conditions was possible independently of agriculture, 
so that crops did not have to be grown to tide animals over the 
winter months, all acted against the implementation of a rigid 
system of crop rotation. The type of crop grown thus tended, with 
the exception of oats, to be strictly for the augmentation of the 
income of the farmer and for human consumption. There seemed little 
place, or need, for extensive fodder crops. With sufficient land, 
there was now little inducement to rotate crops as fresh land could 
always be broken to replace that which was exhausted . 
In considering the lack of adoption of labour saving devices 
and machinery on the part of the Settler farmers, it is essential to 
consider the labour requirements of this group at intervals through-
out the period . The dramatic loss of labour to those party heads 
and Settlers who had come to Albany with the specific intention of 
pursuing agricultural livelihoods , stems from the poor composition 
of the original parties. There were too few genuine agricultural 
labourers and too many skilled or semi-skilled artisans in the 
parties. Neither would there seem to have been any co-ordination 
between parties and all duplicated the number of artisans that they 
brought out. In retrospect it is difficult to comprehend that party 
heads could believe that they would be able to keep on carpenters, 
bricklayers, and other artisans, as agricultural labourer~ after 
they had served their initial usefulness in such skills. Some loss 
of labour would then have been inevitable. The high wages offered 
to such artisans increased the discontent within the parties and led 
to their fragmentation earlier than had been expected . The blame 
for this fragmentation cannot be laid at the door of the initial 
crop failures. These crop failures seem only to have precipitated 
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a process already in progress, and to have caused it to go further 
than was originally expected; party heads felt obliged to get rid 
of as much labour as possible, due to pecuniary difficulties 
arising out of the system of rationing. l 
As the Settlers were forbidden the use of slave or Xhosa 
labour, the only alternative source available to them in the fo rma-
tive years was the employment of Hottentots, to which men like 
Philipps would seem to have resorted. 2 It was the inexpensive nature 
of this labour, together with the pecuniary difficulties in which 
these farmers now found themselves, which decided them against the 
introduction and employment of many labour saving devices; which 
in addition to their initial cost would have to face the high 
shipping costs to Algoa Bay. At least one Settler, Oldham, was to 
sell his threshing machine which he had brought out from Britain 
to the colonial government for 1,000 Rixdollars to tide himself 
over these troubled years. This machine was sent to join those 
already stationed at the government farms at Groote Post in 1822. 3 
other labour saving devices, such as the improved plough, had 
already been introduced in 1820. The old Dutch plough, which was 
wheeled and lacked a coulter, needed between eight and twelve oxen 
to draw it and required three or four men and boys to manage it. 
This was seen as being vastly inferior to the lighter Scotch and 
English ploughs introduced by the Settlers, which could be drawn by 
4 half or less the number of oxen and managed by one man . 
1 See supra, p.42 . 
2 See supra, p.37. 
3Theal, G.M. , Records, op.cit., Vol. XXVII, p.147. 
4Pringle, T. op.cit., p.46. 
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Complaints were made against the quality of t he labour which 
could be acquired from the Theopolis mission stati on , a nd against 
the Hottentots in general, who were judged to be idl e in comparison 
to the average British farm labourer. l After the fourth successive 
failure of the wheat crops, there was likely to have been a fall in 
the demand for this form of labourer, if only for pecuniary reasons. 
The fair agricultural seasons which followed, and the acquisition 
of larger herds of cattle and sheep, would again have seen an 
increase in the demand for labour. There is no clearer intimation 
of this demand and the contempt in which the Khoi labourers were 
held, than the trip undertaken by Frederick Carlisle to Britain in 
1825 . This trip was undertaken to recruit agricultural labourers 
and to attempt to goad the British government into assisting such 
an emigrating scheme . 
While there was an increasing demand for labour amongst the 
farmers in Albany after 1824, this was, nevertheless, a qualified 
demand for cheap, efficient labour; of the type many of them had been 
familiar with prior to leaving Britain. The duration of the 
Napol eonic wars saw a large increase in the price of wheat2 and a 
sympathetic rise in rents and the wages of agricultural labourers . 
This rise was also assisted by the increasing shortage of labour 
available in British agriculture, during the peak periods of employ-
ment, such as the harvest and haymaking periods. At the peac e , the 
British army of over 400,000 men had returned to seek employment i n 
an economy then having to undergo serious adjustments. This meant 
IphiliPPS, T., Settler, p.25l. 
2 See supra, p . 70 . 
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that while the industrial sector was undergoing change, a disprop-
ortionate number of these returning soldiers sought employment in 
the agricultural sector. There was between 1815 and 1850, an 
abundance of cheap labour available to British agriculture. This 
was also to have implications on developments in technology during 
this period. Inventions such as Bell's reaper were to remain dormant 
until the increasing price of labour after 1850 again warranted 
investigation into labour saving machinery.l 
The Albany farmer in 1824 and later, sought an abundant supply 
of cheap labour to assist in his rehabilitation, following the 
2 initial financially disastrous years of the settlement . Somerset 
pointed out to Bathurst in a letter dated March 31, 1825, that the 
lowest wage for which labour could be obtained was for 2 Rixdollars, 
or roughly 3s. per day, with food and a bottle of wine (?),3 
" ..• Your Lordship will easily perceive that nothing which 
the Earth can be made to produce will repay such an expense 
in cultivation, ... It 
In evidence before the sub-committee for the Relief of Distressed 
Settlers in 1825, it was suggested that it was impossible, owing to 
the high cost of labour, to cultivate an acre of land for less than 
4 30 Rixdollars, inclusive of the seed. 
In a letter written in November, 1825, Mrs Philipps complained 
of the shortage of labour and mentioned one of the windfalls which 
5 
assisted in overcoming the problem, 
1 Jones, E.L., op.cit. , p.224. 
2 Theal, G.M. Records, op.cit., Vol.' XIX, pp.5-6, 8-11. 
3Ibid ., Vol. XX, pp.401-1. 
4Ibid ., Vol. XXI, p.123. 
5philipps, T., Settler, op.cit., p.252. 
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"The great want and difficulty of procuring servants and 
the high price of labour renders it impossible for us to 
get on with the improvements on our new Place [GlendourJ . •• 
But we shall now be much better off in this respect, 
Government having brought down a great many people belonging 
to the more distant nations who have been driven on by the 
hostile Tribes beyond them again, and at length have 
approached our territories and have been induced to seek 
food and shelter amongst the Boers, etc., in the upper part 
of the Country. Government at length determined on bri ng-
ing them down here and distributing them amongst us in this 
district as servants. Accordingly a great many were sent 
into Graham's Town and all who wanted Servants and had not 
Slaves were allowed to have a Family, ... " 
These Bechuana servants were bound to the Settlers in five to seven 
year apprenticeships. 1 
When Frederick carlisle travelled to Britain in 1825, he repre-
sented the interests of the frontier community in its search for labour. 
These colonists had bound themselves to provide guaranteed employment 
for 771 emigrants in various categories, of which 200 requests were 
for agricultural labourers. 2 The colonists requesting the emi gration 
of these labourers had further guaranteed the agricultural labourer s 
a minimum wage of 150 Rixdollars or £11.5s. per annum, a dailYwage 
of 8~. plus provisions, making a total wage of Is.6d . per day . 
Carlisle stated in his correspondence to the under-secretary for 
colonies , R. W. Hay, that while the Settlers were prepared to guarantee 
employment to such a number of emigrants and to offer the stated 
wages, they were not seen to be in a financial position to cover the 
. 3 
actual transportation cost of such emigrants to the Cape ; 
"Their funds being so reduced as to render it extremely 
difficult for them to proceed in their undertaking. On 
the other hand if we are to look to the labourers them-
Iphilipps, T., Settler, op.cit., p.254. 
2 Theal, G.M . Records, op.cit., Vol. XXIV, pp.132-3 . 
3Ibid ., Vol. XXVI, p.155. 
• 
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selves for repayment, the subject appears involved in 
equal difficulty. Considering that the term for which 
it is proposed to indenture them is only three years, if 
an instalment amounting to one third of the expense 
incurred upon each individual should be deducted by the 
employer from the amount of wages due to the Labourer at 
the end of each year, the remaining sum would be con-
siderably too trifling to induce people to leave this 
country, whatever might be the distress of their circum-
stances, ... II 
The progress of Carlisle's negotiations with the British goverIiment 
was carefully watched on the frontier. Philipps wrote in August, 
1826,1 
"We long to hear from Carlisle we want population, that 
is, working people, we could place at occupations 100 
families a year and this principally from the ease with 
which the Country supplies a maintenance - Beef has 
fallen one halfpenny to a penny a pound and labour is 
eighteen to twenty shillings a week .•• ln America and 
Van Diemans Land where labour is only so high Beef is 
4d. to 6d. a pound - " 
Nothing came of this proposed scheme, which was rejected by the 
British government. Thus there was no major addition to the work 
force available within the colony from Britain in the period down 
to 1834. There was nevertheless a slow trickle of immigrants into 
2 the colony within this period, varying between 114 and 204 annually. 
Very few of these new immigrants were workers or labourers. 
No official step was taken to augment the labour supply avail-
able to the Albany farmers down to 1828. The potential labour force 
which existed in the form of Xhosa tribesmen had always been 
realised, but had never been officially tapped owing to political 
and strategic considerations. While official thinking had attempted 
to maintain a strict policy of segregation of the two racial groups, 
Iphilipps, T., Letters, op.cit ., Vol. IV, p.191. 
2 Hattersley, A.F., An Illustrated Social History of South 
Africa, p. 87. 
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this source could provide no solution to the colonists' labour 
requirements. After 1824, the introduction of regulated trade 
between the colonists and Xhosa represented the thin edge of the 
wedge in opening up wider co-operation between the races. In April , 
1825, W.R. Thomson suggested to John Gregory that the Fort Willshire 
fair could be seen as a factor removing distrust and strengt:.ening 
the relationship between the Xhosa and the English frontier popu-
lation. He also suggested the introduction of a system of short 
contracts for the employment of the Xhosa as labourers within the 
1 
colony. 
2 On October 26, 1826, Lord Bathurst instructed Bourke that, 
"I have no hesitation in authorizing you to adopt measures 
for allowing the Settlers in Albany, who may not possess 
slaves, to employ, under proper regulations, a certain 
number of Caffres as Labourers. 1I 
This measure was not acted upon until 1828, when in July of that 
year, Bourke issued ordinance No.49, which permitted Xhosa seeking 
work to enter the colony if they were in possession of passes issued 
by a justice of the peace or a field cornet. 3 These Xhosa 
foreigners were not allowed to work for more than one month without 
entering into official contracts. These contracts were not allowed 
to extend beyond a maximum period of twelve months, but allowance 
was also made for their renewal for further periods of twelve months . 
Food and clothing could be considered as a part of their remuneration, 
but liquor and tobacco could not be given to them as part of their 
4 payment. The Albany Civil Commissioner reported the entry of some 
1 Theal, G.M., Records, op.cit., Vol. XXI, pp.175ff. 
2Ibid., Vol. XXVIII, p.278. 
3Ibid ., Vol. II, p.ll. 
4 Hunt, K.S., Sir G.L. Cole, p.99. 
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1,000 Xhosa into the colony within the first nine months of the 
operation of this ordinance; 754 passes being issued and the rest 
entering without them. l Very few of these Xhosa entered into 
agricultural employment , which was the main objective behind this 
regulation, but rather chose to wander about the colony hunting and 
stealing. On August 25, 1829, the new governor, Sir Lowry Cole , 
suspended this ordinance indefinitely after 5,000 head of cattle 
had been stolen within a period of five months, and of which only 
2 1,500 head were recovered. 
Ordinance No.50, 'for improving the condition of the Hottentots 
and other free persons of colour at the Cape of Good Hope, and for 
consolidating and amending the Laws affecting those Persons ' was 
promulgated on July 17, 1828, in the same month as the previous 
ordinance. As suggested, this ordinance repealed the earlier legis-
lation regarding the Khoi. This previous legislation, a proclamation 
of the Earl of Caledon (1807-11) as governor of the Cape in 1809, 
and amended by the Cradock administration in 1812, can be seen as 
an attempt to induce the Khoi into accepting service for the whites. 
This was achieved through restricting their ability to own land and 
in the same instance stipulating that they had fixed places of 
residence, which would be officially registered, while passes were 
required if travelling. Failure to comply with these measures 
resulted in arrest and conviction of vagrancy, whereupon the indi-
vidual could be forced to take employment as and where directed by 
the field-cornet. In turn, if masters employed anyone who could 
IHunt, K. S., Sir G. L. Cole, p.lOl. 
2 Theal, G.M., Records, op.cit., Vol. II, p.ll. 
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not show that a previous contract had terminated, they were liable 
to prosecution. 1 The ordinance No.50 was to limit the powers of the 
employer over the Khoi or free black employee. Contracts were res-
tricted to one year duration and apprenticeship of coloured children 
was forbidden without the consent of their parents. The pass 
regulations, restricting the movement of these people was also 
lifted. 
It is difficult to gauge the impact of this measure on the 
labour situation on the frontier, particularly in Albany. Undoubtedly, 
any measure which repealed a system as restrictive as that which 
preceded this ordinance, would naturally have resulted in a fall in 
the number of Khoi employed. If nothing else, there would have been 
a certain amount of temporary unemployment as these labourers gauged 
the job market and wage structures of the employers before re-
settling where they could obtain most for their labour. As such 
movement was likely to have been on a regional basis, with labourers 
moving from one district or field-cornetcy to another, the time lag 
would have been considerable. Again, there were inevitably those 
who simply opted out of employment to try their chances at self-
employment, or to adopt the wandering life of their ancestors. 
Whatever the real situation, and unfortunately there seems to be 
no record of the actual numbers lost to employment, particularly 
by farmers, this ordinance was to create a great deal of political 
tension throughout the colony. Fears of lawlessness arose, and the 
immediate consequences of a loss of labour, presented themselves 
to the farmers. To some extent, it was probably hoped that 
lMacmillan, W.H., The Cape Colour Question, pp.211ff. 
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ordinance No . 49 would offset the impact of this loss, parti cularl y 
in those districts in immediate proximity to t he frontier. This wa s 
not the case. In spite of growing wealt h i n the frontier community 
down to 1834, a 'shortage' of labour featured strongl y as one of 
the drawbacks to the advancement of this communi ty . The Graham' S 
Town Journal suggested that more attention should be paid to the 
employment of African refugees fleeing the 'N' f ecane ', l and it was 
more than likely that increasing numbers of Africans, both Xhosa 
and of other tribes were encouraged to squat or take up 'tempor ary ' 
residence on the farms of the colonists in return for their labour . 
From the foundation of the settlement in 1820, certain of t he 
Settlers paid considerable attention to the breeding of woolled sheep . 
The failures of the first crops confirmed the determination of t hese 
men who had introduced woolled sheep, to persevere i n the husbandry 
of these animals. In so doing, they were to pioneer this form of 
husbandry on the eastern frontier of the colony. Wool led sheep were 
not first introduced into the colony by these Settlers, but the 
willingness with which this form of husbandry was grasped by the rest 
of the Settler farmers whose land was sui table for sheep farmi ng, 
did much for the popularisation and spread of this form of fa rming 
throughout the eastern districts. Experiments with woolled s heep 
had already been carried out in the western distri cts of the col ony 
prior to the arrival of the Settlers. The closing years of t he rule 
of the Dutch East India Company saw the i ntroduction, by Colonel 
2 Gordon, of a flock of merino sheep. Attempts had been made in 1789, 
1 G.T . J., May 16, 1833. 
2 Thom, H.B., Die Geskiedenis van die Skaapboerd ery in Sui d 
Afrika , pp.52-3. 
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and earlier, to popularise the breeding of woolled sheep. The Dutch 
farmers remained steadfast in their support of the traditional cape 
fat-tailed sheep, which, besides being a source of good mutton, 
rendered from their tail fat the tallow necessary for the manu-
facture of candles and soap, and had acted as a basic ingr edient 
in many of their traditional food dishes. This sheep, which was 
all but indigenous, was well adapted to the climatic conditions of 
the greater part of the colony, so that it required little mainten-
ance and could survive off the bare veld. Woolled sheep needed far 
stricter maintenance, and the regular shearing and washing of the 
wool prior to it becoming saleable. All this required more labour 
than the Boer farmer had, or cared to have, at his disposal. 
The outcome of this had been the rejection of wool led sheep 
by the majority of the cape farmers, despite the potential value its 
introduction would have meant to both the semi-subsistent farmers 
and the local administration. By 1822 there were approximately 20 
flocks of wool led sheep in the colony, making a total of about 
8,000 sheep, which had yielded a total of 20,000 pounds of wool in 
1821. 1 The introduction of new farming practices into the colony 
had of necessity to await either the implementation of education on 
a wide scale and the spread of new ideas in this manner, or the 
arrival, or availability, of people with the incentive to undertake 
change. Such a group was the 1820 Settlers. Coming from a country 
which had undergone and was still in the throes of agricultural and 
social change, it was inevitable that there were those amongst them 
who were familiar with the experiments which were being undertaken 
I'd h f od '1 2 B~r , W., TeState of the Cape 0 Go Hope ~n 82, p . 27. 
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in the improvement of the various breeds of British sheep. They 
were also familiar with the new importance which had been given to 
wool as a fabric by the Napoleonic Wars, and the high prices which 
could be obtained for this product on the British market. There 
was also the fact that this woollen industry was rapidly outstripping 
the production capabilities of both the mother country and Europe to 
supply the necessary wool. New South Wales had already shown that 
the production of wool in the colonies was a profitable undertaking, 
so that it remained only for the Settlers to join their fellow 
colonists in New South Wales in meeting the requirements of the 
mother country. 
Mention has already been made of the small flock of merino sheep 
introduced into the eastern districts by Major Pigot in 1820. 1 He 
was to augment this flock by purchasing rams from the government 
farm at Groote Post and by buying cross-bred sheep from some of the 
other 'improved' flocks of the western districts. This flock was 
not to reach any considerable proportions and most of it was to be 
sold to John Carlisle on the death of the Major in 1830. 2 Pigot 
should, however, be seen as one of the foremost figures in the 
popularisation of wool sheep farming on the frontier . It was he 
who exported the first wool from Albany, packed in dry hides. 3 
The success of this venture was to be the inspiration for many who 
were to follow him. 
Another of the pioneers of the woolled sheep on the frontier, 
1 See supra , pp.32- 3. 
2Thom, H.B., op.cit., p.305. 
3Hattersley, A.F., op.cit., p . 87. 
119 
who has also received mention previously, was Miles Bowker. l Prior 
to his embarkation for the colony, Bowker had already made his 
intentions clear concerning his pursuits there. He specifically 
requested the colonial office for a grant of 1,000 acres of land 
in the colony, for the purpose of establishing a flock of merino 
sheep. It is on the basis of this request, and his previous farming 
experiments with merinos in Devon, that the presumption rests, that 
2 he too brought merino sheep into the colony. In 1823 he purchased 
two merino rams from the Groote Post farm, and Thom has suggested 
that these rams were then used for breeding with a group of Cape 
3 
ewes. This is possible, but it would seem unlikely that a man who 
had specifically asked for land in the colony suited to sheep farm-
ing should have waited three years before commencing this enterprise, 
and then only with cross breeding. It would seem more likely that 
these purchases were being made to augment his small flock, rather 
than to initiate it. Initially, this venture was not very success-
ful. Bowker's two locations of land, which he received in 1820 and 
1822, and named 'Olive Burn' and 'Tharfield' respectively, were both 
in close proximity to the sea, an area in Albany found not to be 
conducive to sheep rearing. The grazing of this area was blamed 
for this, but it is also probable that this area, enjoying a higher 
rainfall than the rest of the district, was more prone to parasite 
infestation and diseases such as Blackquarter which would have 
4 
affected the growth of a flock. It was only after the 1835-6 war, 
1 See supra, p.33. 
2Ibid . 
3 Thom, H.B., op.cit., pp.304-S. 
4 See supra, pp.9l-2. 
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when the decision was taken to move the sheep away from the coast 
to an inland farm on the Koonap River, that the Bowker family achieved 
considerable success from their sheep farming venture . Bowker was, 
nevertheless, the principal supplier of wool to the Bathurst water-
mill of samuel Bradshaw, who used this wool, and that supplied by 
other farms, for the production of blankets and kersey cloth. This 
mill was established in 1822 and continued absorbing some of the 
wool produced by the Settlers down to March, 1835, when it was 
destroyed by fire during the war. l By the time this war broke out, 
2 it would seem that the Bowkers had about 1,000 sheep. As these 
sheep were only to produce 1,000 pounds of wool in the October-
November shearing of 1833, this indicates the poorer state of this 
enterprise by comparison to the other undertakings of this family, 
which made it one of the wealthiest in the district. 
Another of the Settlers who introduced woolled sheep into the 
eastern districts in 1820 was Captain Duncan Campbell . Rather than 
merinos, he was to make a steady and persevering attempt with the 
English breed of Southdowns . These sheep would probably not have 
received much attention from the 'improvers' like Robert Bakewell 
by 1820, so that they were still a relatively small animal which 
3 
was famed for the excellence of its soft, fine, curly wool. 
Campbell imported others on several occasions . 4 Theal has suggested 
that these sheep did not thrive under the local conditions. While 
1 Morse Jones, E., The watermill at Bathurst : An Outline 
Account, Cory MS 7314. 
2Mitford-Barberton, I., Comdt. Holden Bowker, p.60 . 
3 ErnIe, Lord, op.cit., p.178. 
4 Theal, G.M., Records, op.cit., Vol. II, p.39. 
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there might be some justification for this assertion, a more probable 
explanation for their lack of success would lie in the relatively 
greater success of the merino, and hence the latter breed's greater 
popularity. 
Theal has selected as the three great names in the pioneering 
of woolled sheep in the eastern districts, the three half-pay officers, 
Lieutenants Griffith and Daniell, and Lieutenant T.C. White, all of 
whom had headed parties of Settlers in 1820. Griffith, White and 
campbell were all originally to have been located in the western 
districts and were to arrive in the east only after the main body of 
the Settlers, their grants of land in the west being found unsuitable. l 
Griffith was the last to leave the western districts, having taken a 
farm near Cape Town after the rejection of his first location. 2 
While in the west, Griffith saw the successful experiments which 
were being undertaken with woolled sheep at the government farms at 
Groote Post. It was only in 1828 that, after settling in Al bany, 
h ·1 dh f· 3 e ser10US y commence seep arm1ng. In that year he purchased 
4 from a Mr Colebrooke of Hottentots-Holland in the west, a flock 
of 500 cross-bred sheep, the progeny of merino rams imported from 
England and half breed merino ewes, which he had removed to the 
Albany district. 5 Here he occupied the farm 'Burnt Kraal' on the 
outskirts of Grahamst~wn. Beginning his sheep farming career as 
Iphilipps, T., Settler, op cit., pp.92-3. 
2Ibid ., p.93. 
3 Thom, H.B., op.cit., p.307. 
4 Theal, G.M., op.cit., Vol. II, p.40. An article in the 
Agricultural Journal of the C.C . , 12 January, 1893, suggests that 
these sheep came from a merino flock of Mr Goshing at Berg River. 
5 Thom, H.B., op.cit., pp.306-7. 
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late as 1828, and with a flock of this magnitude, it is difficult 
to accord Griffith the status of 'pioneer' with rega r d to the devel-
opment of woolled sheep-farming in the east . In a like manner , 
the same considerations apply to Daniell who commenced his sheep 
farming career in partnership with Griffith in 1828. 1 It was 
rather men like Bowker, Pigot, campbell, and Philipps, who were to 
do the pioneering work with woolled sheep in the frontier district 
of Albany. It was these men who were to make the mistakes with 
regard to the ideal type of sheep for the area. They were also , by 
their experience, to define the areas suitable and unsuitable for 
sheep farming in that district. These half-pay officers were simply 
to exploit the knowledge gleaned by their predecessors to the full. 
Together with considerable sums of their own, or borrowed, capi tal, they 
were rapidly to become the largest woolled sheep-farmers in the 
eastern districts. 
Lieutenant Daniell was granted a location, 'Sweet Milk Fountain' , 
in close proximity to the Bushman's River, in an area ideally suited 
for the breeding of sheep. Like many other Settlers, he initially 
concentrated on grain production . By 1823 Thompson on his journey 
to the Albany settlement noted that Daniell had brought a 'great 
extent' of arable land under cultivation, which had also been 
. 2 
divided into neat enclosures. It can be assumed that, like 
several of the other Settlers, his capital outlay on the improvement 
of his land was excessive in relation to the returns it yielded in 
IThom, H.B . , op. cit., pp.306-7. Theal, G.M., op.cit., Vol. 
II, p.40, suggests that he commenced with merinos in 1827. Thom 
suggests that in 1827 he started gathering merinos but it would 
seem unlikely that he achieved much before his partnership with 
Griffith. 
2 
Thompson, G., Travels and Adventures in Southern Africa , 
Vol. I, p.lS. 
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these early years. By 1827 he had lost nearly everything that he 
had brought to South Africa. l It was then that he had started 
collecting the nucleus of a merino flock , no doubt learning from the 
experience of others, of the greater profitability of such a venture. 
The partnership of Griffith and Daniell was short-lived. The 
most notable feature of this partnership was the purchase of a small 
parcel of good quality merino sheep which had been brought into the 
colony from the Swan River settlement in Australia. 2 These sheep 
were purchased at an average price of £11 per animal, while one ram 
3 had cost them £32. Daniell undertook an extensive buying campaign 
in 1829 for his own account. This would suggest that this partner-
4 
ship with Griffith lasted for little more than a year. This 
purchasing was probably in part motivated by the fact that all the 
sheep acquired in the partnership passed into Griffith's sole 
possession. 5 In 1829 Daniell spent £100 to acquire four rams and 
four ewes, while in the following year 30 rams and a similar number 
of ewes were purchased for £400. 6 The disproportionate number of 
rams would suggest that he was also making extensive purchases of 
Cape ewes for cross-breeding purposes. In 1829 his return from 
wool sold amounted to £97.19.4; in 1830 this sum increased to £250;7 
ITheal, G.M. op.cit ., Vol. II, p.40. 
2 Thom, H.B., op.cit., p.306. 
3Agricultural Journal of the Cape Colony, Thursday, 12 January, 
1893. 
4 Thom, H.B., op.cit., p.306. 
5 Theal, G.M., op.cit., Vol. II, p.40. 
6 Thom, H. B., op.cit., p.306. 
7This is the figure quoted by Thom. The cape Almanac for 1831 
suggests he had 3,700 Ibs. which he sold for 8d. per lb. = £123.6.6. 
2,000 lbs. was sent to London where it fetched 13~. per lb. for 
the broker . The balance was supplied to a hat maker in Grahamstown 
(Mr Allison 1). 
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while in 1831 he had 10,000 pounds of wool on offer for which he 
expected to receive the sum of £625. 1 He also offered for sale in 
1831, 100 merino rams 'of a superior breed' at the low price of 15s . 
2 per head and 800 crossed ewes at 5s. per head. 
Daniell made a serious and very valuable,contribution to the 
popularisation of wool farming on the frontier. He parted freely 
with advice regarding his farming operations and was always willing 
to give enouragement to those who were considering the adoption of 
this form of farming. By his own actions he was also a very good 
example of the wealth which could now be acquired by those farmers 
converting to this form of husbandry. In 1827 he had been virtually 
insolvent, but within the space of six years he had been able to 
re-establish himself as one of the wealthier farmers on the frontier. 
Griffith would not seem to have been as dedicated to the 
breeding of woolled sheep, as his counterpart Daniell was. His 
participation in this form of farming appears to have stemmed largely 
from the anticipated profit to be gained. His two properties were 
well suited to this form of farming and by 1836 he had supplied 31 
bales of wool to the London market, despite the effects of the 
frontier war. 3 Griffith soon abandoned his farms 'Burnt Kraal' and 
'Vaal Krans', to reside in Grahamstown at the 'Prospect House'. 
This is implied in the following advertisement which appeared in 
1834,4 
IThom, H.B . , op.cit., p.306. 
2 G.T.J., Vol. I, No.1, December 30, 1831 . 
3Thom , H.B., op.cit., p . 307. See infra, pp.162-3. 
4 G.T.J., January 9, 1834. 
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"The Young Merino Rams engaged from the Flock of Sheep 
belonging to the proprietor of Burnt Kraal and Vaal Krans, 
are now ready to be delivered by the Overseers on the 
respective Farms whenever sent for. Persons desirous of 
obtaining Young Rams of the pure blood, from two valuable 
Saxon Rams imported direct in July last from Lord Western's 
flock in England, must forward their applications to the 
above Overseers on the Farms, or to the Residence, 
'Prospect House', Graham's Town; that by the period of 
lambing, during the present and ensueing month, the 
requisite number to meet the demand may be preserved. 
The price of the saxon Merinos will be £3 each." 
An advertisement in May of the same year announced that Griffith 
had 100 young merino rams for sale, delivery in June or July, bred 
from imported pure merino rams. 1 Their price was now £2. The availa-
bility of these young rams, undoubtedly did much to assist the 
establishment of further flocks of merinos on the frontier. 
Lieutenant T.e. White was also only to Commence sheep farming 
on his return from Europe in 1828. 2 Prior to his departure for 
Europe he had been employed in conducting a land survey of the 
frontier regions, and during this period he was, no doubt, able to 
gain a good knowledge of which areas were better suited to sheep 
farming. On his return to the colony he applied for a grant of land, 
in lieu of his previous services to the colonial administration, 
and was granted the farm 'Table Farm' in the vicinity of Grahamstown. 
The sheep he brought back to Albany were a selection of fine-woolled 
Saxon merinos from the flocks of the great English breeder, Lord 
3 Western, as well as a few which he had procured in saxony. The 
experience of the pioneers was not lost on Lieutenant White, who 
4 
came to the colony with his 48 varieties of wheat and this group 
1 G.T.J., May 8, 1834. 
2 Thom, H.B., op.cit., p . 307. 
3Ibid . 
4 See supra, p. 98. 
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of carefully selected sheep. On the estate sale of Major Pigot, 
he acquired another group of pedigree sheep, and soon achieved the 
distinction of having one of the best flocks i n the country. His 
flock was considered second only to that of Lieutenant Daniell. l 
Philipps might be considered amongst the pioneers of the woolled 
sheep farming on the eastern frontier. He brought the nucleus of 
a flock of sheep With him in 1820. 2 These could have been Wiltshire 
sheep, but as there is no mention of black faces, they were likely 
to have been of the Ryeland variety, which was popular along the 
Welsh border. This type of sheep was known for its short-stapled, 
fine wool. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, with the 
advance of mechanised spinning, the popularity of this type of sheep 
was dwindling in favour of the longer weolled varieties. 3 Even when 
this animal had been crossed with longer woolled varieties, as it 
probably had been by 1820, the wool of such sheep would have been 
inferior to that of the merino. Philipps referred to his sheep on 
several occasions in his letters, and from this we can attempt to 
gather some idea of the progress of this flock. In November, 1820, 
he commented on their shearing, and also noted that he had purchased 
a further 60 ewes 'of the native breed'. He now hoped that he 
could procure 'excellent weol' from the first crop!4 In September , 
1821, jackals were to get into his enclosure and killed, amongst 
other sheep, two of his English breed. S By now he had also 
ITheal, G.M. op.cit . , Vol. II, p.41. 
2 See supra, p.34. 
3Jones, E .L., op.cit., pp.lSlff. 
4philipps, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. I, p.224. 
SIbid., Vol. II, p.4S. 
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discovered the benefits derived from the burning of the veld i n 
winter to bring on the new growth of grass more quickly in spring. 
1 By April, 1822, Edward, his son, was able to write, 
" ••. my father sent a small quantity of the Wool of his 
half bred Sheep (which was very fine and equal some say 
to the Merino) in one of Mr. Nourse's ships to cape Town, 
but immediately the vessel going out of Algoa Bay ran 
ashore and everything was lost - the crew saved - they 
were most of them intoxicated • • . " 
The difficulties encountered by the sheep farmer were also clearly 
stated by Philipps,2 
" •. • our Sheep .•. suffer much in it [COld weather] we keep 
them in folds at night, .•• on account of the Wolves, 
Jackalls, and Leopards .•. all sickly sheep die in the first 
rains, we shall never do well with them till we have roofs 
- we never turn them out till 10 o'clock and they are in 
before sunset ... " 
Under these conditions it was naturally very difficult for the first 
sheep farmers to make headway. By 1826, Philipps had realised the 
better qualities of the merino, and was cross-breeding his own 
3 flock with this type of sheep. He had also moved to the coastal 
farm 'Glendour,4 where he was experimenting with the richer grazing,S 
" ••• 1 am now trying the Merino Sheep with my own kind 
which I brought out and they are uncommonly fine to the 
surprise of a great many as it was not generally thought 
that this rich pasture would do for them however I burn 
the grass of some of my hills alternatively and by fre-
quent change I have perfectly succeeded - this month 
proves it in Lambs - I have already 170 and expect about 
100 more -It 
By continual burning of the grass and the rotation of this flock, 
there is every possibility that this process was affecting the 
IphiliPPS, T., Letters, op.cit., Vol. II, p.1S7. 
2Ibid ., pp.207-8. 
3Ibid ., Vol. IV, p.196. 
4 See supra, pp. 77-8. 
5philiPPs, T., Letters, op.cit ., Vol. IV, p.196. 
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parasite reproduction cycle. In this way Philipps was keeping his 
flock relatively free from this menace. The ultimate effect on 
the value of the grazing would, no doubt, have been detrimental . 
By 1829, Philipps conceded that his farm and those in close 
proximity to the sea coast were better suited to cattle farming. 
But his experiment had certainly proved that it was possible to 
succeed in the raising of sheep in this area. At this time he had 
made a complete conversion to merino sheep, and was supplying most 
of his wool to the blanket manufacturing mill at Bathurst . l 
The results of the early experiments with the breeding of woolled 
sheep by these Settlers were not lost on the other inhabitants of 
the region. The spread of this type of farming was a far slower 
process in the other districts of the frontier than in Albany itself . 
Amongst the earliest members of the other frontier districts who 
adopted woolled sheep-farming, were the firm of Korsten , Scheuble, 
and Chase, who commenced breeding in 1830 at 'Cradock Place' on 
Algoa Bay, and the laddrost of Graaff Reinet, Andries Stockenstrom . 
Robert Hart, who had been the superintendent of the Somerset Farm 
down to 1825, also appears to have commenced this form of farming 
in the Boschberg around this period. Certain of the original Dutch 
farmers in the Albany district, men like M. Behrens and C.T. Pohl, 
2 had also started shearing woolled sheep by 1833 . 
Korsten's firm purchased its base stock from Lieutenant T.e . 
White towards the latter end of 1830. Some 750 sheep were obtained, 
the large majority of which were cross-bred, with the exception of 
I hOl o • 1 118 P ~ ~pps, T., Letters, op.c~t., Vo . V, p. . 
2 G.T.J., November 28, 1833. 
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one, which was an original Saxony merino ram which had been imported 
by White in 1828, and another ram which had been bred f r om pure 
stock within the colony. By 1834 t his flock had increased to 
between 2,100 and 2,200 sheep which were anticipated to yield 
about 3,000 pounds of wool in that year.l In the same year , 1834, 
a sample of wool from this flock won the Agricultural Society's 
first prize at a competition held in Cape Town. 2 
The rapid development of woolled sheep-farming in the Albany 
district should not only be seen in the light of the acceptance of 
this form of farming by a few progressively minded Settlers. Their 
activity was, undoubtedly, of paramount importance, but the inter-
pretation of the history of the eastern frontier which has, in the 
past, lauded the activities of the Settlers and castigated the role 
of the unpopular governor, Lord Charles Somerset, has tended to 
detract from the role of his administration in the spread of the 
merino on the frontier. Little recognition is given to the fact 
that a free annual distribution of rams was made in the frontier 
districts, and that many of the rams which were used in the build-
ing up of flocks on the frontier. owed their origin to a benevolent 
governor . This action, undoubtedly, was in part politically moti-
vated. After the initial failure of the settlement to establi sh 
itself as an agricultural community, the governor would have cast 
about for a suitable alternative to palliate the political oppo-
sition which was now developing towards his rule in that quarter . 
But there must also have been a more benevolent motive as well. 
IDe Zuid Afrikaan, January 10, 1834. 
2 G.T.J., January 9, 1834. 
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This can be seen in the varied attempts of this governor to improve 
the practice of both arable and pastoral farmi ng within the colony . 
The interest he showed in the experiments and activities of the 
government farms at Groote Post, reflects a deeper concern for the 
advancement and welfare of the colonists than would be motivated 
by purely political considerations. writing to the colonial under-
secretary in 1826 in defence of his actions as governor, Somerset 
1 
was to comment on activities at Groote Post, 
" ..• Although very great losses have been experienced in 
the Merino Flocks of the Farm [Groote post], particularly 
in the tempestuous winter of 1822, constant distri-
butions, gratis, have been made in all parts of the Colony 
of Merino Rams. During the last season 40 were sent to 
Graham's Town to be distributed gratis, amongst the Settlers, 
and previous to my departure I made an agreement with the 
Overseer to supply henceforward 70 Merino Rams annually to 
the Albany and Somerset Districts • •. " 
Prior to the free distribution of these merino rams, the government 
farms at Groote Post had also been a source from which the pi oneers 
had been able to acquire rams at lower prices than the cost of 
2 importing them from Europe. That these rams and this service 
offered to the farmers on the frontier by this administration were 
anything but beneficial, is difficult to dispute. 
From what has been written so far, it is clear that the 
development of woolled sheep-farming on the frontier wa s to benef it, 
both from the patronage of the government, and from the resource-
fulness of the Settlers who saw in this form of farming the oppor-
tunity of improving their conditi on and financial status . The 
example of these pioneers resulted in the rapid acceptance of t his 
lTheal, G.M. Records, op.cit . , Vol. XXVII., p.143. 
2 See supra, pp. 118-9. 
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form of farming by many of the Settlers who had locations suited 
for sheep pastures. By 1830 there were reputed to be 10,000 woolled 
1 
sheep in the district, together with some 67,400 Cape sheep. 
In 1834, Thomas Pringle estimated that this figure had grown to 
2 12,000 woolled sheep. The year 1830 was the first year in which 
a considerable amount of wool was exported from the frontier. 
The Graham's Town Journal give the following figures for the first 
3 three years' exports: 
, 
! 
TABLE II 
Returns of Wool Exports through Port Elizabeth 
1830 - 1832 
Quantity Weight Value 
1830 36 bales 5,040 Ibs. £ 222 
1831 
I 
75 11,020 £ 550 
1832 121 18,150 £ 935 
4 By 1835 the value of wool exported from Algoa Bay was £4,261. 
I 
I 
! 
This large increase can be attributed to the growing awareness of 
the value of woolled sheep amongst the frontier farmers. As early 
as 1824 the African Court Calendar and Directory, later to be pub-
lished as the South African Almanack and Directory, had started a 
propaganda campaign in favour of wool1ed sheep-farming. 5 After 
1831 a similar campaign began in the frontier districts. Here it 
1South African Almanack and Directory, 1831, p.176. 
2Pring1e, T., op.cit., p.224. 
3 G.T.J., March 7, 1833. 
4 Chase, J.C. (2), op.cit., p.173. 
5 Thom, H.B., op.cit., p.168. 
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was the newly constituted Graha$'s Town Journal which launched the 
campaign. Numerous editorials encouraged farmers to convert to this 
form of farming. The prices paid for the wool of those who had 
adopted wool led sheep farming were frequently published as evidence 
of the improved incomes which awaited such cenversion. Corres-
pondence with the various wool f~~prs in London was also regularly 
published. As were hints on the'impr()vem .. nt of stock and the treat-
ment of disease. 
In Albany, traditional farmipg practices were not strongly 
opposed to woolled sheep. Fgr 'tpese readers the object of the news-
paper was to prove the profitability of this form of farming and to 
show up the weaknesses of the alte~native forms in the lack of markets. 
The Journal played strongly on \he latter theme in 1833 following 
good harvests in the previous s~ason. This had resulted in a glut on 
the market for most aqricultura~ products and a resultant fall in 
prices to unprofitable levels. 
pointed out thatl 
The editorial of March 28, 1833, 
, ' 
"Habit and prejudice have long opposed the growth of Wool 
in this Colony, but both are at length giving way to 
conviction. Every farmer in the Colony feels that the 
price of his present marketable produce is limited by the 
confined demand, - that he ,gets little more for his Cattle 
than the market price of the Hide and Tallow - that the 
butcher cannot take all hi. slaughter Sheep even in gift , 
- that a few days rain re4uces the price of Butter and fat 
to less than the waggon hi{. for bringing them to market, 
- that if he reap even an ~rage crop of Wheat, Barley, 
and oats, they are hardly -.rth securing • •• the majority 
know well that those articles fall in price because t he y 
are of necessity chiefly consumed in the Colony; and that 
although the inhabitants of the towns, the troops, the 
vagrants and the wolves were to destroy ten times more than 
they do at present, they c~ld make no sensible impression 
on the price of the millions of unprofitable Sheep whi ch 
overspread the face of the cQuntry." 
« • 
1 G.T.J ., March 28 , 1833. 
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Again in February, 1833, the Journal had written in editorial,l 
"It cannot but afford the highest satisfaction to find 
that the inhabitants of this district are making such 
praiseworthy efforts to extend and improve the growth of 
fine Wool. We have seen numerous fleeces which have 
been shorn within the last few weeks that fully prove the 
great advancement made in this important article. It 
seems to be established beyond doubt th~t the climate and 
pasturage of this part of the colony are eminently suited 
to this profitable pursuit, and which is proved by the 
fact that Wool of some pure Merinos, bred in Albany, has 
been ascertained to be &uperior in fineness to that pro-
duced by the sheep imported. 
We mention these encour~ging circumstances to stimulate 
our farmers to increased exertion; there is still much to 
be done; and there is a great want of pure stock to 
answer the pressing demands of those who are now turning 
their attention to Sheep Farming." 
This growing demand for pure bred stock needed to commence 
farming, or to increase the size of flocks already acquired, led a 
group of farmers and businessmen to form a joint stock company for 
the importation of merino sheep in 1833. This organisation was 
established on February 28, 1833 ~t a meeting in the Free Mason's 
2 Tavern in Grahamstown. The founder members were Messrs. Maynard, 
Griffith, White, Philipps, carli&le, Norden, and Godlonton. The 
enterprise, known severally as the Graham's Town Joint Stock Company 
and later as the Eastern Province Joint Stock Merino Sheep 
Association, was for 'the importAtion of pure merino sheep into 
this district'. It was seen that the failure of private capital 
to establish an importing business for the introduction of stud 
stock had been proved. At the ~me time it was appreciated that 
it was impossible for the majority of farmers to undertake the 
expense, privately, of importing stock because the high freight 
1 G.T.J., February 14, 1833 . 
2 G.T.J., February 28, 1833. 
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charges on live cargoes from Britain. The company .was therefore 
proposed with a subscription of 400 £1 shares , these funds to be 
used exclusively for the purchase of merino rams from the flock 
of the British merino breeder, Lord Western. The sheep would be 
dispatched to Algoa Bay and Grahamstown, there they were to be sold 
as soon as possible after arrival to the highest bidder amongst the 
subscribers . The fact that over £300 was subscribed at the first 
meeting is an indication of the need seen in the district for such 
an organisation. 
At this initial meeting, the formation of a Stud Farm was also 
discussed, and a committee was appointed to draw up a prospectus for 
such a farm. This prospectus was published on March 31, 1833.1 
Another subscription was issued of 200 £5 shares, and over £700 was 
raised at the first meeting. This money was to be used for the 
purchase of 100 ewes and an unspecified number of rams from the 
flock of Lord Western. The use of European shepherds was recommended 
and a request was made to Lord Western to choose these men, who were 
to care for the sheep on the voyage and on the farm in Albany. 
It was decided that only European shepherds were to be used on the 
association's farm. Use ~s made of captain Campbell's farm outside 
Grahamstown, and the superintendence of this farm was entrusted to 
a commission of five chosen from the subscribers. It was hoped that 
such a farm would be able to provide a constantly increasing supply 
of pure-bred merino rams. Initially these would only be for sale 
to the members of the association, but it was hoped that the time 
would come when these rams would be more freely available for selling 
1 G.T.J., March 31, 1833. 
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to non-members as well. After a lapse of five or s ix years, it was 
envisaged that the sale of pure-bred merino ewes c ould also take 
place at prices lower than those paid f or i mported ewes. In this 
way, it was hoped, the flocks of woolled sheep on the frontier 
could be increased more rapidly and at a lower cost than would other-
wise have been possible. l 
In January, 1834, the Journal published the correspondence which 
had passed between the chairman of the association, T.C. White, and 
2 the association ' s London agent, C. Maynard. Maynard pointed out 
that with the exception of Lord Western's flock, few of the English 
merino flocks were pure bred. As the flock of the former could not 
be relied upon to supply the full needs of the association, he 
proposed that sheep from Saxony should be substituted. This move was 
agreed upon, as sheep were dispatched from Hamburg to London, to 
join those which were to be sent from there to the colony. The 
Journal announced the arrival of these sheep in May, 1834. The 
journey to the Cape was a particularly rough one. The Lond on agent 
reported that the sheep from Hamburg had also been subjected to a 
very rough passage, so that they had not arrived in London in good 
condition. OVer 30 per cent of the sheep were lost on the voyage 
to Algoa Bay. Only 69 of the 110 sheep bought in Europe survived 
h . 3 t e Journey. On landing in Algoa Bay the remaining sheep were 
kept on the premises of Mr D.P. Frances until they were again fit 
to undertake the journey to Grahamstown. As a result of the seve re 
1 G.T.J., March 21, 1833. 
2 G. T.J., January 30, 1834. 
3 Godlonton, R., The Irruption of the Kaffir Hordes, p .188 . 
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losses sustained, the association decided to sell these sheep to 
cover their losses . They were duly sold in Grahamstown at prices 
1 
varying between £38 and £15 per head. Once more the government looked 
upon the activities of this association with a benevolent eye. 
These sheep and future shipments were allowed into the colony f r ee 
2 from any duty. The failure of this first venture called into debate 
the existence of the association. Here it was seen as being too 
valuable an organisation to disband after only one attempt and it 
continued to operate . By 1836 it reflected a balance in favour of 
its members of £556 in its accounts, and a dividend of £3.6s . 6d. was 
3 declared, despite the influence of the war. 
The Eastern Province Joint Stock Merino Sheep Association was 
not the only organisation which was active in the importation of 
merino sheep into the frontier districts. Breeders like Gri ffith 
and Daniell, and the Grahamstown merchant, W.R. Thompson, were also 
4 
responsible for the importation of sheep. The famous Captain Robb 
also imported sheep from Australia into the Western Province, where 
many of these sheep were bought up by farmers from the frontier 
districts. The firm of Korsten, Scheuble & Chase was amongst the 
5 largest buyers. 
Despite the activities of these organisations and individuals 
in the importation of pedigreed and pure~bred stock , South Africa ' s 
1 Godlonton, R., op.cit., p.188. 
2cape Archives CPE 1/1/1 (unpag i nated) Letter November 21 , 
1833 Colonial Office in Cape Town to Collector of Customs, Port 
Elizabeth. 
3 G. T. J., December 1, 1836. 
4 Thom, H.B . , op.cit., p.323. 
5Ibid., pp.309-10 . 
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development towards its wool industry was a slow transition from 
the hairy Cape sheep which formed the basis of the greater number 
of flocks. This involved little, or relatively small, capital out-
lays, other than the purchase of woolled rams. Capital was made 
available for the hastening of this transition from several quarters. 
The most notable of these was the slave compensation money, which 
became available to the farmers of the western districts after 
1834. Owing to the small number of slaves in the east, this pay-
ment did not have any great effect in this quarter. Here it was 
the funds which were paid to farmers in compensation, or for expendi-
ture from the war effort, in 1836, which were to provide a major 
source available for the purchase of woolled breeding stock. There 
was also income from the returns of the 'Kafir trade' which was 
being ploughed into sheep farming. Thus the year 1835 can be seen 
as a turning point in the development of the woolled sheep industry 
in South Africa. l Up to this point the industry was in an experi-
mental stage. On the frontier, the late 1820's and early 1830's had 
shown the profitable nature of this form of undertaking. It required 
only the upheaval of the war in 1835, and the serious dislocation 
which this caused, to justify the benefits to be derived from this 
form of farming. 
lThom, H.B., op.cit., p.177. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The outbreak of the Sixth Frontier War in December, 1834, 
brought to an end a period of relative stability and progress for 
the Albany farmers. Many of them were apparently unaware of the 
impending crisis and were not in a position to take the necessary 
defensive action of driving their flocks and herds, and carrying 
their worldly possessions. to the various points of safety. This 
was the· first experience of warfare and inv~sion in the colony for 
many of these farmers. Up to now they had had to contend only with 
occasional depredations of their cattle and horses by Xhosa thieves. 
While stock losses attributable to this source were considerable, 
they were. nevertheless. on a f~r smaller scale. and while the 
thieves were allowed to esc.pe undetected, the threat of personal 
injury was minimal. This outbre.k was more extensive, spreading 
over virtually the whole of the eastern frontier from the Winterberg 
to the sea; in the initial onslaught twenty five colonists were to 
1 h · 1· 1 ose t e1r 1ves. 
In order to understand the attitude of the farming community 
of Albany to this war. it is necessary to investigate the causes. 
for which two distinct interpretations have be.en offered. Whilst we 
agree with the more recent interpret.tion which takes into greater 
consideration the position of the Xhosa tribes in the events leading 
up to the war, it is, nevertheless, necessary also to consider the 
older interpretation to trace the attitudes of the colonists. 
The expansion of the frontier of the colony into the territory 
occupied by the Xhosa and the systematic ejection of these people 
1 C.O.503. p.336. 
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from land which they had come to consider as their own, has been 
suggested as the chief cause of grievance on the part of the Xhosa . l 
This process, which had its beginnings following the f irst continual 
interaction between these two groups in the 1770's,2 was to be 
t he cause of unrest which flared into war, or periods of intensive 
hostility, on nine occasions in the following one hundred years . 3 
The Xhosa were to retaliate to the encroachment of their lands in 
the only way known to a primitive society, namely, the continual 
harassment of those who h~d taken it from them. This harassment 
was mainly to take the form of the theft of c~ttle from these colon-
ists. This is not to suggest that there were not thefts of colonial 
cattle, by Xhosa, for their own sake. The close proximity of two 
people who were both stock farmers would have heightened the 
temptations on both sides to lift cattle belonging to the other group, 
and this was certainly the case . For the Xhosa, however, these 
thefts also represented a broader political motive. 
The reaction of the colonial farmers to this stock the ft can 
well be imagined. It is not in the nature of any man to suffer the 
loss of property lightly, and while they failed, or chose not to 
recognise, their occupation of f~rms along the frontier as a direct 
encroachment on to the territory of the Xhosa, there seemed little 
motivation for the loss of their cattle by Xhosa thefts other than 
the inherent propensity of the Xhosa to steal. 
It is from these divergent views that the two interpretations 
lMacmillan, W. M., Bantu. Boer. and Briton, passim. 
2 See supra, p.4. 
3Macmillan , W.M., op.cit . , pp.25-6. 
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of the causes of the Sixth Frontier war, like those before it, stem. 
The only novel f ·eature in the sixth war was the presence of the 
large group of English-speaking Settlers in the Albany district. 
This group was new to the situation which already existed on the 
frontier. Their presence here stemmed from an attempt to find a 
solution to the problem which existed on the frontier. l The 
original intention of forming a closely knit settlement had failed, 
and those who now chose to remain on the land clamoured for larger 
farms which were essential in a district such as Albany. The 
granting of these farms to the Settlers was, however, to place 
certain real, or supposed, stresses on the demand for land within 
the colony. Their presence also represented a far denser white 
population along the frontier than had existed in any of the 
previous encounters between the colonists and their Xhosa neigh-
bours. There were thus far more colonists, the majority of whom 
still bore close ties with their mother country, who were in a 
position to suffer as a consequence of such hostilities. It was 
this fact which accounts for the prominence of this war, together 
with the fact that unlike their Dutch counterparts who had the 
experience of five previous encounters with the Xhosa, the Settlers 
were taken unawares by this outbreak. 
While the loss of land and the barrier presented to their own 
expansionist drives for grazing land for their cattle were now the 
underlying motivation for Xhosa hostility towards their colonial 
neighbours, sight should not be lost of the fundamental assumptions 
underlying their needs for land. In Bantu society it is cattle 
1 See supra, pp.llff. 
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rather than land which 
? 
/-
represents the chief form of wealth. While 
small portions of land are required for the cultivation of crops, 
by far the greater proportion of land is required for the pastur-
ing of herds of cattle. Thus while chiefs might not suffer the 
loss of land lightly for its own sake, it would only seriously 
reflect on his followers once it curtailed their ability to increase 
the size of their herds, or maintain those which they already 
possessed. 
There is a tendency in South African history to over-estimate 
the political power of the chiefs. This stems from the historical 
evidence of some of the better known warrior chiefs, such as Shaka 
and Msilikazi who held total power and command over their followers. 
There is little evidence to suggest that the Xhosa chiefs living 
in close proximity to the colonial frontier were in a similar 
position. l Thus it was only in matters of common interest that 
these chiefs could call upon the support of their followers. This 
was to be particularly true in the events leading up to the out-
break of the Sixth Frontier War. The political power of these 
chiefs stemmed from their ability to draw their followers together 
for concerted activity in times of need. Such a need arose in 1834. 
Following the Fifth Frontier war in 1818-19, on the eve of the 
arrival of the Settlers, when the Xhosas had supposedly been driven 
back beyond the Keiskama River, the governor, Lord Charles Somerset, 
had instituted the plan for a belt of neutral territory between 
the Fish and Keiskama Rivers. The original intentions of the 
governor would seem to have been to keep this area clear of both 
Xhosa and colonists. This was not to be. The measure lacked the 
lMacmillan, W.M., op.cit., p.82. 
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approval of the Xhosa chiefs, who r esented this further alienation of 
their territory. They were soon to see the upper r eaches of t his 
1 
area being appropriated by colonial farmer s . The c hiefs Maqomo 
and Tyali re-established themselves and their followers i n thi s 
neutral zone and were allowed to stay, on the c ondition of ' good 
behaviour' .2 Maqomo was driven from this territory in 1829 
following an attack he made on the Tembu r e fugees. While this 
affront to the chief could well have been interpreted as a good 
enough reason for war, hostilities did not follow, although it did 
3 lead to an increased incidence of stock thefts. In 1832 he was 
allowed back into this territory, only to be expelled in the follow-
ing year. 4 Galbraith describes the activities of the colonial 
troops 5 who, 
tI ••• drove men, women, and cattle across the river and 
burned the huts the Kaffirs had erected . This summary 
eviction occurred at a time of severe drought; 
consequently the tribes suffered heavy losses of cattle ." 
This military activity in 1833 was bound to have a cumulative 
effect in the Xhosa territory across the Keiskama River . That the 
chiefs Maqomo and Tyali, together with their followers, were now 
thrown back on the territory of the other Xhosa chiefs i n a time 
of drought which extended into 1834, meant that the general over-
crowding of both humans, and above all, livestock, resulted in 
heavy losses of the latter by all concerned. 
1 Macmi llan, W.M., op.cit., pp . 81ff. 
2 Cory, G.E., The Rise of South Africa, Vol . II , p.343. 
3see Appendi x I. 
4Macmillan , W. M., op.cit . , pp. 90-1 . 
SGalbraith, J.S . , Reluctant Empire, p . 10l . 
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In 1819, when the Xhosa army stood before Grahamstown, the 
wizard, Makandhla, predicted that the bullets of the white men would 
1 turn to water. This had not proved to be the case and the Xhosa V 
~j 
had suffered a severe defeat. While the idea of sweeping the whites 
from the face of the land reappeared amongst the Xhosa in 1856, this 
event was left entirely in the hands of the supernatural powers. 
It is difficult to imagine therefore, that at the outset of the war 
in 1834, the Xhosa could have seriously believed in their ability 
to clear the area along the frontier of its white inhabitants. It 
was rather a war of retribution for the replenishment of their herds 
which had been seriously depleted in the events of 1833-34. 2 
To add to the difficulties which now confronted the Xhosa tribes 
with regard to their colonial neighbours, they also faced an influx 
of refugees from the Mfecane which was taking place to the north, 
sending fleeing tribes and fragments of those which had been 
3 destroyed, pouring south into the lands of the Xhosa. Already, 
at least one Xhosa chief had called for colonial assistance to fend 
4 
off an attack by one of these groups. The Xhosa tribes were thus 
caught between the encroachment of white colonists on the .one hand, 
1 Molema, S.M., The Bantu: Past and Present, p.102. 
2Nothing in the activity of this war suggests that the Xhosa 1 
invasion was bent on the conquest of territory. The raiders 
entered the colony, captured colonial cattle, and then drove them 
back across the frontier to the relative safety of 'Kaffirland'. 
The alternative is to suggest that this attack was simply an 
impulse of rage. In this case the Xhosa struck at the most 
vulnerable aspect of the frontier community, their cattle, simply 
in revenge. 
3 
walker, E.A., op.cit., pp.175-6. 
4Ibid ., p.182. In 1828 the combined colonial and Xhosa 
force had defeated the Amangwane beyond the Bashee River. 
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seeking more farming land, and on the other by black refugees seek-
ing land on which to live. Many of the blacks, such as the Mfengu, 
were absorbed into the Xhosa territory as servants, but other 
groups were repelled and friction developed with those who had 
settled in close proximity to the Xhosa lands -- such as in the 
case of the conflict between Maqomo and the Tembu in 1829. This 
pressure on the Xhosa lands from the north did much to heighten 
tensions in the years leading up to 1834,and while the disruptive 
forces of the Mfecane had begun to subside after 1823,1 the full 
effects of this disruption were only reaped on the frontier after , 
1828, so that by the drought year of 1833 this factor helped to 
make the situation on the frontier critical. 
Another factor which kindled strong resentment amongst the 
Xhosa was the operation of the Spoor Law and the 'patrol system,.2 
These measures were introduced as a means for regaining the cattle 
which had been stolen by the Xhosa. The terms of these regulations 
were such, that it was an easy matter for them to be abused by the 
colonists, and there is evidence that this was often the case. 3 
Theal pOints out that the rules for the repatriation of stolen 
cattle varied, sometimes the equivalent number of cattle being 
4 demanded from the suspects, sometimes the equivalent value. 
Xhosa cattle were seen as being inferior in breed and worth less 
than colonial cattle by the colonists, but needless to say, not by 
lWalker, E.A . , op.cit., p.176. 
2Macmillan, W.M., op.cit., pp.77-9. 
3Ibid ., p.78. 
4Theal, G.M., op.cit., Vol. II, p.3. 
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? 
the Xhosa. The usual demand of four Xhosa animals for each colonial · 
animal taken would certainly seem too high. Nor was there any set 
means of determining the exact number of cattle stolen from the 
farmers, or that in fact they had been stolen and not simply lost. 
As early as 1825 the Commissioners of Inquiry in their report on 
1 the proposed Chartered South Africa Company, had pointed out that, 
"It has long been considered by some of the most intelli-
gent of the Dutch Boers, and those most experienced in 
the conduct. of Commandoes, that expeditions against the 
Caffres for the purpose of retaliation should be discon-
tinued, as only furnishing to these savages fresh pretext 
for more extensive plunder. No system is found to be so 
effectual in checking their enterprises as that which 
depends upon constant and vigilant protection of the 
objects of them. The habits of the Boers are averse to 
this system; and they are not unwilling to redeem the 
consequences of careless exposure of their property by 
a few days of active service spent in retaliatory exped-
itions against the Caffres, by which in former times 
they were the considerable gainers." 
Nor would the habits of many of the Settler farmers seem to have 
differed from their Dutch counterparts. A letter in the Journal in 
1834 pointed out,2 
" ••• If we ride through Albany among the settlers, we 
find many of their kraals but very little better than 
those of the boers; and it is a well known fact that 
the greatest proportion of cattle that has been stolen 
from the settlers by Kafirs, have been those that have 
been suffered to stray away ... I feel assured that had 
cattle been properly taken care of by day, and secured 
in a good kraal by night, that instead of having lamented 
the loss of eleven hundred head, the loss would not have 
amounted to one hundred. I believe the cases have been 
solitary where the Kafirs have stolen cattle in spite of 
the exertions of the herd to defend them; •.• " 
With the increasing density in the occupation of land within 
the colony, it was becoming popular for the Dutch farmers to move 
1 Theal, G.M., Records, op.cit., Vol. XXIII, p.203. 
2 G.T.J., March 13, 1834. 
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beyond the frontiers of the colony in search of grazing in times of 
drought. Dr John Philip recognised that this movement was inevitably 
onto the lands occupied by the border tribes and was largely in 
1 
response to overstocking on the part of the farmers. Thi s over-
stocking became particularly severe following the depression in the 
colony after l82S when the traditional market for frontier cattle 
in Cape Town dried up, and the needs of the garrisons and frontier 
community came to be met increasingly by the closer situated Albany 
2 farmers. These larger herds were now also motivating the coloni sts 
in their demands for more land. At the same time, the growing demand 
3 for farm labour was reinforcing the widespread assumption that if 
the Xhosa and other frontier tribes were dispossessed of their land, 
they would have less to spoil by their wasteful methods, and more 
4 
of them would be free to ensure a plentiful supply of farm labour. 
For their part, the Xhosa were, through the curtailment of the 
expansion of their territory, made increasingly vulnerable to the 
effects of drought. The nature of their agricultural system, was 
such, that periods of drought represented lean periods even under 
normal conditions, while the increasingly abnormal situation which 
was now developing made existence in these periods even more 
hazardous. Normally, an area of land was granted to the individual 
by the chief, for the establishment of his huts and gardens, while 
all other land represented communal grazing. They habitually 
lMacmillan, W.M. , op.cit., p.llS. 
2 pp.99-l00. See supra, 
3 See supra, pp.107ff. 
4 'I Macml. lan, W.M. , op.cit., pp.144-S. 
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settled in one spot for between five and seven years, after which 
time the location of the hut and gardens would be shifted for health 
1 
reasons and when the ground had become exhausted. With an increasing 
density of population in a ~estricted area, the point was being 
reached by the 1830's, when it was no longer always possible to move 
to a better located position. This resulted in reduced returns from 
the land in both the quantity of agricultural produce forthcoming 
from the gardens, and in a reduced supply of milk. An increased 
population density now also brought about a reduction in the amount 
of game available to supplement the diminished protein requirements 
from milk. In times of drought, or in poor agricultural seasons, 
the reduced food supply from their land could now easily fail to 
meet their demands. Bowker pointed out that at harvest the Xhosa 
divided their grain into two lots, one part to be kept for present 
use, while the other was stored in their underground granaries. 
The latter were never opened until after a certain period, and if 
the former amount was not sufficient to tide them over to the 
opening of the granaries, they starved, or lived off the land as 
2 best they could. It was during this 'hunger time' that the 
greatest incentive to steal existed. The editor of the Journal 
commented on this in an editorial in February 1834,3 
"It is necessity that in general drives the Kafir to the 
commission of depredations; hence we find that during a 
long drought, and in the winter months when a supply of . 
milk fails, plunder is most frequent. Hunger induces 
him to prey upon the herds of the colonists, and he i s 
too often tempted to the commission of this by the care-
lMaCmillan, W. M., op.cit., p.26. 
2 Bowker, J.M., Speeches. Letters. and Selections, p.52. 
3 G. T.J ., February 20, 1834. 
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less manner in which cattle are suffered to roam the 
country without being guarded by proper attendants." 
The theft of colonial cattle reached its highest level in 1834 
since the war of 1818-19.1 That these thefts were in part motivated 
by want. is borne out by the activities of 1833 when Maqomo and 
Tyali were driven out of the neutr~l territory with great stock 
losses; that this want had united the Xhosa in concerted effort 
under the leadership of their chiefs. so that these thefts c an also 
be seen as being political activity. is borne out by the fact that 
they almost ceased entirely with the ~ppearance of Dr John Philip 
on the frontier as envoy ~ 
, 
l." t 3 was to, 
2 the governor. Boyce has suggested that 
" ••• the jealous feeling created by this [Maqomo and Tyalis'] 
expulsion. that we may trace the real origins of the Kaffer 
War of 1834-5 ••.• " 
This is certainly true. but it was the escalating process in 
which deed was matched with deed. which was eventually to result in 
the Xhosa incursion. It was natural that the increased tempo of stock 
thefts in 1834. should give rise to protest amongst the colonial 
farmers for protection and retribution. Colonel Henry Somerset. the 
Commandant of the frontier, was a man sensitive to the demands of 
the frontier community. His father. Lord Charles. had earlier 
chosen not to heed the demands of this group. with its strong ties 
with the mother country. and it had cost him dearly. His son. after 
his father's resignation in 1826. had chosen to remain behind in the 
1 d" See Appen l.X I. 
2Macmillan, W.M •• op.cit .• pp.119ff. Cory, G.E., op.cit., 
Vol. III. p.47. 
3 Boyce. W.B •• Notes on Soyth African Affairs, pp.4-5 . 
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colony with the lesson well learnt, that it paid to heed the demands 
of the frontier people. The arrival of a new governor, Sir Benjamin 
D'Urban in 1834, coinciding with t his spate of stock-thefts on the 
frontier, placed Somerset in an unenviable position. Retrenchment 
had reduced the forces avail~ble for the effective patrolling of 
the frontier to a level where this was now hardly possible,l and in 
order to appease the farmers the process of retaliatory raids was 
now stepped up against the Xhosa. This ~ction by Colonel Somerset, 
following the delay in the proposed visit to the frontier by the 
new governor, for which the Xho~ were anxiously waiting, precipitated 
h .. 2 t e cr~s~s. The activities of the patrol under Ensign Sparks which 
led to the wounding of the petty-chief Xoxo, w~s simply the last 
event in ~ series which was &training the relations between blacks 
and whites on the frontier. 
The war, which can be ~id to have broken out on December 21, 
1834,3 did not t~ke the form of ~ concerted ~ttack on the colony by 
a single large body of men, ~a had ~en the case in 1819. It was 
rather a series of attacks by small raiding parties. Acting in this 
way, they were to a large degree succes~ful in eluding all forms of 
harassment by the colonial troopa. So successful were they that 
within a few days the frontier from the Koon~p River to the sea had 
been thrown into a state of confusion. Some farm houses had been 
burnt, crops destroyed, and large herds of c~ttle had been driven off. 
For most of the Albany f~rmers, the outbreak of hostilities had come 
1 Theal, G. M., op.cit., Vol. II, pp.i5-6. 
2Macmillan, W.M., op.cit., p.12S. 
3 Cory, G.E., op . cit., Vol. III, p.46. 
150 
as a surprise, in spite of the build-up in tension along the frontier 
over the previous months. The swiftness with which the Xhosa bands 
entered the colony enhanced the confusion. In all, little resistance 
seems to have been offered. The farmers living on the more remote 
frontier, however, who were in closer contact with the tribes living 
adjacent to them, seem to have been given prior warning by their 
servants. This warning enabled them to gather together in groups 
for their mutual· protection, prior to the outbreak of hostilities. l 
Owing to the relative isolation of these farmers and the fact that 
military support was not forthcoming for their stand, their losses 
were to be as great, if not greater, than those of the Settlers and 
other farmers within the colony who had less warning of the impending 
storm. Where there was not ignorance about the impending attack, 
there was probably a fair amount of incredulity stemming from the 
defeat the Xhosa had suffered in 1819 and the belief that this had 
taught the Xhosa a 'lesson'. Others, such as the trader John 
Montgomery, who was in Grahamstown just before the outbreak heeded 
the warning of their Xhosa servants and moved to safer areas. 2 
This news of the impending raids was short, where it was known at 
all. There would, nevertheless, seem to have been sufficient time· 
to give many of the English and Dutch farmers the opportunity to 
escape to the various centres of refuge, such as Salem, Bathurst, 
and Grahamstown. Here there was more hope for their mutual protection 
than in isolated groups throughout the countryside. Some farmers 
lCoetser, P.P.J., GebeurteniiSe Uit die Kiffer Oorloge, p.l. 
2 
Montgomery, J., The Reminiscenses of.", p.80. 
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even managed to escape with their herds and flocks. l In general , it 
would seem that the fear engendered by the impending attacks was 
sufficient to cause families to f l ee to safety with a minimum of 
worldly .possessions . Bertram Bowker, however, noted in his 
journal,2 
"Then another order came from the Lilndrost that we were 
to leave all cattle and sheep and congregate at Bathurst. 
The Government would make good the cattle after the war . 
' Do your best to save life' was the order .•.. Many of the 
people had brought their cattle and there were a lot of 
oxen from the wagons. We could see our cattle 12 miles 
away with the glass. We brothers wanted to go and live 
with them but were not allowed to. We had been 4 days at 
Bathurst when the ~ffirs attacked the cattle • •. " 
Thus there were certainly a large number of herds and flocks which 
were left unattended, to become prey to wild animals, as well as t o 
the raiders. Of the animals which were driven to the safety of the 
various gathering points, many were lost to the invaders from t he 
communal herds which were formed at these places. Commenting on 
their plight a contemporary author noted the following,3 
"The most opposite causes hAd not unfrequently produced 
the same result of utter destitution . Many were attacked 
so suddenly, that they had not time to go into the house 
to take anything out • • • • Others again had timely informat ion 
of danger, regarded it as false alarm, and left everything 
behind them, in the vain expectation of returning in a few 
days, and finding it s~fe; .. oo . II 
It is thus clear that the losses suffered by the frontier farmers 
in this initial onslaught can be divided into two distinct categories; 
the actual depredations of the Xhosa , and the loss of animals whi ch 
were now allowed to stray, unattended, from the unenclosed front ier 
1 Cory, G.E., op.cit . , Vol. III, p.85 . 
2Mitford-Barberton, I., op.cit., p.61. 
3Heavyside, J . , in C.O.503 of 1837, p.304. 
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farms. It was perhaps natural that the frontier farmers chose to 
classify this second group of 108ses along with the first and to 
blame all their losses on the Xhosa. Undoubtedly, many of the 
cattle simply left on farms and allowed to stray, were collected 
by the raiding bands and driven into 'Kaffirland'. There would seem 
to have been a tendency, however, simply to 'write-off' all animals 
left on the farms, as losses, whether or not this was borne out by 
observation and fact. The farmers, once removed from their farms, 
1 
seem to have simply entered their total stock holdings as losses. • 
It is unnecessary to enter into the events of the war itself. 
A detailed study of the actual campaigns is adequately dealt with 
2 
elsewhere. It will suffice to s-y that this was a war of cattle. 
The Xhosa would seem to have been bent on the capture of cattle and 
evaded confrontation with the colonial forces as much as possible. 
In all but one isolated case, they spared the lives of women and 
children, and of the missionaries residing within their own territory. 
With the notable exception of the 'Kaffirland traders', very few 
white colonists were, in proportion to the population, to lose their 
lives. For their part, the colonial military forces, were slow in 
arranging a counter-offensive. This commenced on January 10, 1835,3 
and was then only a clearing operation within the colony. The 
4 
. offensive into Xhosa territory commenced on March 6, 1835. During 
this period the Xhosa were given virtually a free hand in their 
ISee infra, pp.158ff. 
2 Cory, G.E ., op.cit ., Vol. III, Ch.II to Ch.VI. 
3Ibid ., p.98 . 
4Ibid ., p.113. 
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depredations. The fact that the Xhosa did not give the colonial 
forces the opportunity of forcing a major confrontation, meant that 
the offensive into Xhosa territory very soon resolved itself into 
what Colonel Harry Smithl referred to as, 'Smithfield market cattle 
driving' • The major significance of this war for the frontier 
farming community lay,not in the loss of life, but in the numbers 
of livestock lost to the Xho~ and subsequently captured from them 
as compensation • . 
The agricultural population which now sought protection in the 
various centres, constituted a problem, both for the colonial 
authorities, and the populations of these centres. While many sought 
refuge with friends, this being particularly true of the English 
sector of the population, there were others who were now in a 
destitute condition and represented a burden on the community. To 
overcome this, the governor, on his ~rrival in Grahamstown on January 
20, 1835, called for the creation of a 'Board of Relief' to administer 
aid to these destitute farmers. 2 This body was constituted on January 
21, 1835,3 by which time there was a considerable refugee population 
in Grahamstown. As early as December 26, 1834, Bathurst had been 
abandoned and some 900 people made their way in a convoy of 70 ox 
4 
wagons towards Grahamstown. It was the Dutch farmers from both 
sides of the Fish River who were to constitute the largest proporti on ' 
of the recipients of the aid offered by the Board of Relief in 
lHe assumed supreme command of the colonial forces on January 
6, 1835. 
2 C.0 . 503 of 1837, p.296. 
3Ibid . , p.304. 
4Ibid ., p.302 . 
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Grahamstown. This resulted from their closer proximity to the first 
attacks and their lack of family or friends who had not suffered a 
similar fate. There were also farmers from this region who were 
not aware of this aid, so that their numbers could have been 
considerably larger. l 
By February, 1835, the Board had commenced activities. By this 
time there were between 1,500 and 2,000 individuals, drawn from the 
outlying areas, in Grahamstown, who were considered to be in need of 
2 
support. In addition to this group, there were in the outlying 
areas, smaller groups who were also in a destitute condition . There 
was also the large Khoi settlement on the Kat River which, through 
its close proximity to the frontier and its loyalty to the colonial 
cause, had suffered severe depredations. These groups were also to 
receive consideration. As a result of the Board only being 
constituted some time after the outbreak of the hostilities, temporary 
relief had already been offered by the inhabitants of Grahamstown 
to some 80 families, made up of between 300 and 400 individuals . • 
This aid had been limited to what the local community could raise 
in the form of such essentials as food, bedding, and second-hand 
clothing. 3 
The chief functions of the Board were to investigate all claims 
for aid made to it, and to record the statement of all applicants. 
Only those cases which were in dire straits were to be helped. 
In the pursuit of this end, the Board had some difficulty in 
lcory, G.E., op.cit., Vol. III, p.104. 
2 C. 0.503 of 1837, p.304. 
3Ibid ., p.295. 
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determining the exact plight of all the cases presented to it. 
In the case of dubious claims, only small grants were made , and 
initially no claims were made in cash. This was done to deter this 
aid finding its way into the canteens which, initially being closed 
as one of the measures of the emergency, had also reopened their 
doors in February, 1835. Later, cash payments were made to widows 
for the payment of rent or funerals. It was soon found that the 
recording of statements from ~ach applicant was retarding the Board 
in the pursuit of its other functions, and on application to the 
1 governor, this function was dropped. Once the Board had deter-
mined the validity of an application, a requisition was issued against . 
the civil commissary for rations, or upon the clerk of the peace for 
accommodation, or upon the district surgeon for medicines or medical 
attention. 2 For the more distant encampments, not all these pro-
visions could be rendered, and from the report of the Board it is 
clear that the aid given to these outlying areas had, of necessity, 
to be inferior to what was being offered in Grahamstown. 3 
In addition to the requisitions made on the various government 
departments and officers, a separate fund was established. It was 
seen that the aid emanating from the government would, of necessity, 
be a temporary measure, and an independent fund would provide the 
board with the necessary funds to carry on its activities after this 
had happened. The Board raised £3,737 during the course of 18354 
and £3,390 of this was spent in relief of the farming community during 
1 C.0.503 of 1837, p . 296. 
2Ibid ., p.305. 
3Ibid ., pp . 305ff . 
4Theal, G.M., op.cit., Vol. II, p.98. 
156 
1 the year. During the same period over £16,000 was issued i n the 
form of provisions and rations to the destitute. 2 By April 27 , 
1837, only 19 men, 26 women and 25 children remained on the ration . 
list. 3 For the majority of those receiving them, rations ceased to 
be issued on January 31, 1836. 4 
This relief rendered by the Board was for the immediate 
alleviation of the destitute. It was simply an emergency measure 
which was considered as an unavoidable cost of the war for the 
colonial administration. It was essential that steps should be 
taken towards the normalisation of the war-torn economy and the 
rehabilitation of the farming community. To this end, the governor 
established the position of a 'Government Commissioner of Relief' 
5 
on March 12, 1835 . This post was filled by Mr Hougham Hudson, the 
retired magistrate of Uitenhage . 6 The function of this officer was 
the distribution of loans, to enable the farmers to 'renew their 
occupations, upon however a diminished scale', as quickly as 
7 possible. The funds made available to this officer were some 
£7,000 appropriated from the 'Storm Fund' which had been created . 
in 1823 to assist in the relief of the Settlers. 8 From this sum 
1 Cory, G.E., op .cit., Vol. III, p.l04. 
2Ibid ., p.249. 
3 L.G.595, p.56. 
4 L.G.50, p.172. 
5 C.O.503 of 1837, Despatch, D'Urban to Glenelg, 8.6.1836, 
No.30, p.295. 
6Ibid • 
7Ibid • 
8 For an account of the establishment of the St orm Fund see 
Theal, G.M., op.cit., Vol. I, pp.330-l. See supra, pp.67ff . 
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about 400 loans were made to sufferers to the extent of £6 , 792, 
no loan being in excess of £50. 1 The operation of the Commissioner 
in the case of these loans wa s for him to authorise the purchase 
for the applicant for the loan, such articles of stock, seed, or 
implements, as might be required. Security for the repayment of 
the loans was secured in the mortgage of land or moveable property • 
.. \ schedule of all such purchases .·was submitted to the colonial office 
in Cape Town, where drafts on the Discount Bank were issued in favour 
of the persons being assisted. 2 Rations, clothing, and furniture 
were not considered amongst the items for which assistance could be 
given, other than in extreme cases. 
The functions of this officer were extended in June, 1835, when 
the governor undertook to arrange the sale of cattle which had been 
captured during the various campaigns. In order that needy farmers 
might also be allowed to participate in the purchase of these animals, 
the Government Commissioner WeS authorised to issue orders to farmers, 
who were bona fide losers of cattle in the war, at a rate of 15 per 
cent. It can only be assumed that this low rate was an attempt to 
discourage speculators from over-stating their losses, and to ensure 
that all claimants might be able to benefit by recouping at least 
some of their losses. In all, 824 orders were issued, amounting to 
3 £9,019. The individuals who received the orders signed a receipt 
for the amount of the order, and this sum was then considered as 
part compensation for their loss of cattle. This was subsequently 
1 C.O.503 of 1837, No. 30, Encl.2, p.332. · 
2Ibid . , Encl.5, p.340. 
3Ibid ., Encl.2, p.332. 
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struck off their statements of losses against any compensation which 
might later be paid by the colonial or British governments. The 
fact that each claimant was allowed an order for only 15 per cent 
of his original claim suggests that, on one hand, the number of 
animals available for distribution was limited, so that this reduced 
rate would guarantee to each claimant some compensation; or, on the 
other, that the claims were inflated. l 
The latter point is borne out in the sentiments expressed by 
the Government Commissioner,2 
"The sufferers by the Caffre irruption have delivered to 
me their own statements of their losses ••• but their amount 
must not be considered exact, as the state of many of the 
documents prevents the amount of losses being ascertained 
with any degree of accuracy. 
When the parties undergo a strict examination as to the 
correctness of their statements and the value of their 
property, very considerable reductions will take place, 
and some are likely to be disallowed. The impression on 
my mind is, that the sum may be reduced one-third; and if 
two-thirds are taken as the real amount of the losses sus-
tained, I am humbly of the opinion it will be found nearly 
correct .. " 
It was natural that the farming community would overstate its losses. 
The governor had stated his intention of requesting compensation on 
3 their behalf from the British government. There was also the fact 
lL.G.47 is a list of the farmers who received orders to pur-
chase captured cattle. It has a central column of figures which 
is untitled but which bears a strict ratio to the monetary orders 
issued, e.g.: 
Name of claimant 
" 
36 
15 
£ 5 0 0 
2 10 0 
If this column is added, the total is approximately 59,600 . The 
official claim for cattle recaptured in the war is 60,000 . This 
would suggest that there were a considerable number of animals 
available for distribution. 
2 C.0.503 of 1837, No.30, Encl.2, p.332. 
IS~ 
1 that several farmers, like the Bo~kers, had been promised full 
compensation for their herds and flocks by the landdrost for 
Bathurst. Others, not being able to return to their farms during 
the war, were unable to ascertain the full extent of their losses 
and could thus not submit aocurate statements. For them all, there 
was also a strong temptation to make the most of the opportunity of 
recouping themselves for the 'inconveniences suffered'. 
The abstract from the register of statements made by applicants 
to the Board of Relief also pointed out that this was an imperfect 
summary of what had been lost and saved, as 'many of the statements 
are defective, and there are many severe sufferers who have not 
2 
applied to the Board'. This is borne out by the discrepancies which 
exist in the figures quoted by these two bodies . 3 The Civil 
4 Commissioner for Albany, Duncan Campbell, interpreted the figures 
quoted by Hudson as correct, ignoring the note of caution sounded 
by the latter. In spite of being unable to undertake a personal 
inspection of the Albany district,S he considered that,6 
It ••• from the knowledge I possess of the circumstances of 
the people, and of the statements they have made of their 
losses, I am disposed to think that, when due inquiry is 
1 See supra, p.lSl. 
2 C.O.S03 of 1837, p.328. 
3Ibid • Compare pp.328 to 329. See Appendix VIII. 
4Macmillan, W.M., The Cape Colour Question, p.121 notes that 
Campbell was also a farmer who, following raids on his kraals out-
side Grahamstown in October 182S, wrote to Dr John Philip that he 
would have vengeance and 'a commando to teach them'. He rejected 
the idea of conciliation with the 'Xhosa and suggested that 'Powder 
and Ball, by G-d, is the only means of civilizing them'. 
5 C.O . 503 of 1837, No.30, Encl.4, p.337, Campbell to Secreta ry 
to Govt. 
6Ibid ., No.30, Encl.3, p.335, Campbell to Secretary to Govt. 
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made, they will be found in general not to have over-
estimated them; and in this view of the case, I am fully 
borne out by the opinion of the Rev. Mr. Heavyside, ... " 
campbell then went on to quote the figures of Hudson, and to calcu-
late the value of these losses according to a rather arbitrary set 
1 
of average values J 
Schedule of the Losses of Property sustained by the Inhabitants 
of the Districts of Albany. Somerset and Uitenhage 
by the caffre war 
Descril2tion Numbers Value each 
£ s d 
Horses 5,715 at 5 0 0 
cattle 114,930 1 5 0 
Sheep and Goats 161,930 4 6 
Houses burnt 200 200 0 0 
256 100 0 0 
Household goods 200 40 0 0 
Clothing 30 0 0 
Houses pillaged 300 30 0 0 
Waggons 58 25 0 0 
Amount of orders given by Comm.Hudson to 
824 persons for the purchase of captured cattle 
Total Value 
£ s 
28,575 
143,662 10 
36,434 
40,000 
25,600 
8,000 
7,680 
9,000 
1.450 
£300,401 lOs 
9,019 o 
£291. 382 lOs 
d 
These figures have been freely quoted by most historians without any 
heed to the warning note sounded by Hougham Hudson , or any con-
sideration given to the figures published by the Board of Relief,2 
They have become the standard figures quoted in relation to this war, 
It must be stressed that they are probably highly inflated. This is 
borne out in considering the abstract from the register of statements 
1 C.0.503 of 1837, No.30, Encl.3, pp.334-7. 
2see Cory, G.E . , op.cit . , Vol. III, p.72; also Theal, G.M., 
op.cit., Vol. II, p.91. 
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made before the Board of Relief. While this set of figures only 
reflected the losses registered down to December 31 , 1835, they 
nevertheless cover virtually the whole period of the war . In the 
1 
major area of cattle losses, the figure given here is for 51,722, 
or slightly more than one-third of the losses registered with the 
Government Commissioner. This figure would naturally be lower, in 
that not all farmers were to seek relief with this board, but a dis-
crepancy of this · size suggests that the larger figure is suspect. 
This is particularly true if it is borne in mind that those seeking 
relief from the board had nothing to gain from overstating their case. 
Hougham Hudson was very sceptical of the statements made by the 
farmers, and of Campbell who backed their cause. He realised the need 
for an unbiased approach in the handling of such claims, as is 
2 indicated in the following statements, 
"If it be your intention ere long to entrust me with other 
important duties and the completion of this business 
[determining the extent of depredations] should pass into 
other hands, I most humbly but strongly recommend that the 
person or persons Appointed should be entirely unconnected 
with the frontier or the Inhabitants thereof, .•• " 
Again, 
" ••• My Object in bringing this to your notice is to prevent 
any difference of opinion arising between me and the Civil 
Commissioner as we do not nor shall not think alike . -" 
The need for a closer investigation, which was never undertaken, of 
all claims made by the agricultural community, worried Hudson. He 
proposed in October, 1835,3 
lsee Appendix VIII. 
2 Letter from Hougham Hudson, 10.10.1835, Cory Library, MS920. 
162 
" ... Doing what has hitherto been impossible to do, viz . 
framing a Return of Losses sustained by each Individual 
According to the Statements and Estimates furnished by 
the parties themselves. l When this is Complete •.. I would 
suggest if I might be allowed humbly Suggest that a trav-
elling Commission should Commence to inspect and value all 
the Houses and Buildings burnt and destroyed by the Caffers 
and in order that it might be properly performed I should 
recommend that the Government Commissioner, Accompanied by 
a Justice of the Peace and a Field Cornet of his division 
should proceed to each farm and examine every building 
destroyed ••.• This being completed the Statements of the 
losses of cattle should be compared with the Opgaafrol .•• 
and the strict examination of the parties themselves ... " 
He was also worried by the fact that claims did not differentiate 
between the livestock stolen by the Xhosa and that lost in the con-
fusion of the war.2 This raised the point, that if these animals 
had not been lost to the colony, certain unscrupulous individuals 
were obviously holding them. With the inefficient administration 
of the colony and the total absence of a police force, these thefts 
would have gone undetected indefinitely. 
If no other figure was inaccurate, the figure quoted in the 
accepted table for sheep and goats lost would alone be sufficient 
to call the issue in question. Throughout the literature on the war 
there is little mention of the loss of these animals, and yet, 
according to this table they represent the highest figure of any 
type of animal lost. 3 A brief glance at the export figures and 
4 graph of the wool exports from the eastern districts throughout the 
period of the war, indicate that there was no serious reduction in 
IThis was done . 
2 Cory Library, MS923. 
3 See Cory, G.E., op.cit., Vol. III, and Theal, G.M., op.cit . , 
Vol. II, for accounts of the war . 
4see Appendix II. 
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the quantities of wool exported. This implies that it was not the 
woolled flocks that were stolen or lost in any great numbers. It 
should be remembered that the sheep was largely alien to the 
husbandry of the Xhosa tribes, and certainly did not represent a 
form of wealth, as in the case of cattle. It would therefore seem 
unlikely that the Xhosa warriors would have risked their lives for 
the sake of sheep and goats. There was the additional factor, that 
sheep and goats cannot be driven over any great distance at speed 
or without rest. Thus it would have been virtually impossible to 
move flocks of stolen sheep and goats undetected, except when these 
flocks were found in the immediate proximity of the frontier. This 
is borne out in the evidence. Most of the farmers who professed to 
losing sheep and goats lived in close proximity to the Fish River. l 
Godlonton has suggested, that not many of the sheep were actually 
stolen. 2 He wrote, 
"Some of them were left for weeks to wonder over the 
country, a prey to wolves [jackals] and wild dogs, or 
still wilder and more ferocious savages. II 
To this can be added the evidence of the colonial farmers 
themselves. Miles Bowker admitted to the abandonment of his farm 
near the Kowie after the war, in preference for sheep farming on the 
Koonap River, for the very reason that the Xhosa did not steal 
3 
sheep, 
"Previous to the war our attention was chiefly turned 
to cattle farming, but as the greater part of those 
fell prey to the Kafirs in the War, we have since that 
1 See C.O.503 of 1837, p.315ff. 
2 Godlonton, R., Irruption of the Kaffir Hordes, p.189. 
3 G.T.J., August 8, 1839. 
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period turned more of our attention to sheep, as a 
stock less liable to become the prey of Kafir depreda-
tors." 
Goldswain mentions the fact that the Leech family was left with only 
1 their sheep to drive into Salem in the opening days of the war . 
As early as 1825 the Commissioners of Inquiry, reporting on the 
. 2 proposed Chartered South African Company, had po~nted out that, 
"Flocks of sheep are in no danger from the plundering 
incursions of the Caffres, for they do not value them, 
but they are constantly exposed, even in the day time, 
to depredations from wild dogs and wolves." 
This evidence suggests that a more plausible explanation for the 
losses that did occur, might be more realistically sought, in the 
lack of fencing and paddocking which was a feature of frontier farms . 
Animals could simply be lost in the thickets which were also a feature 
of every farm. Here, as Godlonton suggested, they either became prey 
to wild animals, or to the wandering bands of raiders, many of whom 
were probably vagrant Khoi. The remainder would be rounded up again 
by the farmers, on their return. to their farms. It was certainly 
worth claiming them as lost, if, as the governor was doing, an 
appeal was being made to the British government for compensation. 3 
Another point which supports this argument is, that figures 
published in the Grahamstown Journal for the two decades previous 
to the war indicate a remarkably small number of sheep stolen by 
the 'caffres'. Only 2,692 sheep were lost in this twenty-four year 
period, 2,059 of them in the space of a single year, which, again, 
is sufficient to make this figure suspect. In the same period 
IGoldswain, J., op.cit., Vol. I, p.74. 
2 Theal, G.M., Records, op.cit., Vol. XXIII, pp.209-10 . 
3c.0.279 of 1836, D'Urban to Abderdeen, pp.4ff. 
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1 38,467 cattle were reputed to have been stolen by the Xhosa . The 
hypothesis can be put forward, that the high figure quoted for 
sheep and goat losses in the official documents, may well have been 
quoted in the hopes that this would encourage, or enhance, the 
chances of the farmers for receiving remuneration, particularly for 
these losses, in the face of the changing trend towards woolled sheep 
farming and the growing significance of wool in the Brit ish textile 
industry . The fact that sheep and goats were actually s t olen by the 
Xhosa at all, suggests that these were taken to augment their food 
2 
supply, following the disasters they had faced in the 18'33-4 season . 
Again, had the captured cattle been distribut ed amongst the 
farmers on a pro-rata basis, according to the stated losses of this 
group, as was the case in previous wars,3 then those who claimed 
most, would have stood to gain accordingly . What distinguished this 
war from its predecessors was, that this was the first war to occur 
on the frontier which was fairly well populated by colonists . The 
last war of 1818-19 had been fought prior to the arrival of t he 
Settlers . Their presence on the frontier had changed several factors : 
Increased interaction with the Xhosa had resulted in their purchasing 
guns and ammunition from unscrupulous traders . This gave them more 
guns than they had enjoyed in any of the previous encounters , making 
them more of a force to contend with. Unlike the previous war , the 
Xhosa this time proved an elusive foe, who capitalised on the 
element of surprise . This they used to drive off the colonial cattle 
1 G. T.J., August 30, 1838 . These figures were reputed to have 
been extracted from colonial office records . They appear as 
Appendix I of this work. 
2 See supra, p.142. 
3 Boyce, W.B., op. cit., p.12. 
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deep into their territory in advance of the punitive forces sent 
after them. In this war there were more farmers to share in the 
spoils of the 'Kaffirland campaigns', but there was not a 
proportionate increase in the number of animals recaptured to meet 
the farmers' claims. 
The official figure for the number of cattle captured across 
1 the Fish River from the Xhosa, is 60,000 . It is not clear whether 
this figure represents the total number of animals taken during t he 
campaigns, or whether this was the total number of animals which 
survived from the total captured, and that were available for distri-
bution amongst the farmers. Unfortunately, there would seem to be 
no record of an official commissariat count, of either figure, which 
has survived. Boyce considered this figure to apply to thc tot al 
number of animals captured during the campaigns, and then that ha l-
2 this figure would be closer to the truth . Governor D'Urban, i n a 
despatch dated November 7, 1835, to the British colonial office , 
. d 3 ment~one , 
1I ••• There have been taken from them, also besides the 
conquest and alienation of their country, about 60,000 
head of cattle, almost all their goats, their habita-
tions every where destroyed, and their gardens and 
corn-fields laid waste. II 
Cory has suggested, that of this number, only a fifth were available 
4 for distribution amongst the farmers. The rest were used by the 
colonial forces as a meat supply while in the field, or died of 
1 Theal, G.M. op.cit., Vo. II, p.127. See footnote, supra, p . 158 . 
2 Boyce, W.B., op.cit., p.xii. 
3 Cape of Good Hope Papers Relating to the Caffre War and the 
Death of Hintza, p.89, D'Urban to Glenelg, November 7, 1835 . 
4 Cory, G.E., op.cit., Vol. III, p.219. 
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exhaustion from being driven hither and thither across 'Kaffirland' 
in times of drought . Goldswain mentions that up to 80 cattle died 
at a time in 
their eating 
the Xhosa territory after being recaptured, owing to 
/ 1 
tulip. This plant remains green after the grass has 
I 
died off, and would have been an irresistible lure to starving 
cattle reared on grazing free from this plant. 
Heavy mortality occurred amongst the captured cattle once thay 
had returned to the colony. A letter from W.M. Smith, the acting 
government secretary, to George Jarvis, the commissioner for cap-
2 tured cattle, of September 4, 1835, stated, 
"It having been represented to His Excellency the Governor 
that great mortality has commenced amongst the captured 
cattle now herding on the Tietsikamma plains in the dis -
trict of Uitenhage, and that such anxiety is shown by the 
Inhabitants to purchase them, I am directed by His Excellency 
to inform you that under these circumstances the present 
moment appears to Him most favourable for their sale a nd as 
further delay can only increase the loss without answering 
any good purpose, I am consequently to request that you 
will be pleased to take steps to dispose of them should 
you not see any weighty objection of which His Excellency 
is not aware." 
W.R . Thomson, in a letter to Jarvis, from the Balfour mission in 
August, 1835, requested that additional animals be sent to that 
place, as of the 186 cattle sent there for distribution to the 
members of the Kat River Settlement , only 139 had survived. 3 
Even if these losses are t aken into consideration , then accord-
4 ing to Theal and Cory, there were twelve hundred head of cattle 
lGoldswain, J., op.cit., Vol. I, p.lIO. 
2 L .G.597, p.29. 
3 Ibid ., p .20, Balfour, August 20, 1835. 
4 Cory, G.E., op.cit., Vol. III, p . 219 ; Theal, G.M., op.cit ., 
Vol. II, p.127. 
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ava i lable for distribution amongst the farmers. While this was 
not an inconsiderable number, it was certainly far short of the 
numbers which the farmers professed to have had taken from them . 
There is a possibility that large numbers of cattl e were also lost 
in the frontier districts during the course of 1836 . Theal mentions 
the outbreak of a cattle diseasel amongst the herds of the Gca l eka 
in which thousands died. This could also have affected colonial 
herds in the proximity of the frontier . Alternatively, the number 
of cattle available for distribution to the frontier f armers might 
have been far larger, and the figure of 60,000 might apply. If 
this was the case, then this would certainly have been a fair com-
pensation. Bearing in mind the warning of Hudson , on the over-
stating of claims, this would have meant a return of approx~ately 
two cattle for every three lost . It would seem more likely that 
the truth lies somewhere between these two points. 
Another aspect which counters the accepted views of the 
severity of the losses claimed by the frontier farmers , is the 
rapid recovery that was made . Livestock numbers were to increase 
rapidly in the years after the war and a period of general pros-
perity would seem to have set in. In part this was assisted by 
the fact that 1835 was, generally, a good a .qricultural year through-
out most of the area affected by the war . During the latter part 
of May and the beginning of June, 1835, the governor had dismissed 
the farmers serving with the colonial forces, in order that they 
might return to their farms to undertake the sowing of the winter 
2 
cereal crops. This was particularly relevant to t he commandos 
1 Probably anthrax. 
2cape Papers Relating to the Caffre War, op.cit ., p . 86 . 
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which had been drawn from the western districts, but a lso applied 
to those from the frontier. The opportunity of return t o their 
farms allowed the farmers to begin the rehabilitation of these 
properties along the frontier . I Bertram Bowker recalled that , 
"We went from one place to another, to plough and sow 
each one's land so that we might have something to redp 
when the war was over. There were no cattle in Lower 
Albany to destroy crops as we were looking after all the 
cattle." 
By September 30, 1835, there were 182 men employed in the cultivation 
of 309~ · acres in the vicinity of Bathurst. 2 Farmers were now 
returning to their farms throughout the district. On September 27, 
1835, H. James Lloyd reported to the Civil Commissioner, that he and 
his family, together with their cattle had returned to their location 
at the Fish River mouth . 3 He reported the presence of Xhosa spoor . 
This return to their farms was not without risk. 4 A truce had not 
yet been reached and small bands of Xhosa could enter the colony at 
will. On August 10, the governor issued orders for the recall of 
specified numbers of farmers for active duty , for a final onslaught 
5 
on the Xhosa. This onslaught was not necessary and by September, 
1835, the Xhosa had agreed to come to terms with the governor. 6 
The frontier farmers were still in an unsettled state, and alarming 
reports of Xhosa incursions continued to flow into Grahamstown . 
lMitford- Barberton, I., op.cit., p.65 . 
2 C.0.2756 (unpaginated). 
3Ibid • 
4 Theal, G.M., op.cit . , Vol. II, pp.ll7-l8 . 
5 Cory, G. E . , op. cit ., Vol. III, p.204. 
6Ibid ., p.208ff . 
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One such report stated that 100 Xhosa and a herd of stolen cattle 
were in the cOlony at Nottingham Party in October, 1835. This 
turned out to be one Xhosa and a Khoi, with a few cattle, proceeding 
to the Theopolis mission station. l Another phenomenon which now 
began to appear with increasing intensity, was a series of cases 
in which the owners of animals then in government pounds claimed, 
that these animals had initially been stolen by the Xhosa. For 
2 
example, 
"I . do here by certify on oath that a Black ox of mine 
lately taken by the Caffres is now in the Pound." 
signed Ann Mitchley. 
George Jarvis, the civil commissary in charge of captured cattle, 
made a tour of inspection of the frontier districts during the 
closing months of 1835. 3 This was done to ascertain the progress 
being made by the farmers in their rehabilitation. He noted that 
in every part of the district of Albany the marks of the ravages 
and depredations were still apparent. There were, nevertheless, also 
signs of progress. At Bathurst the crops had advanced to a stage 
where he considered that the allowance of provisions could be stopped 
without occasioning any serious inconvenience. At Salem nearly all 
farms were reoccupied. Here the locusts were damaging crops. 
Along the Fish River little cultivation was taking place dnd locusts 
were also present. Jarvis commented,4 
" ••• indeed, had it not been for the remarkable fineness 
of the season, and for the abundant and continual rains, 
1 L.G.14l, p.201ff. 
2 L.G.597, p.45ff. 
3 C. 0.503 of 1831, D'Urban to Glenelg. No.30, Enc1.4, p.337ff. 
4Ibid ., p .338. 
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there would have been scarcely a vestige of herbage l eft 
in the whole of this field-cornetcy, so completely has 
the whole country been filled with these destructive 
insects .. tI 
Along the Koonap River, it was seen that this area had been affected 
by the war right up to the conclusion of peace , so that little culti-
vation had taken place. This was the worst affected area along the 
frontier. Between the Koonap and the Winterberg, he reported,l 
"There is not any part of the district which wears so 
cheering and enlivening an appearance as t his quarter. 
The crops of grain of all kinds are luxuriant and. 
abundant, and the most experienced amongst the farmers 
state that the present is far beyond a good average crop." 
The farmers in this area had also had a good season the previous 
2 year, 
" •. • the inhabitants derived considerable assistance from & 
being able to find a ready market for their last year's 
grain, at Camp Adelaide, at a remunerating p rice; and 
had it not been for the demand occasi oned in that quarter 
by the supply of rations to the inhabitants of the Kat • 
River settlement, many of the farmers would have been 
unable to have taken their grain to the usual market , 
owing to their great deficiency of the means of transport." 
The shortage of cattle was generally felt throughout the settle-
ments. It should, however, be borne in mind that the extent of 
cultivation, mentioned by Jarvis, would have been impossible with-
out the presence of some animals for draught purposes . 
There is a tendency to view the Albany districts as being devoid 
of all livestock during the greater part of the year 1835 . This 
was not t he case . The abstract of the Board of Relief pointed out 
that amongst those who had applied to this organisation for aid, 
1 C.O.503 of 1837, D'Urban to Gl enelg, No.30, Encl.4, p.339. 
2Ibid., p. 339. 
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11,418 cattle, 1 ,186 horses, and 102,343 sheep and goats remained 
. . f h ' 1 2n the possess~on 0 t e1r owners. Certainly not all the 
inhabitants of the district had applied for aid to this body, and 
the remnants of their herds and flocks have gone unrecorded. Many 
of these animals 'were driven to the various gathering points by 
their owners . Here the oxen and wagons of these refugees were 
mostly conscripted into government service.. Horses were also tabs-." . 
The remaining animals were now sent out in communal herds to farms 
in the district under armed guards. Here they were kept for the 
duration of the war and those removed for commissariat use were 
credited to the compensation accounts of their owners. Gold swa in 
entered his wagon in the commissary department in February, 1835, 
2 
at twe lve shillings and sixpence per day. 
After the war these claims for the use of farmers ' property 
were added to those for the loss of their livestock to the Xhosa. 
On beth counts the government was to default. The British govern-
ment did not consider itself responsible for the loss of property 
3 through acts of war and the Cape administration lacked the ready , 
funds to make good its .borrowing. This turned the colonists' eyes 
to the territory across the Fish River. It was seen, that if the 
colonial government could not provide compensation and repayment 
for its debts in money, it could do so in the lands which had been 
captured from the Xhosa. The terms of the peace had extended the 
British dominions to the Kei River. The governor decided on the 
1 C.0 . 503 of 1837, p.328. 
2Goldswain , J. , op.cit., Vol . I , p . 85. 
3 C.0.503 of 1837 , Glenelg to D'Urban. pp.343-4 . 
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resettlement of the clans within this territory and also decided to 
'strengthen the European element on the border by allotting all the 
ground in the territory ceded by Ngqika in 1819 that was not in 
possession of the Khoi at the Kat River,.l Grants i n this territory 
were to be made in lieu of monetary compensation. These grants were 
eagerly sought after by the farmers. Between May and December, 
1835, 406 applications were made for land in this new province of 
Queen Adelaide. 2 A late entry on November 12, 1835, reads as follows, 
Claimant Area claimed Remarks 
E . D. Weinand To a farm between the All land in this section 
Fish River and Keiskamma. already appropriated . 
Much of this territory was seen as fine farming land. Bowker noted 
in March 1835, that this country was in fine appearance following 
3 good rains, and that 'it will make excellent sheep farms'. This 
land was seen as being 'far to good for such a race of runaways as 
the Kaffirs,.4 The reversal of this policy by the colonial secretary 
Lord Glenelg in 1836, was bound to kindle a great deal of resentment 
5 
amonst the colonial farmers. Not only would these farms have helped 
to ease the growing demands for more land by the frontier farmers, 
but the fact that they were suited to the pasturing of sheep in 
many cases, would have assisted in the more rapid rehabilitation of 
many of the Albany farmers whose old farms were unsuited to this 
form of farming. 
1 Theal, G.M., op.cit., Vol. II, p . 126. 
2 B.K.32, Claims for Farms in the New Province of Quec!:. l\delaide. 
3Mitford-Barberton, I., op.cit., p.115. 
4 I bid ., p.1l6. 
5 C.0.503 of 1837 , Glenelg to D'Urban, pp.lff ; p.44; also 
Macmillan, W.M., op.cit . , pp. l73ff. 
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The Graham's Town Journal took a different view on the proposed 
granting of farms in the new province . It saw fit to advocate the 
sale of farms "ithin this territory, rather than the disposa l of 
this land by free grant. In two editorials during the month of 
1 October, 1835, i t stated its case. By giving this land t o the 
farmers for agricultural purposes, rather than selling it to them, 
the Journal saw that the colonial government was being deprived of 
a possible source of revenue which could be effectively used for the 
supply of essential services to the community in general. It was 
pointed out that by giving this land to the farmers, this could 
affect the value of landed property within the colony. By December, 
1835, the Journal stated categorically,2 
"It is nonsense to talk of persons not having the means 
to pay for farms; we deny the fact ." 
That an organ, as influential as wa s the Journal on the frontier, 
could make such a statement, is a clear indication of the condition 
of the f rontier farming community. 
I n summing up t he effects of the Sixth Frontier War on the 
farming community of the eastern frontier, and Albany in particular, 
it is fair to say that this group were certainly the largest losers 
by the Xhosa irruption. A large number of their livestock were lost, 
either to the Xhosa or wild beasts. Many farmhouses and a good deal 
of t heir personal possessions were lost to the invading tribesmen, 
by the fire-brand and theft. There was, however, a tendency to 
overstate their case, both by the affected parties t,emselves, and 
1 G. T. J., October 22 and October 29, 1835. 
2 G.T . J., December 3, 1835. 
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by subsequent writers of their history. There is also little doubt, 
that the compensation which they received for these losses did not 
meet the full amount, either in recaptured cattle or pecuniary 
gains. Having stated this, however, it is necessary to add 
immediately that this war had not come to an impoverished community. 
If their losses had been substantial, so was the amount they had been 
able to retain. The past emphasis laid on their losses has stemmed 
from the rage and indignation felt by these people, and through it, 
the bias it has given to the interpretation of their history. This 
war was a set-back in the developnent of the Albany farming community, 
but it was far from fatal. The Xhosa had not invaded the bank • 
balances of the se farmers, and while there were those who had been 
rendered destitute by this incursion, by far the greater majority 
could begin again to piece together the basis of their wealth . 
The tragedy lies rather in the fact that they had failed to see 
clearly the causes of this irruption and to take steps towards the 
prevention of a repetition. 
\ 
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CHAPTER V 
The introduction of the new "treaty system" by the newly 
appointed lieutenant-governor Andries Stockenstrom, marks the 
beginning of the post-war period on the frontier . l The reversal of 
the schemes adopted by the governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, for the 
extension of the colonial frontier to the Kei River was resented t,y 
the frontier farming community. The abandonment of this policy 
meant the negation of their hopes of gaining farms in the fertile 
territory across the Fish River.2 Undoubtedly, it was also felt by 
the frontier commercial community, that the extension of the frontier 
would have brought a great deal more of their custom in the ' Kaffir 
trade' under colonial jurisdiction. 3 The disappointment of both 
these factions on the frontier resulted in unjustified hostil ity 
towards the new treaty system for the regulation of interactions 
between the colonists and Xhosa. The major feature of this new 
system was the regulation determining the repatriation of stolen 
cattle . The frontier community was loud in its clamour that this 
section of the treaty system did not work. 4 This view has subsequently 
been reiterated by historians sounding the colonists' viewpoint. S 
More recent research has, however, cast serious doubt on this 
1 For a description of this system see Crankshaw, G.B., 
The Diary of C.L. Stretch: A Critical Edition and Appraisal , p.14ff. 
2 See supra, pp.172-3. 
3 Godlonton, R., Irruption of t he Kaffir Hordes, p.144ff. 
4 Bowker, J.M., op.cit., p.l07. 
~ . Cory, G. E., op.cit., Vol. III, p.219ff. 
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interpretation. 1 Evidence drawn from the diary of C.L. Stretch, 
the appointed colonial agent for the implementation of the system 
with the Ngqika tribe, indicates that all the cattle which were 
2 
reclaimable in terms of the treaty, were returned. This negation 
of the major area of discontent also casts doubt on colonial 
claims that the issue was a major obstacle to the progress of the 
frontier farming community. It is not suggested that thefts of 
colonial cattle ceased, but rather, that there was now a far greater 
incidence of them being returned to their rightful owners. 
Thus, in spite of these political setbacks for the farming 
community, and the fact that the new treaty system was not fully 
effective in the curtailment of stock thefts, there was little 
besides natural occurrences to hinder the prosperous development 
of this group in the decade down to the outbreak of the Seventh 
Frontier War in 1846. Agriculture and pastoral farming had indeed 
flourished in the period up to 1845, and the greatest problem which 
faced the frontier community on the eve of the Seventh Frontier War 
was not a question of survival in the face of the Xhosa threat, but 
rather a question of finding markets for their expanded production. 
Commenting on the position of agriculture in 1845, the Graham's 
Town Journal, in criticising the failure of the goverr~ent to seek 
and explore possible outlets for the colony's excess production, 
3 pointed out, 
"Agriculture is the root from whence springs our pros-
perity. UnleSS this flourish vain will be all t!le 
1 Crank shaw , G.B., op.cit., p.87ff. 
2Ibid . , p.87. 
3 G.T.J ., April 10, 1845. Editorial quoting Vattel's "Law 
of Nationsl1. 
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ceaseless activity, extensive knowledge, and high intelli-
gence, of the merchant - futile and unprofitable the skill 
of the mechanic. II 
On the eastern frontier the rapid development of woolled sheep-farming 
was adding reality to this statement . 
Woolled sheep had played a relatively minor role in the frontier 
agricultural economy prior to the war. Their profitability wu s not 
doubted, but their numbers remained small . Cattle farming had a h lays 
predominated. The war changed this, and it was now, in t he post war 
era, that the woolled sheep assumed dominance. The reasons for this 
are not hard to find. 1 In the first instance, as we have already seen, 
wool was a commodity with a high export value. Britain was in a 
position to absorb all the wool produced by her colonies. The se were 
given the incentive to produce by the removal of all tariff res-
2 trictions against the importation of colonial wool. Secondly, the 
transition to wool led sheep-farming was not a capital intensive 
process. Large flocks of Cape sheep already existed in the colony, 
and although these were hairy animals, they could be successfully 
cross bred with rams of the various woolled varieties . In this way 
flocks of woolled sheep could be built up relatively quickly, even 
if the wool from the initial cross-breds was of a very poor quality. 
This wool COUld, nevertheless , still be used for the manufacture of 
3 hats, mattre sses, and for padding saddlery. The Graham'S Town 
Journal commented on the low capital outla y necessary for the 
4 
commencement of woolled sheep-farming in the colony, as follows , 
I See supra, pp.ll7-8. 
2 Cape of Good Hope Almanac 1839, p .lOS. 
3 Cape of Good HoP" Almanac 183"1., p.53, 'Statement. Respecting 
t he Production of WOol from Cape Sheep by M. Van Breda '. 
4 . G.T . J., October 7, 184~. 
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"Let it be remarked that there is no Colony where sheep 
farming can be commenced with so small a capital as here, 
nor any in which the returns are so considerable." 
Cape ewes could be bcught for two to three Rixdollars (3s. to 4s.6d.l l 
and by the late 1830's woolled rams were becoming more readily 
available from local breeders, such as Griffith and Dani~ll, for 
2 between three and twelve pounds each. 
While capital was not of the utmost necessity, it was never theless 
also readily available for hastening this transition. 3 Finally, and 
perhaps the most significant reason for the increased popularity of 
sheep farming in the aftermath of the war, was the simple fact, that 
4 the Xhosa were not sheep farmers. Writing to a friend in England 
towards the end of 1842 J.M. Bowker expressed this reason why his 
f 01 d h had d h f 0 5 am1 y, an many ot ers, converte to seep arm1ng, 
" ••• the frontier inhabitants have, therefore, more decidedly 
turned their attention to the breeding of woolled sheep, as 
the Kafirs do not keep sheep, and, therefore, steal no more 
than the odd one for food, whilst on their plundering 
excursions within the colony. The export of wool has, there-
fore, increased within these last few years more than twenty-
three fold ••• " 
The Cape was not the only British colony which was now under-
taking the production of wool. The Australian settlements of New 
South Wales and Queensland also entered wool production in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, and were to outstrip the Cape in 
production, in spite of the fact that woolled sheep had been intra-
duced into these colonies much later than at the Cape. Thom, in 
1 G.T.J., January 23, 1834. 
2 G.T.J., December 28, 1837; February 23, 1842. In 1842 
Daniell was selling French X Australian Merino ram lambs for £12. 
3 See supra, p .137 , 
4 See supra, pp.163-4 . 
5 Bowker, J.M. , op.cit., p .lIO. 
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looking for a reason for this tardy development of the Cape wool -
farming industry, has suggested the necessity to protect cape 
flocks from "gevaarlike en roofsugtige inboorlingstamme en skadelike 
roofdiere II • 1 This under-estimates the influence of the Dago and 
Aborigine in Australian farming, and the cultural and economic 
background of the South African Bantu. 2 It must be conceded, however, 
that while the Australian farmer was subjected to continual harass -
ment from the above mentioned sources, this situation never deterio-
rated into open warfare on a similar scale to the war of 1834-5 at 
the Cape. It is nevertheless difficult to support the contention, 
that this war at the cape hindered the development of woolled sheep-
farming. 3 The export figures for Algoa Bay do not reflect any 
decline in wool production during the course of this war, although 
during the following two frontier wars, in 1846-7 and 1851-3 , a 
decline did take Place. 4 Rather than a disruptive influence, the war 
of 1834-5, would seem to have stimulated the transition to woolled 
sheep f a rming along the frontier, or at least to have come at a time 
when its influence on the local infant wool-farming industry was 
negligible. The vulnerability of the cattle farmer during this war 
decided, not only the Settler, but also his Dutch counterpart , that 
woolled sheep farming could not only be undertaken with a relatively 
low capital outlay, but also with less hazard to their personal 
welfare. 
Thom is more accurate in citing the large capital imports which 
1 Thom, H.B., op.cit . , p.174. 
2 Holden, W.C., The Past & Future of the Kaffir Races, p.223ff. 
3 See supra, pp.163-4. 
4see Appendix II. 
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flowed into Australia, the formation of farming companies, and the 
presence of wealthy individuals, as reasons for the earlier develop-
ment of those colonies' wool production. Another important reason 
can be found in the fact that the wool industry of these colonies 
began soon after their establishment. This was not tho case at the 
Cape. Here sheep had initially been kept for their mutton and fat. 
It required a major upheaval, such as the war of 1834-5 on the 
frontier, and the emancipation of the slaves in the older districts, 
to help break down the traditional conservatism of the Dutch sector 
of the population. 
The cape, lacking capital infusion on a similar scale to the 
Australian colonies, and already in possession of large flocks of 
hairy Cape sheep, had necessarily to face a period of transition. 
Thom has further argued that the Australian industry, not being 
delayed by this transition, was in a position to improve upon and 
adapt the European woolled breeds to local conditions more quiCkly.l 
This would, however, overlook some of the inherent advantages of 
the Cape sheep, such as a greater resistance to disease and the hot 
climate, which were not enjoyed by some of the British breeds. 
The chief reason for the later development of the Cape wool-
farming industry, in relation to its Australian counterpart, would, 
therefore, seem to have been the traditional conservatism of large 
numbers of the farming population, and the lack of a capital infusion 
on a similar scale to that in the Australian colonies. 
The year 1835 can, therefore, be seen as a turning point in 
the history of sheep farming at the cape. This year marked the end 
IThom, H.B., op.cit., pp.174-5. 
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of the experimental period. l The progress of this new farming trend 
was not uniform. There were still many farmers after the war who 
chose to return to cattle farming, and there were undoubtedly many 
more who could not afford a direct transition, so that 'mixed' 
farming became popular. The suitability of certain areas for sheep 
farming also influenced their importance in relation to the £~st of 
the frontier. Lower Albany now lost much of its importance as mor e 
and more farmers sought land to the north-west of Grahamstown. It 
was the ' suitability of the area now known as the cape Midlands for 
woolled sheep-farming, as much as the fact that the original 
inhabitants began adopting this form of farming, which gave impetus 
and added importance to this area. Again, it was not only that the 
Dutch inhabitants of this area now became woolled sheep-farmers, 
but rather that their English counterparts moved increasingl y into 
the region to pursue this form of farming, which enhanced its 
importance. This tendency was greatly facilitated by the beginnings 
of the Great Trek. This phenomenon allowed men such as Collett, 
the Bowkers, and Howse, to buy into this area of upper Albany and 
Somerset, which was now being vacated by the original Dutch o.mers. 
Ayliff, reminiscing on the activity of Howse at this time stated, 2 
"The years 1836-7 saw a very extraordinary event trans-
pire and one which tended to make Mr. Howse one of the 
most extensive landed proprietors in this part of South 
Africa. The event was called by the Colonial name of the 
'Trek' and consisted of a move from the Colony for the 
interior parts of the Continent by thousands of the 
wealthiest and the most worthy of the Dutch Inhabitants -
•• • Mr. Howse ' s very extensive acquaintance with the Dutch 
colonists ••• was the cause of numbers of those appl ying to 
him to become the purchaser of their farms , sever al of 
I Thom, H. B. , op.cit., p . 177. 
2Ayliff, J., Memorials of James Howse e sg., p . 30ff . 
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which he bought -, and as the Colonial Government had 
in the first instance granted the said land to the Dut ch 
farmers they were sold at a very low price to Mr. Howse -
The principal part of the land he thus bought was situ-
ated between Graham's Town and Fort Beaufort - the high 
road running for a distance of nearly twenty five miles 
through his land." 
The Bowkers were also to acquire property in this area a t this time. l 
James Collett was also established as a sheep farmer on the Koonap 
2 River by 1839. Thom is to some extent misled in believing that the 
move of woolled sheep-farming into the Cape Midlands after 1835 
represents the rapid acceptance of this form of farming by the Dutch 
3 farmers. It was only in 1842 that the Graham's Town Journal noted 
the beginnings of a transition on the part of the Dutch farmers of 
Somerset away from their former modes of farming towards woolled 
sheep- farming. 4 
To gain an impression of the increasing importance of sheep 
farming on the eastern frontier, consideration should be given to the 
returns of livestock published in the Cape Blue Books . Here it is 
necessary to point out the inaccuracy of these figures, and also to 
note that the magisterial districts quoted altered their boundaries 
during the period under review. By 1837 the districts of Somerset 
and Graaff Reinet had been reduced in size, some of their area 
being incorporated in the newly created districts of Colesberg and 
Cradock . These figures nevertheless give some idea of the general 
5 trends. 
IMitford-Barberton, I., op.cit., pp. 67-8 . 
2collett , J ., Diary and Accounts Book of ••• [unpagina ted]. 
3 Thom, H.B., op.cit., p.308. 
4 G.T.J., February 3, 1842 . 
5 Cape Blue Books, C. O.S97Sff. 
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TABLE III 
Census of Sheel2 Numbers in Variou§ Frontier 
Districts Between 1833 and 1845 
(Cape Sheep Included) 
Year Albany Somerset Graaff Reinet Cradock Colesberg 
1833 104,000 671,243 609,381 
1834 104,000 671,243 542,000 
1835 404,705 
1836 701,399 
1837 106,900 170,000 200,000 460, 000 
1838 239,553 434,869 276,398 414,032 
1839 160,000 253,000 440,000 280,073 596,179 
1840 304,670 357,360 315,783 817,346 
1841 244,452 412,512 350,000 873,104 
1842 310,869 455,848 451,350 380,000 843,654 
1843 369,929 449,319 473,627 388,500 863,950 
1844 428,586 556,819 500,000 400,200 1,052,467 
1845 451,860 580,687 440,671 405,200 1,025,735 
From these figures it is calculated that there were approximately 
1,320,000 sheep on the frontier at the outbreak of the Sixth Frontier 
War in 1834 and 2,900,000 prior to the outbreak of the Seventh Frontier 
war, in 1845. Thus the sheep population of the frontier districts 
had more than doubled in the decade between the Sixth and Seventh 
Frontier wars - an increase of 220 per cent. The fluctuation in the 
figures between 1834 and 1838 may be attributed t o the effects of 
the Sixth Frontier war and the Great Trek. 
AS we have suggested, the reasons for this rapid expansion of 
the flocks along the frontier can be found in the growing awareness of 
the profitable nature of woolled sheep-farming. Writing in 1843 
Chase emphasised the profitable nature of this form of farming. 1 
1 Chase, J.C., Cape of Good Hope and E.P. of Algoa Bay, p.170ff. 
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He suggested, that on average, two acres were required for pasturing 
a sheep. His suggestion that a ninety per cent lambing rate could 
be expected, appears somewhat over optimistic, as was his suggestion 
that the mortality rate could be confined to below seven per cent, 
1 per annum. The examples he used to indicate the profitability of 
sheep farming also seem a little too optimistic, one case revealing 
a capital appreciation of £681 over a two year period from an 
investment of £750. 2 The Graham's Town Journal also quoted the 
financial records of certain farmers to indicate the profitable 
nature of this pursuit. 3 In December, 1836 it revealed the records 
of one Mr. B. Meintjies. Three years previously he had purchased 
700 cape ewes, for which he paid 700 Rixdollars (certainly a good 
bargain). He subsequently purchased a few rams from Lieutenant 
R. Daniell. He then did not increase the size of the flock by 
adding new stock to it but sold off wethers from it. By 1836 the 
flock numbered 1,600 ewes, which had then been purchased by Daniell 
for 9,414 Rixdollars (£700). In addition to this sum Meihtjies 
had also sold 1860 pounds of wool from this flock in Grahamstown 
on December 21, 1836, for which he received 16d. per pound (£124).4 
He had thus received approximately £825 from this venture, from 
whic~ could be deducted the cost of the sheep of £52 lOs . This 
amount does not cover the cost of the rams or any additional ex-
penses which he might have incurred, but it gave a fair impression 
lChase, J .C., ibid ., p.181. 
2 Ibid., p.184. 
3 See supra, pp.132ff. 
4 G.T.J . , December 22, 1836. 
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of the message which the Journal was attempting to convey to its 
readers, and particularly the Dutch community. Writing in 1843, 
the editor commented,l 
"We believe that when the profits of sheep farming are 
calculated on an average of years at from 12 to IS, and 
under favourable circumstances, as high as 20 per c 'mt 
upon the actual amount of capital invested therein, we 
are not very wide of the truth." 
Another factor determining the rapidity of the spread of wool led 
sheep-farming, and directly related to the profitability of this 
industry, was the price set for this commodity in the British market. 
This was particularly relevant as the Cape producers very soon out-
2 
stripped the very small local demand for their product . In the 
international market Cape wool had to compete against the better 
quality wools from Australia and Europe. The collapse of the Cape's 
preferential wine tariff in 1838 hastened the decline of this export 
industry, which had already begun to decline by 1834, following the 
3 
emancipation of the slaves. The collapse of the wine trade placed 
great economic impcrtance on the growing wool industry. Theal 
suggests that it was the merino sheep which saved the country from 
4 general bankruptcy. This was to have far reaching pclitical con-
sequences in the colony, in that this gave credence to the developing 
'separatist movement' in the east. By March, 1838, t he Journal 
5 
commented, 
"It appears to be a conclusion now generally arrived at 
by all acquainted with the capabilities of thin country 
1 G. T.J., May 11 , 1843. 
2 See supra, p.l20. 
3 Theal, G.M., op.cit., VOl. II, p.83. 
4Ibid ., p .l93 . 
5 G.T . J., March 29 , 1838 . 
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that Wool must become, and continue to be its staple e~port .•. 
It is quite evident, that notwithstanding all improvements 
which have been made to this branch of rural economy, still 
that we have done no more than made a commencement." 
The fall of wine and the development of the wool industry are perhaps 
1 
no more eloquently explained than in the figures quoted by Chase, 
TABLE IV 
Annual Value of Wine and Wool Exports 
Between 1834 and 1841 
ru£ Wine Wool 
1834 £ 93,744 £ 9,806 
1835 96,027 16,186 
1836 83,147 26,169 
1837 99,633 22,172 
1838 102 , 583 26,627 
1839 96,995 30,190 
1840 78,533 45,985 
1841 67,832 48,839 
In the figures quoted in the official Blue Books, the final eclipse 
of the wine industry came in 1842, when the value of wine produced 
and exported amounted to only £43,141, as compared to the value of 
wool exported, 2 which amounted to £72,497. 
The decline of the wine industry, and the resultant increasing 
dependence on wool as the major exportable staple of the COlony, 
made the question of the improvement of the quality of Ca.pe wools 
imperative. This issue was made all the more pressing by the setback 
the colony received through the emancipation of the Hottentots and 
the freeing of its enslaved population, and the resultant decline 
3 in the labour force, together with the exodus of thousands of her 
1 Chase, J.C., op.cit., p.lSO. 
2 C.0.5984. 
3Marais, J.S., The cape Coloured People , p . 160ff . 
\ 
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white population in the Great Trek. While this had not resulted 
1 in any serious decline in the wool production of the colony, it 
2 had affected the production of wine, cereals and other foodstuffs. 
It was generally accepted that if this problem was to be overcome, 
white emigration from Europe would have to be encouraged . This 
need was heightened by the reluctance generally felt to increase 
the flow of black immigrants from across the Fish River. 3 
By virtue of the composition of cape flocks, the improvement of 
the quality of wool was a slow process. In 1842 most Cape wool was 
still of a low quality, and it was to remain subordinate in quality 
4 to that of Australia and the Argentine for the rest of the century. 
Improvement was forthcoming, if slow, and the Graham's Town Journal 
became a great protagonist for the cause of wool improvement. 
In August, 1836 the editor noted the improvement in the quality of 
Cape "ools which was reflected in the better prices being paid on 
the London market for this commodity. While the highest prices had 
been paid for German wool, which reached 2s.9~. per pound, the best 
5 
cape wool had sold for 2s.7d. per pound. Needless to say, this 
was not indicative of the bulk of Cape wool, but the editor took 
the opportunity to stress the importance of wool and the concentration 
of farmers on quality rather than quantity. In 1837 was, however, 
6 forced to comment, 
I See Appendix II . 
2 See infra, pp.193ff. 
3 See infra, pp .208ff . 
4 Thom, H.B., op.cit . , p.187. 
5 G.T . J., August 18, 1836. 
6 G. T.J ., May 11, 1837. 
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"It is with great regret we learn that returns from London 
by the last arrivals give a very unfavourable account of 
the Wools exported last season from this part of the colony. 
We have seen quotations by which it appears t hat several 
bales shipped by a house at Graham's Town did not realise in 
the London market the prices paid on the spot. This wool is 
spoken of in the accounts from the Brokers as being amongst 
the worst wool ever exported. We have long warned our wool 
growers of the evil consequences which must inevitably result 
from the slovernly manner in which a great deal of wool. has 
been sent to the market; and we would again impress on them 
that it is quality and not quantity which should be the 
primary consideration. A bad character in the London market 
will be of serious consequence, and the fact now stated now 
calls upon our traders as well as our growers for the 
exercise of the most vigilant precautions in their future 
proceedings. II 
In l838 a London wool-broking firm commented to a Grahamstown merchant-
1 house that, 
lilt appears to me inexplicable how such extreme irregular-
ities can be produced in the same flocki for instance, one 
bag exceedingly short and unwashed, - another half washed, 
and a third long in staple and clean washed . Surely a 
method may be adopted by sheep owners to avoid having s uch 
an incongruous mass of wool sent to this country under one 
head in one consignment. Prudence would rather dictate 
another course, viz. to send the washed wool under one mark, 
- send the greasy under another, as by so doing, the con-
signm,ent would receive occular demonstration of sending 
long wool to this country, instead of that short, ha i ry, 
filthy class of wool we occasionally receive from t hence . " 
As late as 1843, a report in the Journal called for the classi-
fication of Cape wools, as it had been realised that even the best 
wools sometimes fetched far lower prices simply owing to the 
selection of a poor sample from the bales. It observ~d that farmers 
were already separating the wool from different flocks but i ndi-
cated that this was not enough, and that sorting and class i ficat ion 
2 
of each individual fleece was called for. In a circular published 
by Joseph S. Christophers, Wool Merchant s , London, and r0p.-~nted 
IG.T.J . , March 29, 1838. 
2 G.T.J. , September 21, 1843. 
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1 in the Journal in 1845, it was again pointed out that, 
"Many known good Cape flock-masters feel surprised their 
Wools do not meet the prices of their neigliliours. This is 
partly accounted for by the better sorting, which if not 
done in the colony must be done here. The loss to the pur-
chaser on that which does not suit him , and the expense of 
resorting might all be retained in the pocket of the Cape 
colonists, if this department of the business were better 
attended to." 
Thom has pointed out that another problem to be overcome was 
the traditional practice of shearing the sheep twice annually. This 
practice was not widespread in the 1830's and 1840's, and really only 
became fashionable following the Eighth Frontier War in 1853. 2 
k d h ' 3 Bower commente on t ~S, 
"This is the worst thing that ever happened to the country . 
There have been less lambs, poorer sheep and more mange 
ever since it began." 
This practice was to continue fairly generally down tv 1875, and a 
lasting complaint against the quality of South African wool was, 
4 that it was too short. 
Another handicap to improving the quality of cape wool was that 
the whole marketing structure as Thom has indicated, was not orientated 
towards the promotion of quality consciousness. 5 While all but the 
most discerning flock-masters were prepared to sell their wool on 
thei r farms to travelling merchants, at an average price: there was 
no great incentive to concentrate on the quality, rather than the 
quantity, of wool produced. Even amongst those who were i n a position 
1 G.T.J . , J anuary 2, 1845. 
2Mitford-Barberton, I., op.cit ., p.70. 
3Ibid . , p.70 . 
4 Thom, H.B., op .cit., pp .190-91. 
5I bid ., p.187ff. 
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to export their wools directly to the London markets, there was 
very often a tendency to concentrate on quantity rather than quality, 
as was pointed out by the Journal in 1845,1 
"It should always be remembered that here, where inland 
carriage is considerable, and a market distant, a r eduction 
in bulk is of the first importance; and hence the necessity 
of improving the quality to the utmost degree of perfection 
of every article of export. This is not sufficiently con-
sidered by our wool-growers. They are too apt to estimate 
the value of their clips by the number of bales , and not by 
the quality of their contents - and hence the result is too 
often a disappointment, and very serious loss. We hazard 
nothing when we say that this colony is capable of producing 
wool fully equal in intrinsic value to any in the world .. . 
Comparing our advantages with those of other wool-producing 
countries, it may safely be affirmed, that for want of due 
care in washing, sorting, and packing, our flock-masters 
suffer a loss of not less than from 2d. to 3d. per pound, 
in the London markets, upon their entire clips . " 
The same leader article pointed out, that while Australian wool had 
sold for up to Is.lOd . per pound in London in September, 1844, the 
best Cape wool had only fetched Is.5~d. per pound. other complaints 
lodged against the cape wool farmers were for the frequent presence 
of dirt in their wool, and for the presence of 'stick hair' resulting 
from first and second crosses with cape sheep which was mixed with 
2 purer wools. The logical outcome of these complaints was that Cape 
wool retained a bad name in the London market for the greater part 
of the period down to 1850. As the Journal was quick to point out, 
the fault did not always lie with the Cape producers, but often with 
the London buyers who were not suff iciently discriminatory in their 
3 inspection of cape wool. 
"It is a fa.ct, notorious here) that our must carefu and 
furtherest advanced flock-masters do not meet either with 
the reward or approval to which they are entitled." 
1 G. T.J., January 16 , 1845. 
2 Thom , H.B., op .cit., pp.180-1. 
3 G.T.J . , January 16 , 1845. 
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It was, however, accepted that Cape wools had yet t o gain a good 
1 
reputation in the British market. The exertions of the bett er 
farmers were being hampered by the slower transition and adoption 
of accepted techniques by the rest of the farming community. 
There is no clearer indicator of the rapid progress of the 
woolled sheep industry in the frontier districts than the a nnual 
record of exports from Port Elizabeth. 2 The volume of exports 
grew from 79,848 pounds in 1835, to 2,085,064 pounds in 1845. 
Throughout this period the demand for wool remained strong in the 
British market with prices ranging between Is.2d. and Is.8d . for 
the better quality cape wools, and between 6d. and Is . 3d. for the 
3 poorer sorts. A good example of the expansion of the woolled sheep 
industry can be found in the farm diary of James Collett. During 
January, 1839, he delivered to George Wood, a Grahamstown merchant, 
2,860 pounds of wool fo! which he received 11,75 pence per pound, 
or approximately £140. In January, 1844, he sent 9,601 pounds to 
Grahamstown, and while no price is given, it may be assumed t hat 
it would have sold for approximately Is.3d. or for a total of £600. 
By 1845, he had decided to undertake the export of his wool clip 
directly to the London market. This consignment of 9,810 pounds 
was despatched per 'Harriet ' from Algoa Bay on J a uua ry 15, 1845 . 4 
The rapid development of wool1ed sheep farming had to a gr eat 
extent eclipsed all other forms of farming activity on the front i er 
1 G.T.J., January 16, 1845. 
2 d. See Appen ~x II. 
3These figures are not calculated but are taken as t .he highest 
and lowes t prices quoted i n t he Gra h ... ,\nl ' G _Tow~~, J .... un . 1:. throughout 
this period. 
4 Collett, J., ~p . cit . 
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in the years following the 1834-5 war. It is thus difficult to 
gain a clear picture, from the sources available, of the develop-
ment of these other spheres . Thorn has stressed, that while wool 
production had increased in importance, the other products of 
sheep farming, namely, mutton, skins and tallow, had no l lost their 
1 importance, but had rather been overshadowed. Much the same can 
be said for the rest of agriculture. 
A useful source for gathering information for the overall picture 
of agriculture during the period 1834 to 1846 is the weekly quotations 
of Grahamstown's market prices. These were published regularly in 
2 
the Graham's Town Journal . 
On the value of the Grahamstown market Godlonton pointed out 
3 that, 
"Every village ... has it Market •.. These markets are but 
i ndifferently attended, except that held at Graham's Town, 
which from the great competition amongst its numerous 
traders, and the demand for produce, occasioned by the 
1 Thom, H.B., op.cit., p.178. 
2This information has been processed to give a monthly a verage 
price for each of the selected commodities . These monthly averages 
have been plotted as graphs to indicate the price fluctuations over 
this period. Also plotted are graphs using the same material, but 
subjected to a thirteen month moving average, to remove any seasonal 
fluctuations. In this way the medium term trends can be clearly 
recognised. The agricultural products which have been chosen for 
this study are potatoes, wheaten meal , butter, and oat hay. These 
appear with some regularity throughout the period under consideration 
in the weekly quotations . Three of these repre sent basic food stuffs, 
and thus indicate trends in the cost of living of the small popu-
lation group divorced from food production on the f rontier, as well 
as the income levels of farmers adopti ng their production. The 
military commissariat was the largest purchaser of oat hay on the 
frontier, and while most of its supply was provided by privat e con-
tract, its purchases would indicrectly have af f ected the pr~ce of 
this commodity on the market. Two notable omissions appear, namely 
meat and wool. Most wool was sold directly to brokers or merchants 
and little found its way on to this market . Host cattl.e were also 
sold by private contract to butchers, and 1.l t no t.iill8 do liv8 sT.ock 
prices fea t ure on t he lists quoted bl' the J'ournal. (See G. T.J., 
August 17, 1837.) 
3 Godlonton, R., op .cit. , p.196 (Introductory Remarks). 
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consumption of the military, attracts nearly the whole of 
the growers, who prefer in general making a journey 
thither - sometimes of several hundred miles - to disposing 
of their goods at their own homes, even should they realise 
the same prices . To the Dutch- African farmer a journey to 
market is rather an excursion of pleasure than a matter of 
toil and difficulty." 
In 1834 some 2,409 wagons visited the Grahamstown market and the 
1 
value of produce sold there amounted to £22,635 4s.6d. During the 
year July I, 1836 to June 30, 1837, the market register recorded 
2 transactions valued at £27,038 6s.4~d. While in the three months 
3 
ending July 31, 1845, transactions to the value of £7,210 took place . 
From the study of the various products under review, a general 
upswing in prices in the period down to 1839 is revealed. The com-
bination of the exodus of large numbers of Dutch farmers, together 
with a series of poor agricultural years, fostered this trend. It 
should, however, also be borne in mind that this upward trend in 
prices began before the outbreak of the war in 1834. In June, 1839 
4 the Journal reported that, 
..... since the disastrous irruption of the Kafirs all the 
chief necessaries of life have advanced in price at least 
100 per cent.1I 
As to the inflation during the war, Goldswain noted that, 5 
"Before the war Meal was from 24 Shillings to 30 Shillings 
pur Muead 1801bs . but as soon as the war comenced it rose 
to 90 Shillings pur Muead, and all t hat I was able t o get 
was 45 Ibs . 11 
Hudson was also to complain that his salary was insufficient t o 
meet his expense~ during the war,6 
1 Godlonton, R. , op.cit ., p.196. 
2 G.T.J., August 17, 1837. 
3 G.T.J., August 14, 1845 . 
4 G.T.J . , J une 13 , 1839 . 
~ 
"' Goldswain, J., o p . (.; it., Vol. I, p.19 . 
6 Hougham Hudson (Cory Li.urary 1·' 5 " ~~). 
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"In March, 1835 Sent for to Graham's Town Appointed 
Government Commissioner with £200 a Year with House rent 
of £50 in addition to my pension - when my expenses ... 
from the high price of everything during the war ..• 
amounted to full £50 more." 
The cause of this inflation during the war was not hard to find. 
The increased numbers of troops and burgher forces on the frontier 
created an additional demand, while the conscription of wagons and 
other means of transport by the military, together with the gener" l 
state of uncertainty, resulted in a drastic reduction in the supplies 
reaching this area. The excess cost of the war over the normal 
1 
annual expenditure of the military of £96,000 was £154,000. It may 
safely be assumed that a fair proportion of this expenditure was 
incurred on the frontier, in the purchasing of stores by the 
commissariat, together with services from the frontier community,2 
and the payment of the troops. A large proportion of this additional 
liquidity would have flowed directly into circulation resulting in a 
demand-pull inflation. 
The agricultural season of 1837-8 was one of drought . Many 
springs dried up and it was reported, that, 'Along the coast many 
farms are very nearly destitute of water; and, if rain should not 
3 fall very shortly, must be abandoned'. By the following September 
it was reported, that while many of the early sown crops had. been 
lost to a drought , showers of rain had subsequently fallen and 
crops, particularly along the coast, were looking promising although 
rust was attacking the wheat crops.4 These falls of rain had 
1 Theal, G.M., op.cit., Vol. II, p . 127. 
2 See supra, pp.172-3. 
" G.:r.J'., March 8 , 1838. 
4G. T. J ., September 27, 1838. 
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increased the demand for maize seed. It was selling • ... in the last 
few days at the unprecedented price of 28 Rixdollars per muid·. l 
In spite of these rain~ the wheat harvest, much of it being lost 
2 to drought and rust. fell short of an average crop. Not only was 
the crop deficient in the east, but many of the producers in the 
west of the colony had also curtailed their production. This was 
owing to the anticipated labour shortages following the abolition 
of the period of apprenticeship of the freed slaves. 3 The movement 
of the Voortrekkers from the Winterberg area had curtailed production 
in this, the chief growing area of the frontier. 4 These factors all 
contributed to driving up the price of cereals. Wheaten meal rose 
to 60 shillings per muid on the frontier (in Grahamstown), while in 
cape Town it sold at 40 shillings per muid. 5 Similar price in-
creases can also be traced in the marketing patterns of butte r and 
potatoes on the frontier. 6 
From the above information and the general price trends, it 
would seem that the 1837-8 and 1838-9 agricultural seasons were 
exceptionally poor. Coming at a time when the frontier districts 
were recovering from the war, and when there was a movement of 
producers out of the colony, it was inevitable that the prices of 
most agricultural products should peak during this period. There 
was also the additional factor, namely a reduction of imports of 
1 G. T.J ., September 27, 1838. 
2 G.T . J., Febrl~ry 21, 1839 . 
3Ibid • 
4Ibid . 
SIbid. 
6see Appendix IV and V. 
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cereals into the frontier districts, owing to the curtailment of 
production in the western districts following the emancipation of 
the slaves . 
In contrast to this, the year 1839, and the agricultural season 
1839- 40, were exceptionally good. By October, 1839, the Graham's 
Town Journal was raising the question of what was to be done with 
the surplus crops which had been produced in the frontier district s . 
This surplus was seen as being partly, an over-reaction to the 
failures of the two previous seasons, and the higher prices which 
1 had resulted . A suggestion was made for widening the infrastructure 
of the colony. It was realised that if products, such as wool, which 
were then exported in a raw state, could be worked up in the colony, 
this would encourage immigration. This, in turn , would boost con-
sumption of locally produced foodstuffs, thus alleviating the problem . 
This was not, however, a short term solution. Rather, it was 
suggested, farmers should aim at the production of a wider variety 
of crops, so that surpluses would be less likely to occur in such 
magnitude. It was further suggested that a foreign market should 
be found to absorb any excess produced within the colony . Here 
Mauritius was seen as being ideal as it could absorb all surplus 
grain and beef, provided shipping rates could be k~pt low. 2 
The bumper crop produced in 1839 had come about as a result of 
good and regular rains throughout the growing season . The Journal 
pointed out that,3 
1 G.T.J., October 3, 1839. 
2Ibid . 
3Ibid . 
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" ... the superabundance of oathay is such that when taken 
to market it scarcely realises the bare value of its 
conveyance thither. 11 
The steady rains were, however, to have a detrimental effect 
on sheep, for early in 1840 it was reported that an outbreak of an 
epidemic, similar in character to sheep-rot, had been reported from 
'Mancanzana) Bavian's River, parts of the Konap, together with most 
of the high lying regions' 1 It was later reported to be 'Geel 
Siekte,.2 It was also an unprecedented year for scab . 3 Collett 
noted when shearing his sheep in December, that there were a con-
siderable number of broken fleeces. This would have resulted from 
the animals running high . temperatures. He was to lose a considerable 
number of sheep to what he termed, 'the sickness,.3 In March, 1840, 
he recorded that a great number of his 'October lambs' were stunted 
4 in growth 'principally owing to the late sickness of the ewes'. 
By January, 1840, he noted that his flocks were showing signs of 
improvement. 5 Unfortunately, there is no record of the exact number 
of fatalities. 
The abundant rains of 1839 were to continue through 1840. 
In November of that year there were again reports of 'unusually 
6 large ret urns I • The Journal commented, 
"There has never been so fine a lambing season as the 
past and the increase in the quantity of wool l ed sheep, 
1 
-G.T . J., January 16, 1840. 
2 G.T.J., January 23, 1841.i. 
3 Collett, J., Op.C l.t., e ntri es o f D£.cemoc.z } 1 8 39. 
4Ibid ., entry March 3, 1840. 
5rbi"., enTry Jan',ary 4, 1840. 
6G ~ T . J ., J Novem.oer. 2 6 . 2.840 . 
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and consequently, the weight of wool, will be beyond any 
former precedent ••. lt is calculated that this year's clip 
will show an increase qf at least 30 per cent on any 
former year." 
Collett observed that his ewes had produced more lambs than he had 
1 
expected. 
The agricultural season 1840-1 was, once again, a good one. 
Crops were generally plentiful throughout the colony and the seasen 
was marred on the frontier only by the appearance of large swarms 
of locusts. By June, 1841, Collett was in the fortunate position to 
be able to write that his past urage was good, notwithstanding the 
2 
ravages of the locusts. Good rains throughout the winter of 1841 
allowed the pasture of farmers along the Koonap River and upper 
Albany to recover from this scourge. During the course of 1841 and 
1842, swarms of locusts were to affect all areas of the frontier . 
During November, 1841, swarms were again reported from the Tdrka, 
Winterberg, Kat River and Peddie areas. 3 Many swarms were destroyed 
either by burning the bushes they settled on at night, or by driving 
flocks of sheep over them while they were still in the hopper stage 
4 
of development. During December, 1841, the Kat River Settlement 
suffered severely from swarms which destroyed large areas of crops 
relied upon by t he inhabitants for their subsistence. S Bathurst 
and l ower Albany were visited by the swarms during the course of 
6 December, 1842, and the maize crops were destroyed. The effect of 
1 Collett, J. , op.ci t . , entry £01: August I G, .:a ·~o .. 
2Ibid • , entr}' f or J une .1 , 1840. 
3 G.T . J. , November II, 184l. 
4 G.T .J. , November IB, 184l. 
5 G.T.J. , Decemb~r ~O . 1841-
6 G.T .J. , December 13, lL4.l. 
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these swarms was particularly severe as drought had now set in, 
making pasture scanty . Fortunately, the winter crops of cerea ls 
1 had already been reaped . 
The drought in the agricultural season lB4l-2 had t he e ffec t 
of again pushing up the prices of agricultural produce on t he f rontier . 
Most of the colony was affected by this drought. The Journa l reported 
2 the l oss of livestock as far away as the Long Kloof. Collett , a ~ 
early as October, lB4l, noted that his sheep were fal l ing off in 
condition as a result of the dry conditions. 3 By November, the 
4 
'Boers [were] Tracking for Pasture' . The springs supplying water 
to Grahamstown were also affected so that water became very expensive 
and that obtainable 'very often impure'.S Rains followed in May, 
1842, over much of Albany and this allowed for the cultiva t i on of 
winter cereals. 6 The Journal noted that, 
"The extraordinary high prices obtained for all kind s 
of farming produce is a powerful stimulus to exertion ... " 
The winter cereal crop for 1843 was generally f a vourabl e and 
assisted in reducing prices once more. The pri ce of meal had r i sen 
7 
steadily between 1840 and December, 1843 . The general condit ion 
of most l i vestock seemed also to impr ove, although there were r eports 
of Elevere sheep l osses owing to the cold weather in the Sneeuberg 
1 G.T . J ., December 13, 1841 . 
2 G. T.J . , May 12, 1842. 
3 Collett, J . , ent ry for October 14, 1841 . 
4 Ibid ., ent r y f or November 27, 1841.. 
S G.T.J., April 28 , 1842 . 
6 • G. T.J ., May 26 , 1842. 
7 d ' See Appen LX I II. G. 1' . J ., August 17 , 1843. 
I 
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1 during August, 1843. Collett reported the loss of several lambs 
2 
owing to the cold weather a nd snow . There were also serious 
recurrences of the locust infestation, and crops of maize were 
3 
again destroyed in lower Albany. By October, 1843, it was reported 
that the whole area from the Orange River to the sea was infested 
4 
with locust swarms. There was also a report in June, 1843, o f an 
outbreak of 'hoof and tongue' disease which was described as being 
5 
• •.• extremely prevalent amongst horned cattle'. 
A regular rainfall during 1844 ensured that the 1844-5 season 
was a particularly good one for all branches of agriculture. Heavy 
rains falling in October, 1844 , had, however, caused some damage. 
It was reported that the Howison's Poort road was rendered impassable 
by wash-aways, while 'nearly every dam in the neighbourhood has been 
6 destroyed'. Commenting on the state of agriculture the following 
April, the Journal pointed out that crops were so abundant in lower 
Albany the previous year that many farmers contemplated l etting ground 
lie fallow in absence of a suitable price for their produce. This 
is borne out by an examination of the quoted market prices. 7 The 
editorial advocated the cultivation of cotton, stating,8 
1 G.T.J . , August 17, 1843. 
2 Collett , J., entries for August, 1843 . 
3 G.T . J ., NovE'.mber 9, 1843. 
4 G.T.J., Oct uber. 26 , 1843. 
5 G. T . .. l., J .. m ,t:: i , 1 4.3 . 
6 G.T.J., October 24, 1844. 
7 ~. See Apper.l. ! ~x I I r to Vl . 
8 G~ ~J. , A}:'\ril 3 , 1845 ; See s~.lprat :.:p .. 9 3ff~ 
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lilt is utterly vain for them [ farmers] to confine their 
efforts to the growth of produce merely for home con-
sumption. They must look beyond this . They must fix 
their attention steadily upon an Export trade - and when 
they have secured this they have the British Islands for 
their markets, and an unlimited scope for the industry, 
intelligence and enterprise of the whole community." 
Further in the interior, 1844 proved to be a year of drought. 
Collett noted in August, 'Catt le getting very poor and som~ few 
1 
already dead - Pasture burnt up'. He was fortunate as rain fe ll 
during October,2 This drought extended into 1845, and by October 
f h h 1 d h ' h ka d' , 3 o t at ,year, t e Journa reporte tat 1n t e Tar 1str1ct, 
" •.• not less than 7,000 head of cattle have perished from 
want of pasturage, while many farmers have lost nearly 
their entire flocks of sheep . • . many hundreds of lambs have 
been killed to save the ewes, and where this has not been 
done both have perished from disease and poverty." 
In Albany, 1845 presented a fairer picture, although further experi-
ments carried out with the cultivation of cotton had failed . 4 This 
had been owing to poor germination, attributed to the quality of 
the seed and the cold weather during October. The young plant s had 
also not stood up well to the wind . More success was achi eved in 
the cultivation of flax, but here the 'grub and caterpillar have 
5 been a great source of annoyance' . Other crops fared better and 
reasonable harvests were reaped. There were reports of an outbreak 
of glanders disease amongst the horses of Uitcnha ge in October and 
advice was given to destroy all affected animals. 6 This did not 
1 Collet , J ., op.cit., entry for September, 1845 . 
2Ibid . , entry fo r October I , 1845 . 
3 G.T . J., October 9, 1845 . 
4 G.T.J., November 20 , 1845. 
5rbid . 
6 G.T . J . , October 9, 184" 
1 
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cont ain the dia,ase; by January, 1846 it had spread, and was r eported 
to be as wi despread as 'Kaffirland, . l 
From the above discussion it appears that agric ultural pr ices 
for the produce s old on the Grahamstown market fluc t uated very 
much in accordance with the weather conditions enjoyed by the 
frontier . This could be expected in a free uncontrolled economy . 
As , however, we can also take this fluctuation of the market pric " s 
as an indicator of the general welfare of the frontier's agricultural 
, 2, b 1 commun~ty, certa~n aspects ecome c earer. With the exception of 
the bumper years of 1839 to 1841, prices generally remained at 
higher levels than those ruling immediately prior to the outbreak 
of the Sixth Frontier War in 1834. 3 These large movements in the 
prices of pr oduce J as revealed in the cases of wheat en meal) oat 
hay, and potatoes, resulted almost entirely from the size of the 
harvests of these products in respective seasons and the c onsequent 
fluctuations in the amounts available to the market. The lack of 
an export market for these products, and their limited requirements 
as food, in the case of potatoes and wheaten meal, in the s taple 
diets of the colonists, would suggest further that t he demand fo r 
these products was relatively inelastic. If thi s was t he case , then 
it would follow that farmers' incomes f r om t hese sour ces were d i rectly 
linked to the se prices . Higher prices would , t herefore , i ndicate 
1 G.T. J ., J anuary 31, 1846 . 
2This a ssumption is ba sed on the iact t hat this COIm1tu~lity wa s 
f undamentally an agr i cultural one . While it was a lso lar gely self -
subsi s t ent in t he provi sion DE f00dst Lfs, t his ma :.ch.et: prov.ided t he 
major outlet for surplus whi ch provided t he only pecuniary i ncome 
for many. The welfare of the pastoral farmers was also c l osely 
related to the weather , as ha s been discuss ed a bove, so that, whil e 
t heir i nc omes V.~ere no't. re late.; t o this tactor J it (.~lso give s some 
i ndic a tion of tne ir sta l e of progress~ 
3 See Appen:Ux I II to V: • 
204 
higher incomes from these sources. Farmers would thus have profited 
from indifferent seasons rather more than from good ones, or 
disastrously poor crops. An investigation of the prices of these 
products on the Grahamstown market .in the period under review would 
suggest therefore, that on average, farmers' incomes in the period 
1835 to 1845 increased from these sources. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that other factors wer !..? 
also involved in the agricultural scene on the frontier in the 
period 1835 to 1845. It is fair to say that no farmer was entirely 
market orientated and the majority of farmers maintained a certain 
amount of self-sufficiency. The market demand for agricultural 
produce was, therefore, largely confined to meeting the requirements 
of the urban settlements of Grahamstown, Port Elizabeth, and the 
non-agricultural pcpulations of the other hamlets on the f r ontier . 
In addition to this there was the demand created by the military. 
The farming undertaken on the frontier had, particularly in the 
. period under review, become increasingly 'mixed I, with the intro-
duction of woolled sheep on many farms. The enhanced value of 
sheep generally, encouraged farmers in their husbandry . 
Butter reacted along basically similar line s to the market 
prices for the agricultural crops already quot ed . This is an inter-
esting phenomenon, as butter also featured throughout this per iod 
in th" lists of exports of colonial produce shipped f;:om Algoa Bay . 
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TABLE V 
EXllort of Butter from Algoa Bay 
between 1834 and 18451 
Year Quantity Value Av. Price per lb. 
1834 53,705 £ 1,517 0 0 6 3!4d 
1835 37, 822 1,848 0 0 11 3!4d 
1836 60, 339 2,412 0 0 9 1!2d 
1837 128,931 4,681 o 0 8 3!4d 
1838 67,299 4,38000 15 3!4d (? ) 
1839 82,420 4,091 0 0 11 7!8d 
1840 123,063 4,881 0 0 9 1!2d 
1841 264,405 * 9,806 0 0 9d 
1842 (to Oct. 10) 62,522 2,967 0 0 11 7!8d 
1843 51,339 2,892 0 0 13 l/2d 
1844 54,743 1,843 0 0 8d 
1845 84,635 3,512 0 0 lOd 
(* Figure quoted by J.C. Chase, op.cit. J p.164. This figure 
probably included the quantity shipped to Cape Town, which 
would not strictly constitute an export figure.) 
It would seem that, in spite of these export s, butter tended 
to fluctuate in sympathy with other commodity prices on the Grahams-
town market . 2 It will be seen from the graphs, that this fluctuation 
tended to be greater than for certain other commodities, such as 
wheaten meal, or potatoes. Another important aspect of the price 
of butter was t hat it did not fall to its pre 1834-5 war level 
during the whole of the period under review. Again , this can be 
seen as a reflection of the fact that exports of butter reduced the 
overa 11 quantity aVliilal·lle f or r:ale on the Grahamstown market , 
lSee respective copies of the CaE!L2.f.~_l:!2E£.Jl .iln§\.!:'. and 
Blue_Bo.ok.;:, C.O . 5976-O.987. 
<see Appendix IV. 
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This was particularly true of the favourable seasons between 1839 
and 1842. Alternatively, the relatively stable price of this 
commodity between 1835 and 1838, indicates that the chief source of 
1 
supply was not severely affected by the war. The peaks in butter 
prices on the market between 1839 and 1842-3 indicate the accentuated 
scarcity within the frontier districts. This is also revea l ed in a 
fall in exports, although contracts and other commitments would not 
have allowed these figures to fall too rapidly.2 
It - is very difficult accurately to gauge the progress of the 
frontier cattle farmers in the period 1835 to 1845. The figures 
which are available3 prove to be highly erratic and cannot be seen 
as accurate. This was the period of the Great Trek and large herds 
of cattle were constantly on the move throughout the frontier districts. 
, Albany, which had a large English-speaking population which did not 
participate in the Trek, reveals a fairly steady increase in cattle 
numbers, but this is an exception. 4 For the greater part, however, 
5 it is perhaps incorrect, as has been pointed out above, to consider 
the cattle farmer as a predominant, specific type of farmer in this 
period. There was, rather, a community of farmers on the frontier 
who still persisted in a form of semi-subsistence farming, in 
which cattle played a role along with agricul ture . Woolled sheep 
1 Chase, \1 .C . , op . cite , pp.. 55 ~ 164.. Uitenpac1~ di strict was 
the chief source of but t er producti on i n t he eastern dist:!".icts, 
and did not Jy.,'r t he b n l ,t of the Xhosa attack il" 1834-5. 
2 See Tab ~ . r;" 205 < 
3 See Appendix VII. 
4 Ibid . 
5 See supra, pp. 177ff. 
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were, however, since the 1834-5 war, coming to play an i ncreasingly 
significant part in the agricultural economy of the f rontier 
districts. 
Thom has suggested that the period after 1835 can be seen as 
one of expansion and intensification in agriculture. l Expansion was 
to come in the form of the Great Trek, while there was now a general 
intensification of method and carrying capacity undertaken on 
colonial farms in response to the demands of woolled sheep farming. 
2 The frontier was now fixed with a greater permanency, so that for 
the immediate future, at least, there was no prospect of obtaining 
new farms in what had been, and was again, Xhosa territory. The sal e 
of many farms in the colony by Dutch farmers who were trekking into 
the interior, did much to allay any immediate land shortage . As 
many of these farms were situated in areas ideally suited f or sheep 
farming, there was an infusion into these areas of a new type of 
farmer who could fully exploit the situation,3 and in the limited 
capacity which nature would allow, pursue a certain amount of 
intensification. If nothing else, there was now a move towards 
specialisation on many farms, 'mixed' farming giving way to 
intensified sheep breeding. This intensification and specialisati on 
was, however, a slow process. 
The loss of a considerable number of white colonists to the 
Great Trek can not be seen, other than in the immediate short term, 
l Thom, H.B . , op. cit., p . 3I8. 
:2 In terms of t he abando,~ent of t he province 
the FiGh River was f i xed as t he new frontier, with 
in the colony of the Winterbe rg and Koonap regions 
of Queen Adela ide , 
the inclusion 
beyond i t . The 
concn-pt o~ t he 'Neutr.a l ' "c:rr ' tcry ' 1: ~ n :.:.. ... ahJ.tdCllOO. 
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to have caused any great reductions in the production capacity of 
the frontier farming community. This was rather a strategic loss 
which saw a reduction in the capacity of the frontier to defend 
itself. The emigration of these Trekkers was, nevertheless, to 
cause considerable alarm along the frontier and efforts .,ere to 
be made to obtain emigrants from Britain to fill the 'vacuuw ' 
created by their exodus. l 
Of greater significance to the frontier farming community was 
the growing demand for labour. It was this demand which was partly 
responsible for the activity involved in trying to encourage an 
emigration scheme from Britain. That this scheme was unsuccessful 
reduces its significance in the economic sense, and attention is 
rather focused on the available labour supply. 
One of the major events of the Sixth Frontier War was the 
migration of the Mfengu into the colony in search of protection and 
opportunity. 2 These people were initially viewed by colonial 
farmers as a blessing. General orders issued in September, 1836, 
3 
stated, 
"Lieut.-Colonel England is also requested to make it 
known to the several Authorities within his Distri ct, 
that it is desirable at the present moment that passes 
to Kaffirs to enter the Districts of Albany and Somerset 
should be restricted as far as possible." 
While the entry of Xhosa into the colony was discouraged, the Mfengu 
were seen as friendly and encouraged to seek employment on farms in 
the colony ; Many of these people were recruited by the burgher 
forces during the war . George Jarvis reported to the Civil 
1 Theal, G.M., op.cit., Vol . I I, pp.193-4 . 
2 . Cory, G.",., op.c ... t., \101. Ill, p.144ff. 
3 L.G.14l. pp. l 7l- ~ . 
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Commissioner in May, 1835, that some 40 families of Mfengu had 
followed the second division into town. Many had come with farmers 
in order to take up service with t hem, but had later become dis-
satisfied. They were now squatting on the outskirts of Grahanstown, 
1 
and Jarvis noted, 
"There has been some anxiety manifested by many of the 
Inhabitants to take these people into their Service , and 
I have been obliged to exert some Authority to prevent 
their being taken away without passes and before entering 
into proper Contracts with the persons intending to employ 
them, and there cannot be any doubt that that the whole of 
them will very soon be provided with Masters." 
One group of Mfengu had been settled in the Tzitzikamma region, the 
other was situated in close proximity to Fort Peddie in the 'ceded 
territory'. Bowker noted in a letter to the governor in October, 
1837, that 'such is the demand for Fingo labour towards Cape Town, 
that nearly one thousand applications for fingoes were made in one 
day, '. The demand for these people to serve as labourers within 
the colony was certainly great. 
This demand came in the wake of the passing of Ordinance No.50 
in 1828 and the unsuccessful implementation of Ordinance No.49 of 
2 the same year. Added to this was the potential disruption of the 
emancipation of slaves in 1834. These factors combined to create 
a fluidity in the labour structure of the colony which had not 
3 
existed before. It was with this background of events that the 
demand for Mfengu labour should be seen. Superimposed on this was 
the growing demand for labour by the farming community. In the 
1 C.0.2756, Jarvis to Campbell, May 26 , 1835. 
2 See supra . pp .lL3ff. 
3Marais, J .S., op .cit • . pp.180-4. 
1 
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western districts, in the wake of emancipation, labour was still 
required mainly in the cultivation of vineyards and cornfields. 
In the east, and to a lesser degree in the western districts, 
t here was a growing new demand for labour. This was related to the 
increasing popularity and spread of woolled sheep-farmir,g . Prior 
to this, the demand for labour on the frontier had centred on 
labourers to act as herders and to assist in cultivation. Woolled 
sheep, however, required far more attention than had been lavished 
on the flocks of Cape sheep and herds of cattle. The shearing of 
these flocks and the periodic washing of their fleeces ensured a 
demand for labour over and above the shepherds. The situation now 
arose where the labour requirement of the frontier farming community 
was to ebb and wane according to seasons and the time of year. 
The system of monthly contracts introduced in terms of Ordinance 
No.SO of 1828 meant that it was no longer necessary for farmers to 
hire the full complement of their labour requirements in advance. 
Marais is correct in suggesting that this system increased the 
incidence of vagrancy amongst the Khoi population, but does not go 
1 
so far as to suggest that this was not entirely voluntary. While 
farmers complained bitterly that the new system increased vagrancy and 
the incidence of thef·t associated with it, they chose to ignore the 
benefits they derived through its operation. These short contracts 
were particularly conducive to the farmers, as this period revealed 
a general rise in labour costs,2 particularly of Khoi workers. The 
Graham's Town Journal saw th.lt ·this arose, in part, from the better 
IMara;s, J S ' t 18' 3 ~ .., op . c~ ., pp . . ~ -. 
2Ibid ., p.185ff. 
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wages recei ved by many of the Khoi who had served in the Cape Corps 
during the war. l The wages of Xhosa and Mfengu workers sti ll 
varied. While Collett could still procure most of his labour 
2 
requirements at a rate of one cow per annum , it was estimated, in 
1841 , that this type of labour could be hired in Albany at between 
2s . 6d . and 6s . per month, with food and lodging. 3 In terms of the 
price of cattle, this would have varied between one and three cows 
per annum. 
Ordinance No.49 had not been repealed in 1829,4 and Xhosa 
continued to enter the colony during the period 1836 to 1845 in 
search of employment. One of the chief functions of the Resident 
Agents, appointed in terms of the new treaty system, was to regulate 
the flow of this labour supply, and to issue the passes necessary 
5 for the legal entry of Xhosa into the colony. 
Thus the labour supply necessary for the smooth operati on of 
the farming activities of the frontier community was forthcoming. 
That most of it was to come from across the Fish River, in the form 
of Xhosa and Mfengu workers, caused the frontier community t o worry 
over the strategic implications rather than its cost. This is not 
to suggest that this was an entirely reliable source. The supply 
of this labour tended to be greater in poor agricultural seasons, 
when t he Xhosa saw in colonial employment the opportunity to 
1 G,T.J • . August 25 . 1836. 
2 Collett , J .. , op,, ~it •• pa s sim to 1845 . 
3 C.O . 5984 , p.IS8. 
4 See supra, p . 114 . 
5 Cory , G.E., op.ctt ., Vn l . III, p.376. 
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augment their food supply. As these were periods when the demand 
for labour within the colony was slack, this did not improve the 
situation. Alternatively, when the seasons were good, and there was 
a strong demand for labour within the colony, the Xhosa and Mfengu 
had less incentive to enter into employment. This situation 
continued down to 1845. 
It is clear that the frontier agricultural community progre ~sed 
rapidly in the period between 1835 and 1845. The wealth of this 
community came to rest increa·singly on the income derived from 
woolled sheep-farming , but this is not to suggest that the other 
branches of agriculture necessarily languished. It was rather that 
they were now eclipsed by the new dominance of wool. The progress 
of this community rested also on the amount of labour which was 
forthcoming. If this was sometimes erratiC, there would, neverthe-
less, seem to have been sufficient available not to hamper the 
progress of this farming community. 
This then was the situation which existed on the eve of the 
outbreak of the Seventh Frontier war in 1846. As a community, the 
frontier farmers were now familiar with both the Xhosa 'threat' 
across the Fish River, and with their agricultural surroundings. 
This war was not to take them bY surpr ise, as had been the case 
with the previous war, and its effects were considered as being less 
serious . 
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APPENDIX I 
LISTS OF KAFFIR DEPREDATI ONS 1810-1834 
Year cattle Horses Sheep 
1810 1,950 43 55 
1811 2,468 39 
1812 302 18 
1813 1,008 128 3 
1814 763 15 2 
1815 800 83 
1816 729 18 
1817 844 108 
1818 1,004 21 
1819 12,412 178 2 ,059 
1820 476 7 
1821 294 4 
1822 2,537 54 
1823 2,044 92 
1824 2,009 20 
1825 1,525 62 
1826 1,276 85 406 
1827 2,126 76 
1 828 752 51 41 
1829 7,021 273 62 
1830 2,259 61 
1831 980 50 
1832 493 111 
1833 1,095 120 
1834 7,037 147 
--- ---
Total Stolen 54,204 1,864 2,682 
Recovered 15,737 ~ 
38,467 1,270 2,682 
(Source: Graham's Town Journal, August 30, 1838 . ) 
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APPENDIX II 
WOOL EXPORTS FROM THE CAPE BETWEEN 1833 ~~ 1846 
Weight in 
Millions Ibs. 
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, 
, 
1850 
Exports via Port Elizabeth 
Exports via cape Town 
Cal2e Town Port Elizabeth Total 
73,324 Ibs. 39,753 Ibs. 113,077 
89,062 54,831 143,893 
136,020 79,848 215,868 
256,629 116,574 373 , 203 
227,833 123,991 351,824 
286 , 246 201,508 490,754 
377 , 639 208,338 585,977 
509,579 401,521 911,118 
536,979 479,828 1,016,807 
616 , 807 811,986 1,128, ·/93 
534 , 377 1,220,380 1,754,737 
936,269 1,297 ,677 2,233,946 
l,109,5!i4 2,085,064 3,194,602 
1,082,191 2,188,637 3 ,271,158 
(Source: Cal2e of Good HOl2e Almanac, 1855. ) 
Ibs. 
Pence 
Muid 
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APPENDIX III 
MARKET PRICE FOR WHEATEN MEAL SOLD ON THE 
GRAHAMSTOWN MARKET IN THE PERIOD IB33 TO 1846 
per 
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APPENDIX IV 
MARKET . PRICE FOR BUTTER SOLD ON THE GRAHAMSTOWN 
MARKET IN 'rHE PERIOD 1833 to 1846 
per 
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APPENDIX V 
MARKET PRICE FOR POTATOES SOLD ON THE GRAHAMSTOWN 
MARKET IN THE PERIOD 1833 to 1846 
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~P.ENDIX VI 
MARKET PRICE FOR OAT HAY SOLD ON THE GRAHAMSTOWN 
I>!ARKET IN THE PERIOD 1833 to 1846 
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APPENDIX VII 
CATTLE NUMBERS IN THE FRONTIER DISTRICTS 
IN THE PERIOD 1836 to 1846 
Graaff 
Year Albany Somerset Uitenhage Beinet Cradock Colesberg 
1836 40,957 44 , 735 
1837 14,000 40,957 11,648 27,977 33,940 
1838 21,379 10,500 24,939 31,161 26,435 
1839 25,000 22,500 10,500 25,000 31,017 48,801 
1840 25,151 10,500 25,277 39 ,000 64 ,206 
1841 41 , 901 10,500 28,500 39 , 500 69 ,314 
1842 46,429 42,270 10, 500 38,109 40,000 82,946 
1843 50,520 38,973 16,500 37,627 41 , 950 73,827 
1844 54,574 37,254 16,650 40,000 42 ,000 80,523 
1845 58,550 39 , 419 16,650 33,092 42,500 85,684 
1846 18,155 30,625 25,413 24,417 65 , 266 
(Source : Imperial Blue Books on South Africa, C.0. 5978 to C.0 . 5988.) 
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